Global Guerrillas

THE CONTROLLED CHAOS EXIT FROM IRAQ

The United States is losing the moral conflict with Iraq's guerrillas. The US President's support among Americans has dropped to the lowest levels since Richard Nixon and opposition groups are becoming more strident and popular. Opposition calls for a rapid withdrawal from Iraq are now supported by a near majority of Americans. The development of these non-cooperative centers of gravity is due to the propagation of the following factors of moral conflict:

• Uncertainty. Can we leave in five years or next year? Is the Iraqi government worth fighting for? Will Iraqi troops ever be good enough to fight on their own? Is the insurgency growing or collapsing?
• Menace. Will US troops continue to die at the current high rate? Will the conflict devolve into a civil war with US troops caught in the middle? Will the conflict spread?
• Mistrust. Did Bush lie about the reasons for going to war? Are the Democrats playing politics with the war? Is the opposition treasonous?

Isolation Drives Vulnerability to Moral Conflict
The decline in US moral cohesion is a natural consequence of the isolation of US decision makers from the external reference environment. Instead of making connections, we severed them (for a complete analysis of why this occurred, read my earlier brief on "Boyd on al Qaeda's Grand Strategy"). This isolation (across mental, physical, and moral vectors) drove:

• Bad decision making. The willingness to accept flawed intelligence on Iraq's WMD capabilities. The failure to stop the looting after the invasion. The decision to disband the Iraqi military. The failure to send enough troops.
• Ad hoc planning and strategy development. The lack of a plan to win the peace in the Iraq. The plethora of different military plans since then: build Sunni militias (Fallujah), stability for elections and a political solutions, aggressive counter-insurgent sweeps, clear-and-hold (oil-spots), etc.
• False or corrupt internal dialogues. An internal: Are you with us or against us? Democracy throughout the Middle East was the real goal of the US invasion. This is another Vietnam.

The Controlled Chaos Exit
The end result of this break-down in moral cohesion will be the following:

• A withdrawal within the next three years. The inevitable result of a collapse in US moral cohesion is a quick withdrawal. The pressure to leave will only increase.
• A reliance on "loyalist" paramilitaries. Despite the claims that Iraqi troops are capable of independent action, they aren't. While some few may be able to lead an engagement, they don't have any of the support systems necessary to sustain an army in the field (from medical to supply to air power). This support capability won't emerge before we leave since it takes many years to develop. This means that we will rely on Shiite and Kurdish paramilitaries to enforce the peace (we got a taste of what that means when the US raided the Badr Brigade's/Interior Ministry's torture chambers in November).
• The collapse of the Iraqi state and the spread of the conflict. The withdrawal of US forces will cause the Iraqi state to split. The Kurds will be the first to leave. An independent Kurdish state will inflame regional tensions through the activation of guerrilla groups in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. A slow burning war between Shiites and Sunnis will draw in regional powers and cause substantial instability in the Gulf Monarchies with large Shia populations. Finally, as Iraq's global guerrillas return home from the Iraqi training grounds, they will bring disruption with them.

SIZING THE IRAQI INSURGENCY

Here is my new estimate on the size of the Iraqi insurgency. It is available as a PDF download: How Big is the Iraqi Insurgency.pdf. I will likely convert it to a Web view at a later date.

VAN CREVELD'S PREDICTION

Iraq’s insurgency is made up of dozens of different groups, each with their own motivation for fighting. Under this big tent, no one group is dominant. Even the foreign Jihadis under Zarqawi are but a single digit percentage of the total insurgency. Despite this fragmentation, the insurgency appears to act as a single entity: it probes for weakness, improves its methods, and mounts campaigns. The major reason for this is that Iraq, unlike most of the places we have fought insurgencies, is a relatively modern urbanized environment. It has a cell phone grid, a modern highway system, and Internet connectivity. People have the ability to both communicate and travel quickly throughout the entire country. This high level of connectivity makes possible for the insurgency to combine and recombine into new organizational networks that are similar to what we only see in advanced western settings.

LONG TAIL COUNTER-INSURGENCY

The complexity of the threat posed by open source warfare in Iraq has accelerated the US military's use of outsourcing. The growing trend towards outsourcing military operations has created a new variant on the term, "a long tail." Traditionally, this term has been used to describe the number of support personnel (the tail) required to support combat troops (the tooth). Tooth-to-tail ratios have grown over the years as the complexity and resource intensity of modern combat has increased. In essence, modern warfare requires a loooong tail of support troops. The US military's tooth-to-tail ratio is approximately 1 to 10 (or more).

The modern variant of the "long tail" can be seen in the force structure of the US counter-insurgency effort in Iraq. This new tail is composed of 120,000 personnel in hundreds of large and small companies that provide everything from traditional support functions to reconstruction to security in Iraq. To be even more accurate, you could also throw in the tens of thousands of Shiite, Kurdish, and tribal militias that US troops rely upon.

