Guerrilla Proto-States
The feeling here, and this is just based on my day in the city running around talking to people, is that Hizbullah plans to stay and fight. For a movement fueled by martyrdom, a glorious final battle with the hated enemy must have some cachet. This might explain their air of confidence rather than desperation when me and a colleague got hassled by Hizbullah’s security guys in the bunker. They acted like guys in complete control with none of the twitchy desperation of guys who think the gig is up. Hizbullah may soon be surrounded, but they’re going to stay and fight, I think.
It's funny that so many people are still thinking of Hizbullah in terms of a state. They aren't. They are as happy to fight under occupation as they are to rule temporary autonomous zones in Lebanon (same goes for Hamas). Their primary loyalties are actually strengthened under occupation, unlike a state that requires territorial control, a conventional military, and a functional economy for legitimacy. Defeating them conventionally won't matter. They will merely move to guerrilla warfare.
It's also funny that people think that running an EBO on Lebanon will help them become a more aggressive state that enforces its borders/internal groups/etc. It won't. It will only drive the development of alternative, more resilient organizations.
I don't think that the frame or paradigm of networks for political organizations at this scale of activity has sunk in with the political class or the media. "State" is the traditional conception so it is the commonly used yardstick.
Such yardsticks tend to hang on for decades ( or centuries) after they have lost their original usefulness or situational relevance. Look how long aristocratic norms prevailed in Europe after the nobility ceased to wield independent military power ( or even political power). Once vibrant institutions decline into hollow ecclesias.
Posted by: mark safranski | July 16, 2006 at 11:44 AM
It looks like the question in Lind's recent piece has been answered big time.
'To be or not to be a state, that is the question – for Hamas and soon enough for other 4GW entities as well.'
http://antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=9252
Posted by: Tom Griffin | July 16, 2006 at 11:47 AM
Being a state is overrated.
Posted by: John Robb | July 16, 2006 at 12:32 PM
That is also one of the conclusions of Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory.
I wonder if there aren't some synergies between his theory and Van Creveld's.
What is wrong with the strategy the world left evolved in the course of the nineteenth century? There must be many things, since the strategy has not been successful. The centerpiece of the overall strategy was the concept of "two steps": first obtain state power, then transform the world.
http://www.transformaties.org/bibliotheek/wallersteinleftpol.htm
Posted by: Tom Griffin | July 16, 2006 at 03:23 PM
John. Can you give *any* kind of story under which the current Israeli invasion of South Lebanon makes sense?
Posted by: phil jones | July 16, 2006 at 04:27 PM
Tom, that link just takes me to a Network Solutions "coming soon" page.
Posted by: phil jones | July 16, 2006 at 04:29 PM
Phil, try this link:
http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/iwleftpol.htm
Posted by: Tom Griffin | July 16, 2006 at 04:49 PM
Taking out (or at least temporarily incapacitating) Hiz before the US hits Iran.
Posted by: John Robb | July 16, 2006 at 04:55 PM
Anyone like to play this game?
I went to this prediction market :
http://www.strategypage.com/prediction_market/default.asp
and made a couple of bets which should be consistent with a GGish way of thinking. (eg. "the Israeli invasion of Lebanon will strengthen Hezbollah" and "US casualties will be up in 2007")
The useful thing about a market like this is that it creates a cheap sort of accountability : it keeps track of your predictions and how they actually turned out. You, and everyone else, can see whether your biases are leading you into error.
Posted by: phil jones | July 16, 2006 at 07:46 PM
John. That almost sounds like you see a conspiracy going on : ie. Israel are starting the war against Iran in readiness for the US entry. Is that how you really see it?
Posted by: phil jones | July 16, 2006 at 07:48 PM
Phil, you should have done that two years ago. LOL.
No conspiracy. It does explain US acquiescence. Israel is operating under its own logic.
Posted by: John Robb | July 17, 2006 at 07:47 AM
Phil, I see the current administration as being extremely happy at any "reasonable" excuse for attacking Iran. They can't get any UN Security Council resolution authorizing such attacks past Chinese and Russian vetos. However, if they get thrown into the briar patch, defending Israel, they'd be just happy taking Iran's oil as well as destroying their nuclear power plants.
Between the neocons, the evangelists and the pro-Israeli special interest groups (which overlap a lot), there is no possibility of the US criticizing Israel or stopping the attacks. About the only possiblity would be a repeat of the 1973 oil embargo.
Posted by: Tangurena | July 17, 2006 at 11:02 AM
Military Hubris: http://billmon.org/archives/002529.html
Posted by: BillSaysThis | July 17, 2006 at 11:43 AM
"For a movement fueled by martyrdom, a glorious final battle with the hated enemy must have some cachet."
The Hizbullah fighters could be described as modern kamikaze. Why don't we study more closely the kamikaze phenomenon of World War II?
Kamikaze
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamikaze
Kamikaze intellectuals
http://japundit.com/archives/2006/07/12/3034/
Posted by: Dimitar Vesselinov | July 18, 2006 at 02:46 PM