JOURNAL: The Mumbai Model of Urban Takedowns

John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus has a new article on the rise of urban takedowns. He points out, correctly, that these takedowns are more effective than ever on a tactical level: 

The urban attacks of the 1990s and the early 2000s, however, are qualitatively different. Destructive power has increased due to better operational sequencing of paramilitary attacks, car bombs, and suicide bombers. Multiple elements can operate in time, utilizing better C2 nodes than before. Hostage takers have developed better fortification, surveillance, and perimeter defense skills. 

In short: the breadth (number of sites/zones attacked), speed, and duration of urban assaults are increasing.  However, even with these upgrades, the improvement in the productivity of urban assaults is, at best, only slightly better than linear.  Why?  The costs and the training required to accomplish these attacks, once factored in, are still extensive (made even less effective by the loss of the attackers in the assault).  

In contrast, urban takedowns using systems disruption that use the global guerrillas model (like the Bandh), reduces training/costs to negligible levels while increasing the breadth of the shutdown.  In addition, very few of the attackers are ever caught in this type of attack, which allows repeated use of learned skills and easier recruitment.  Repetition of method and movement expansion are many multiples higher as a result.  In other words: an exponential improvement.

Comments

[A.E.]

Hi John,

Thanks for the link! I agree with your point about the relative inefficiency of these assaults. However, the primary goal, as with all terrorism, is symbolic targeting. Even at that, I suppose, it fails for cost-efficiency because the effect is often increasing public support for government crackdown.

Also, John P. Sullivan is my co-author. Could you please put his name up too? Thanks!

[A.E.]

Also see our original Mumbai piece, where we cite your City Journal piece and the elaboration of the systems disruption model: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/02/postcard-from-mumbai/

[Brother Mark]

Seriously John, when will they figure out the value of an ultrcapacitor attached to a simple hand-held microwave gun? I can think of so many idiots I want to see vaporized.

[Brother Mark]

I should admit that I am trolling for John's opinion on technology. The scary technology.

[Chris]

John,
I had a similar discussion about the tactical ineffectiveness of the Mumbai attacks.
I compared them the the VT killings.
In Mumbai:
10 shooters, virtually unlimited ammo, grenades, rifles not pistols and three days= 141 kills
VT:
1 shooter, limited ammo, handguns only (including a 22) and two hours=29 kills.

I have to think the planners of the Mumbai attacks have to be disappointed with the body count. I guarantee the planners were thinking for the investment they made the number would be 500-1000+.

I realize not necessarily your sphere, but why do you think they were so tactically ineffective?

[Darren]

Chris

I don't think "kills" is the point. I suspect the idea was to shutdown a major financial hub for three days, force the Indian government into greater authoritarianism and invigorate sympathizers in the Muslim world.

Hence John's point about systems disruption. The best urban takedown would produce zero casualties.

What would happen if some sort of anti-industrial action group were to adopt these methods to save Gaia?