If we plot the number of personnel by the source, the resulting curve has the classic long tail distribution pattern. The curve starts with the US military and rapidly drops off as additional groups are added. At the far right hand side of the curve are a plethora of small private military companies, tribal groups, and engineering companies that provide security and reconstruction services.

The good thing about the long tail approach to warfare in Iraq is that it provides a demand driven mechanism for dealing with a rapidly evolving threat. For example, the US State Department can hire private bodyguards from Triple Canopy to defend themselves against assassination and kidnapping (this means that they are not reliant on a bureaucratic US military for protection services and can therefore tailor their purchases to their specific needs). The bad part is that the US military hasn't come to grips with this new way of conducting war. It doesn't provide the platform services necessary to make it work efficiently (exactly what those platform services are will be detailed in my upcoming book).

Unfortunately, the lack of a platform, particularly in the form of legal cover for deployed PMCs, is about to unravel this distribution. The Iraqi government has started to regulate private military companies working in the country. Since the rules governing these personnel are still largely undefined, this regulatory effort will likely result in a distortion of the US military's counter-insurgency market due to rampant corruption and mismanagement by Iraqi authorities.

OPEN SOURCE WARFARE IN LONDON

The hunt for the perpetrators of the London attack is in full swing. The forensic evidence will be collected (including CCTV footage and Internet traffic), sifted, and analyzed over the next couple of weeks to identify the culprits and their origin. Unfortunately, what we may find is that this group had few, if any, direct ties to known al Qaeda entities. In fact, it is likely to be an operation accomplished completely by terrorist entrepreneurs that are using it to gain entry (through contribution) into al Qaeda.

INSIDE THE FALLUJAH TAZ

New data (4.3 Mb PowerPoint) from the US military on global guerrilla operations in Fallujah provides fresh detail on how the bazaar of violence in Iraq operates.  Here's what the US forces found:

• 11 improvised explosive device (IED) "factories."
• 653 unexploded IEDs.
• 203 weapons caches (graphic of the amounts of large munitions found).
• 3 hostage holding areas.

The data (and the map) indicates a very dispersed operation in Fallujah.  One explanation for this is that US airstrikes on guerrilla facilities in the city forced decentralization.  However, a more likely explanation given the available data on how the city was run indicates that the insurgency in Fallujah TAZ was a highly decentralized organization at the outset -- the dispersion of the facilities merely reflects this organizational style.  For example: each group likely had their own caches of weapons and/or a factory.

One final note on the centrality (or more precisely, the lack of centrality) of Fallujah.  The data shows that very few IEDs and IED materials were found (less than a month at the current run rate).  Obviously, many of the devices were removed prior to the assault for use in the multi-city counter-assaults that occurred.  However, even if we assume that each IED "factory start-up" produced a device every day (a generous assumption), the total production rate would be less than 1/4 of the current usage rate of 772 IEDs a month (half of the production ended up in inventory or were rejects/duds). 

IRAQ'S SECURITY SYSTEM MELTDOWN

The most important result of the reduction of the Fallujah TAZ was the decimation of Iraq's security.  From all perspectives, the global guerrilla campaign against the Iraqi security system has been an unqualified success. Here's how it rolled out:

• Pre-action preparation.  Hundreds of attacks, including high profile mass assasinations, have shaken the Iraqi security system to its core.  The net result:  50% attrition within Iraqi national guard groups.
• Test Failure.  In a crucial test of the battle readiness of Iraqi unit, they failed.  In the 24 hours prior to the attack on Fallujah, 100 of the remaining 425 men in Iraq's best-trained battalion, normally 850 men, headed for the hills.  The only troops that remained were reconstituted Kurdish pershmerga.
• Coup de grace.  Since then, attacks on Iraqi forces (mostly against the police, given the national guard has been gutted) have escalated across Sunni Iraq.  For example, attacks on multiple police stations in Mosul resulted in the scattering of ~5,000 policemen.  The commander was fired and there are reports of policemen switching sides.  This was repeated across Sunni Iraq.  Total policemen on-hand in Iraq dropped from 84,900 to 43,900 between August and October.

