Global Guerrillas

URBAN TAKEDOWNS: TO WHAT END

Within the context of 21st Century warfare -- filled with crime-fueled, systems disrupting sons of global fragmentation taking on the nation-state -- cities are no longer bastions of defense as they were in 20th Century maneuver warfare. The question now becomes, why and for what end? The answer to why, as is often the case when dealing with global guerrillas, is as varied as the primary loyalties -- from religion to criminal to political -- that bind these groups together. So, the best starting point for analysis is to work backwards, from what it is possible to achieve rather than forward from motive. Here's the major categories of objectives possible to achieve using an urban takedown:

• Nation-state over reaction. Essentially, bait the nation-state and its people into reactions that will embroil them in external and internal conflict. From the "superpower baiting" of al Qaeda to the Mumbai attack's focus on new tensions between India/Pakistan (ditching reconciliation and moving back to open hostility) and the election of hard right governments (a win for the BJP, the Hindu Nationalist Party, in India's upcoming elections would be a sign of success).
  
• Economic failure. To force a city to decline from a high level of economic equilibrium to a lower one (decline tend to jump between levels as opposed to gradual declines). This is done by exacting a terrorism "tax" on economic activity. See the US Fed's report on how this works. Many of the urban assaults we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003-07 achieved this goal. The late 2008 protests at Thai airports also achieved this, but on a country-wide scale.
  
• Coercion. Simply, a small group takes down an urban area to force a state to leave them alone (to allow them to continue operations without interference). The Brazilian takedowns of Sao Paolo and Rio are good examples of this. The violence in Tijuana Mexico is another.
  

NOTE: please read my article for the City Journal from last year, "The Coming Urban Terror" for more detail on urban takedowns. I was going to write a follow up for them on "Fear Management" as it applies to urban takedowns earlier this year, but didn't get it fully done. I should probably revisit it since it really brings the thinking on the Mumbai assault and inevitable future attacks of this type to a new level.

URBAN TAKEDOWN: MUMBAI

The late November commando attack on Mumbai India is a great demonstration of the state of the art in "urban takedowns." Essentially, an urban takedown is an attempt by a small group of attackers to overwhelm a city and force it into a prolonged shutdown (see the site, Naxalite Rage for an excellent exploration of the incident). The attack consisted of:

• A nautical assault (coup de main). Several boats. laden with explosives and commandos armed to the teeth, gained entry to the city via the port. This allowed maximal entry velocity into the city's center. However, a rapid response by the Indian naval units in the area closed off the water as an escape route.
  
• Swarm of the city using autonomous "buddy pairs." Each pair had their own routes, minimizing the potential for fratricide. While the initial dispersion of the group was concentrated, the deployment was the opposite (this is an inversion of the formula for animal pack hunters and U-boat swarming). The pair teams shot/blew up targets en route to maximize confusion/fear.
  
• Use of the city's infrastructure for movement and coordination. The city's transportation infrastructure was leveraged, travel by roads and the acquisition of vehicles. Cell phone communication for coordination (not confirmed yet)?
  
• Hostage drama at international hotels. Some of the buddy pairs were able to assault international hotels, which allowed them to focus on killing foreigners. These assaults became prolonged hostage dramas when the government's forces arrived.

THE SWITCH

Traditional guerrilla movements and insurgencies were founded on strict ideologies or political agendas. As a result, their organizations tended towards hierarchy and strong central control. However, the advent of a dominant global market (that no organization, despite claims to the contrary, controls) and the subsequent and inevitable weakening of the nation-state changed that. It substituted market values for ideological or political values and insurgencies are quickly changing to reflect that. For example:

• A group is only successful, long term, if it can consistently generate wealth (as in: enjoy economic success).
  
• Dynamism, resilience, and flexibility are prized over size, rigidness, and purity.
  
• Alliances, cooperation, and interconnectedness is better than "go it alone" or rabidly competitive approaches.

