Modern insurgency is increasingly a race to amplification land -- the place where small attacks generate big results. The alternative is a local effort that is systematically dismembered while the reach of efforts/attacks become increasingly narrow/limited.
Historically, the approach most insurgent groups use is blood and guts terrorism or engagement with military forces, as we are seeing in Pakistan now. However, that approach suffers from diminishing returns and ultimately doesn't produce the level of amplification necessary to achieve meaningful results (on average). It also doesn't leverage the critical difference between this century and the last: we are all interconnected.
A better approach, and one that is gaining acceptance over time (changes in warfare take time, but when they ultimately take hold, watch out), is to extend the insurgency through the use of networks (infrastructure and social networks). This approach is cheap, effective, and safe (few casualties). It's also unlikely to generate direct backlash via public anger or renewed nationalism.
A network approach uses the dynamics of the networks that underly modern life, a critical requirement for modern mega-cities (as we see in Pakistan), to manufacture discontent. It does this by precise targeting of network hubs and interconnections (critical nodes in scale free networks), which when damaged create cascades of failure. These nodes, or systempunkts (very similar, but different than the schwerpunkts of maneuver warfare), are plentiful and self-regenerating. They never run out.
Insurgent campaigns that systematically break these networks, from electricity to oil to food to water, are able to
- terminate the ability of nation-states to deliver political goods (which is critical for legitimacy)
- force civilians to form groups that deliver core services (from criminal to militia -- non-cooperative, from the perspective of the nation-state, centers of gravity)
- create opportunities for enrichment, shortages/smuggling opportunities that fund ongoing activities
- damage the nation-state and its allied businesses in the global marketplace (which generates a slap of Adam Smith's invisible hand)
- bleed the nation-state, since defense against these attacks are very expensive for the nation-state (very similar to the problem the Turks faced with Lawrence's campaign) -- it also depletes forces that could be used to extend into insurgent autonomous zones widespread
- easily extend the insurgency to encompass the entire country and/or region, well beyond the borders or insurgent zone has
- keep barriers to entry low, which is important for open source insurgency -- emergent groups and individuals can participate without support, training, or coordination
- .....
Once a move to amplification land is made, the results can be dramatic. If applied to the Taliban's insurgency in Pakistan, it would likely result in a rapid failure of its megacities -- replete with population displacement, militia/criminal group formation, protest, civil unrest, national bankruptcy, and much more. With the arrival of these innovations, recent attempts at revising the last century's counter-insurgency doctrine (ala CNAS), would be fall on rough ground.
Let's hope that our opponents aren't learning, but I wouldn't bet on that.
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