A Systemic Failure

Iraq's security system is currently in free-fall.  All the major elements underlying its potential for success have crumpled under pressure from global guerrillas (the total numbers of troops on hand have actually decreased since January 2004 -- see chart):

• A crisis in the state's legitimacy.  The interim Iraqi government, due to ongoing attacks on infrastructure, has been unable to deliver the basic services required to legitimatize the government.  Iraq is in failure and economic collapse.  The net result is that the state is required to rely on market factors to build its security system.
• Market failure.  The all-volunteer security model initially worked due to widespread unemployment (estimates are as high as 75%).  However, ongoing attacks have distorted the the employment equation.  A high probability of death or dismemberment is now part of the job description for positions in the police and national guard.  These troops stayed in place as long as things went well.  They have since proven they will melt away at the first sign of danger.  This market failure has thrown the Iraqi government back onto ethnic loyalties.
• Loyalist paramilitaries.  To fill the ranks, the Iraqi system attempted to build on the loyalty of Shiite and Kurdish fighters.  However, lukewarm support for the interim government by Shiites (at least until the elections) and the promise of tough fighting has left only the Kurds (reconstituted peshmerga) in the ranks. 

Globalization in Free Fall

The systemic failure of Iraqi security, creates the following situation:

• Ethinic passions on the rise.  The use of Kurdish fighters in both Fallujah and Mosul has exacerbated the insurgency. 
• The US in the hot seat.  Left with the security burden, the US is in a tough position.  Its firepower intensive tactics (force protection 2GW methods) are causing more damage to the Iraqi government's legitimacy than it provides.  Further, we also don't have the troops in country to even approximate what is needed to provide a modicum of basic security.
• Complete system failure.  This has set the stage for ongoing attacks by innovative guerrilla entrepreneurs on all other aspects of globalization in Iraq (people, resources, and investment).  The economy will remain in failure, as will the state.

TARGET: THE FALLUJAH TAZ

Fallujah is a TAZ.  A temporary autonomous zone that is being used by global guerrillas for regional operations.  It isn't a central hub of the insurgency, because there isn't any central hub.  The insurgency is a decentralized entity composed of many small networks that coordinate their activities through the open source bazaar.  A good definition of Fallujah (and other locations like south Wazirastan) is that it is:

• A lawless zone
• that is locally controlled and
• fiercely independent.

What a TAZ provides

A TAZ is not a major source of funding, manpower, or supply for the insurgency.  It doesn't power the insurgency at a root level.  It is merely a geographic zone that is free of state control -- an organic byproduct of a failed or weak state.  Global guerrillas find sanctuary in a TAZ because they fight the same enemy.  The state.  A TAZ provides:

• Basic shelter (housing, etc. that can be bought).
• Freedom of movement (it is a no-go zone for forces of the state).
• Open commerce (interconnections with other groups, trading, etc.)

Collapsing the TAZ

The current operation to take Fallujah pits US Marines (and their reconstituted Peshmerga and Badr Brigade allies) against local boys, organized by neighborhood, mosque, family, or tribe.  Most of the global guerrillas previously operating in the city are already gone.  However, some will stay for the fight (as payment for the support provided and/or due to a strong affection for the city's people).  The net result will be:

• A good fight.  The city is being defended by people that are fighting for their homes.  This isn't Najaf (which is often cited as the model for Fallujah), where the militia was bused in.  Think Grozny lite (to the limited extent that traditional Arab warfare can translate to siege warfare).
• Little damage to the insurgency.  Most of the people and equipment we want to kill or capture is already gone.  The US/Iraqi government telegraphed their desire to retake the city months ago.  Further, many other locations are available (the US does not have enough troops in country to make a full court press on every TAZ in Iraq).
• A moral loss.  The first target seized by the US military was Fallujah's hospital.  The reason:  to limit information (or disinformation) on the number of casualties generated by the firepower heavy Marine assault.  Despite this action, the media will deliver the moral message.  A weak force of local "freedom fighters" has been crushed by a powerful US military.  As a result, we will likelly see a Sunni boycott of the elections.

TERRORISM AS A TECHNIQUE

Terrorism is a technique of warfare grounded on the theories of fourth generation warfare and Boyd's framework of pscyhological conflict. As a technique of war, it is blunt weapon that directly assaults the enemy's society and the minds of its decision makers by killing its citizens. The wanton and random nature of the technique provides much of its strength and its weakness. Further, the method is limited to three vectors by which its effectiveness can be improved. These include:

• Scale improvements. Bigger attacks, better results.
  
• Symbol selection. The more dear the symbol atttacked, the greater the impact.
  
• Extended reach. The deeper inside a society's comfort zone a strike is made, the better the results.

Terrorism hits the wall
Al Qaeda adopted terrorism as its method of warfare when it first began operations. It improved the effectiveness of its strikes by pushing along the vectors outlined above. The end result of this effort was the attack on 9/11. That attack was the apex of conventional terrorism, only nuclear terrorism could exceed it. Without a nuclear alternative, terrorism is declining as a technique. There is reason to believe, based on strategic and theoretical analysis, that nuclear terrorism isn't likely to arrive in any relevant time period. If al Qaeda did have a nuke, it would have used it in that attack rather than method it chose. Additionally, the current emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation makes it very difficult to obtain one. Left without this alternative, terrorism is in decline due to the following (all of which are acutely felt by al Qaeda and affiliated groups):

• Diminished returns. People become inured to terrorism the more it is used.
  