The Impact on Organizations
This "switch" also means that control of the nation-state became is nearly useless in an environment where success was only generated by competition within a global market system at a local level. As a result, modern or 21st Century guerrilla movements/insurgencies increasingly don't put ideology or politics first (although there are some high profile hold-outs, reversals such as al Qaeda suffered in Iraq demonstrate that an inability to invert goals is the path to failure). Increasingly, they put economics first, or more specifically: they focus on the ability of the group and its members to generate wealth. They do this through the integration of their military capability with production centers and supply routes that power the multi-trillion dollar flows of Black Globalization. This connection provides them with the ability to:

• Grow Support. Become competitive with the state in an ability to generate wealth (and everything that economic advantage implies: from services to security) for supporters. This is a competition for legitimacy and nation-state are increasingly losing that competition.
  
• Grow Operations. Grow operations through the development of business operations that enable ever greater wealth. Contrast this to the spiraling deficits and (soon) cuts in security budgets at the nation-state level.
  
• Gain Efficiency and Productivity. Financial success enables these groups to efficiently expand operations through dynamic market operations that enable the rapid purchase of everything from assassinations to IED attacks. This not only vastly expands the pool of participants, it enables specialization and rapid innovation.

It should be apparent that "the switch" to economic agendas in combination with decentralized organizational structures makes modern guerrillas much more dangerous than ever in history. While 9/11 demonstrated the growing leverage (in an ability to do harm) of small groups and Iraq/Afghanistan the power of doggedness of decentralized organizations, this depression will demonstrate the strength of economically driven operations. Barring a major and unforeseen redux in how nation-states operate, we might see the world look like Swiss cheese by early in the next decade: as in, most nation-states riddled with ungoverned spaces/holes in their territory, lost to insurgent groups.

OPEN SOURCE WARFARE: Cyberwar

In less than an hour, I had become an Internet soldier. I didn't receive any calls from Kremlin operatives; nor did I have to buy a Web server or modify my computer in any significant way.
Evgeny Morozov, Slate, An Army of Ones and Zeroes
How I became a soldier in the Georgia-Russia Cyberwar.

Cyberwarfare is a form of open source warfare (see Brave New War for a deep exploration of open source warfare) over the Internet fought by groups civilians for reasons of nationalism, revenge, and (worst of all) fun. It's messy, chaotic, and nearly impossible to control. The benefits of an open source cyberwar include:

• Deniability. Offensive operations by government computers/personnel against a target nation is an act of war. Actions by civilian vigilantes is not and can be disowned. An inability to point to a an offending organization can make blame difficult to affix: note the speed at which the US tech press was willing to deny a Russian cyberwar against Estonia.
  
• A huge talent pool. Rather than spend money on training a limited number of uniformed personnel (likely poorly), it's possible to draw on a talent pool of hundreds of thousands of participants (from hackers to IT professionals to cybercriminals). Given the rapid decay/turnover in skills, high rates of innovation, high compensation, and the value of real-world expertise, the best people for cyberwarfare don't work (nor will they ever) in the government. The best you can do is rent/entice them for a while.
  
• Access to the best Resources/Weaponry. The best tools for cyberwarfare are developed in the cybercriminal community. They have vast and rapidly growing capabilities: a plethora of botnets, worms, compromised computers within target networks, identity information, etc. Further, these capabilities are cheap to rent.

The Problem
Unfortunately, in the US, there is nothing but confusion over cyberwarfare. The news that the Pentagon will not create a new USAF new Cyber Command added to a recent failed attempt by the US military to define what 'cyber deterrence' means and it becomes evident that the entire concept of 'cyberwar' is yielding little but confusion. Unfortunately, it appears little relief is in sight.

In contrast to failed US efforts, both China and Russia have adopted the OSW approach to cyberwarfare. How did they do it? Simply:

• Engage, co-opt, and protect cybercriminals. Essentially, use this influence to deter domestic commercial attacks and encourage an external focus. This keeps the skills sharp and the powder dry.
  
• Seed the movement. Once the decision to launch a cyberattack is made, start it off right. Purchase botnets covertly from criminal networks to launch attacks, feed 'patriotic' blogs to incite attacks and list targets, etc.
  
• Get out of the way. Don't interfere. Don't prosecute participants. Take notes.

JOURNAL: Governance of the Wilderness

During the recent mass arrests of "insurgents" in Saudi Arabia, a new book by Sheik Abu-Bakar al Naji (al Qaeda's lead warfare theorist), Governance of the Wilderness (Edarat al-Wahsh), was found in safe houses. It appears, both to me and the many readers that sent me news of this, that al Qaeda's theory is edging ever closer to Global Guerrilla thinking (the optimal approach for small group warfare/global insurgency). Amir Taheri has an excellent review of the book at the Post. Salient points include:

• System disruption. "countless small operations" that "target oilfields, sea and airports, tourist facilities and especially banking and financial services" to weaken the state and create a "wilderness."
  
• Temporary autonomous zones and primary loyalties "Islamists in the 'wilderness' must create parallel societies alongside existing ones."
  
• Avoid control of a state don't "set up formal governments, which would be subject to economic pressure or military attack."
  

GLOBAL OIL PRODUCTION UNDER SIEGE

Systems disruption, made effective superempowerment, has now gained control of pricing on global energy markets. Returns on investment (ROIs) for attacks are now routinely counted in billions. This is particularly evident as MEND's open source war against the government and its corporate partners (Shell, Chevron, etc.) speeds up. In one week, they have taken out over 400,000 barrels a day of oil (This represents a half of one percent of total global production. It is also a substantially larger percentage of light crude, which has a larger impact on prices):

• Shell's off-shore Bonga Platform. 225,000 barrels a day disrupted. Guerrillas in speedboats towing dugout canoes attacked a platform 75 miles offshore (likely guided there by hand held GPS navigation). Jeff Vail has some good analysis of the attack.
  
• A gang attack on Chevron's pipeline near Escravos Nigeria. 100,000 barrels a day disrupted.
  
• An attack on the Escravos facility itself. An additional 100,000 barrels a day of production.
  

Again, this demonstrates (particularly the offshore attack) rapid cycles of improvement while maintaining strategic focus -- the result of decentralized tinkering/innovation by the many groups participating in the effort under the same plausible promise. The large number of groups involved in MEND also makes it nearly impervious to government counters. In the larger context, these attacks put at risk one of the world's foremost sources of new production -- which was slated to bring 1.25 m more barrels a day of offshore production online in the next couple of years, all of which is now at risk. So, instead of 2.5 m barrels a day climbing to 4 m barrels a day, production has dropped to ~1.3 m barrels a day (and is continuing to fall).

NOTE: Disruption isn't limited to Nigeria. A remote control bomb by the FARC on Occidental Petroleum's pipeline in Colombia just knocked out 100,000 barrels a day. It's also interesting to note how irrelevant the US military/national security system has become in regards to global energy security. The entire paradigm of warfare has changed but the $1 Trillion behemoth has barely budged.

JOURNAL: More on the Shadow OPEC

I have a guest post up on "The Oil Drum" (an excellent "out of the box" site on energy topics) on how global guerrillas can use disruption to set global oil prices. Have fun.

NOTE: On cue with this brief, a MEND attack on a Nigerian offshore facility (Shell's flagship project, Bongo, 75 miles offshore) took out 200,000 barrels a day of production yesterday. About ~9% of potential production and ~14% of existing production in one event. Didn't get the computer control room though (probably forgot the thermite). This is also likely light sweet oil production and it is at a level that is more than enough to offset the planned Saudi increase in heavy oil production (although not the Chinese price hike).

NOTE 2: More disruption in Nigeria. Chevron lost 120,000 barrels a day when its pipeline in the delta was breached on Thursday. This time from a youth group (gang). Open source insurgency at work...

JOURNAL: Foreclosures and Violent crime

Mortgage foreclosure rates for US single family homes are expected to range between 10-15% over the next three years -- with some neighborhoods well over 30% (for example: in the San Diego exurb Temecula 15% of homes are already either bank-owned or in some stage of foreclosure). The Chicago Fed has found that under normal circumstances, every increase in the foreclosure rate by 2.87%, there is a 6.68% increase in violent crime. Further, housing values fall by nearly 1% for each foreclosed home within 1/8 of a mile.