• The comparision to 9/11. All attacks, when held up in comparison to 9/11, pale.
  
• Indecisive results. While 9/11 was able to gain a victory within Boyd's framework, it was unable to gain a decisive result that achieved the stated goals of al Qaeda. As a result of this perceived failure, al Qaeda intentionally opted for a rural insurgency in Afghanistan (that never materialized due to the emergence of a stable, decentralized, narco state alternative).

Post Terrorism Conflict
As a result of these factors, terrorism is in deep decline as a method of warfare. It won't disappear, particularly given its historical momentum and the fragmentation of the opposition's effort. However, it is in the process of being replaced by a more effective alternative mainly through a highly decentralized and innovative process of development in Iraq that has stripped al Qaeda of its control of the movement (despite its attempt to integrate Zaraqawi into its command and funding system). Within that conflict, global guerrilla warfare is on the rise. This method of warfare differs from from terrorism and classic guerrilla warfare because it attacks systems as a means of decisively undermining the psychology of its opponents. Its elements include:

• Infrastructure sabotage.
  
• Market disruption.
  
• State failure and deligitimization.

Epilogue
To the global guerrillas in Iraq, it may appear that they are participating in classic terrorism or guerrilla warfare since this new method of warfare draws on a similar tactical approach. However, the results of their efforts point in another direction. Almost all of the attacks in Iraq can be aggregated into categories of system attack that lay waste to the processes of globalization and state power. In contrast to terrorism, global guerrilla warfare is a greenfield technique -- in that it never suffers diminishing reutrns (I will post more on this later). It also converts the inevitable civilian casualties that often over time detract from terror's effectiveness into a more acceptable "collatoral damage" -- people that are killed while near valid targets (this is another lesson learned from the US military). The net result is an effort that is likely going to be decisive within Boyd's framework. It will win the war in Iraq (unless there is immediate action to counter it). It will also be a method of warfare that will be exported around the world.

LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES

Iraqi uniformed forces are being rapidly trained to fight the growing insurgency in the country. This effort is showing signs of failure. These include:

• A lack of government legitimacy. The Iraqi government appears to be a puppet of the US (for lack of a better term). It has also been unable to deliver basic services (for example: electricity and street level security) to the Iraqi people that are at the core of claims to legitmacy. Soldiers won't fight for an illegitimate government regardless of how well trained they are.
  
• A successful campaign of FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) by the guerrillas. Constant attacks against Iraqi forces (over 700 deaths this year) has driven up turnover (as high as 40% in some areas), adversely impacted recruiting, and forced Iraqi forces into a protective posture.
  
• Infiltration. Evidence is mounting that the low level of due diligence in the recruitment of Iraqi forces has resulted in force riven with insurgent sympathisers.

The Latin American Solution
The secret sauce of US counter-insurgency efforts in the post-Vietnam era are loosely controlled loyalist paramilitaries. This policy option is now very likely under consideration given the recent appointment of John Dimitri Negroponte as the Ambassador to Iraq. Negroponte was the Ambassador of Honduras during the establishment of the Contras and other Central American paramilitaries. These units enjoy multiple advantages over uniformed forces including:

• Legitimacy and loyalty. Unlike the uniformed Iraqi forces, militias draw on tribal, ethnic, and religious loyalties. Close knit units can be formed on the basis on long-standing relationships. This increases their ability to fight.
  
• Rapid ramp-up. These militias require little formal training. They can quickly leverage existing relationships and lines of loyalty to build units.
  
• Effectiveness. Decentralized militias have a record of effectiveness. They innovate rapidly and can draw on the same sources of strength available to global guerrillas.

Unleashing the Genie
The establishment of a counter-bazaar of loyalist paramilitaries in Iraq would quickly put the insurgency on the defensive. Over the next year, their establishment would likely result in a level of "controlled chaos" sufficient to allow the US to withdraw its forces. Additionally, these militias could operate while the government maintains a fig leaf of democracy. However, there are some negative consequences we can expect if this option is selected. These include:

• Institutionalized corruption. These militias would likely involve themselves in illegal activities. A government abetted franchise for their counter-insurgency activities would require inaction in regards to their criminal actions.
  
• Human rights abuses. These militias will operate within the same rule set used by the guerrillas they are fighting. This means assassinations, hostage taking, etc.
  
• Long term instability. While the militias will be able to put a lid on the growth of the insurgency, they will likely be unable to eradicate it. This means that Iraq will be stable enough for the US to leave but will suffer long-term instability.

NOTE: This is not an endorsement of this option, it is merely a exploration of what is possible.