The Swiss Cheese Effect

As US cities, suburbs and neighborhoods begin to look like swiss cheese, there's little doubt that the US will experience a radical increase in the formation of gangs, militias, and other violent groups. A volatile mixture of wealth/expectation destruction, neighborhood decay (due to empty and abandoned properties), and a visceral sense of economic betrayal/abandonment will be the drivers. Connectivity (both local and global) will ensure that the damage spreads virally.

JOURNAL: GG Progress

With a partial US withdrawal from Iraq likely for next spring, the factions in Iraq are relatively quiet, building strength for the battles to come. There are lots of bloody scores to settle (is there a Maliki dead pool online?). Meanwhile, global guerrillas (the open source, system disrupting, crime fueled sons of globalization) are making progress in both Nigeria and Mexico.

Mexico:

Simply, Mexico is in a guerrilla war and the majority (54%, in a recent Reforma poll) of the population thinks the narco-guerrillas are winning. Last month, the guerrillas decimated the senior staff of Mexico's law enforcement organizations and there are threats of more assassinations to come. In small towns, policemen are resigning en masse as the drug gangs continue their killing spree. Placards and banners are openly displayed in town streets promising death to the police that oppose the drug gangs and/or offers to recruit anybody with military experience.

Calderon's effort to crush the syndicates has backfired. As the top leadership of the syndicates were arrested or killed, a myriad of smaller and more violent groups have emerged to replace them (as predicted by global guerrilla theory). Currently, the groups are fighting each other more than the government, which has reduced their effectiveness. That will slowly change as territories are become fixed, connected to the primary loyalties of village or neighborhood. Eventually, a fully formed open source insurgency will emerge and the government might find itself only in command of the capital. At that point, Mexico will be a hollow state. A government in name only. This is going to be interesting to watch.

NOTE: The only existential threat the US faces in the near term, is from global guerrillas in Mexico and not the Middle East. A breakdown there could result in massive population movements, refugee centers, and the spread of guerrilla warfare into US border states.

Nigeria:

A world away, Nigerian guerrillas under the banner of MEND (an organizational shell that serves at the mouthpiece/catalyst for Nigeria's open source insurgency) has rapidly ramped up its attacks on the country's oil system (and particularly Shell Oil). As anticipated, Henry Okah has been quickly replaced. Oil workers are being killed and oil flow stations are being damage at the highest sustained rate to date. These attacks have helped keep oil prices at record levels. Ominously, the guerrillas have expanded their operations to include electricity disruption. As pressure continues to mount on Nigeria's government, we are likely to see broad-based unrest as other groups, spawned by widespread deprivation, begin to take up arms. At that point, oil production from Nigeria, except for bunkering, will completely cease (due to the lack of a viable counter-party to purchase the oil from and a total breakdown in oil worker security).

HOLLOW STATES: LEBANON

May's dispute between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah is an interesting example of the contest between hollow states and virtual states over legitimacy and sovereignty. As in most conflicts between gutted nation-states and aggressive virtual states, Hezbollah's organic legitimacy trumped the state's in the contest (an interesting contrast between voluntary affiliation and default affiliation by geography). The fighting was over in six hours.

A Parallel Communications Backbone
What's more interesting than the actual fighting is what the conflict was about. In summary, the government made an attempt to slow the expansion Hezbollah's fiber optics network, which provides secure/robust communications and surveillance (via automated cameras) to the group. Specifically, the government tried to shut down surveillance nodes of the network overlooking Beirut International Airport. Hezbollah responded by defining the network as a core part of its organization and that they were willing to defend it with violence if necessary.

So, we can now conclude that in addition to a 4GW militia and social services, a parallel communications/surveillance network is a core feature set of virtual states. This tracks with our emerging experience in Sadr City. It also implies we may see interesting virtual variants of this via the parasitic piggybacking of open source insurgencies (the PCC, al Qaeda, etc.) on cell phone networks and the Internet.