Great article by Amit Paley from the Washington Post (with interviews) that describes al Qaeda's shift from social policing (which is always a bad idea -- only a minimal/loose rule set works in "conquered" areas) to systems disruption:
Lehebi, 47, whose nom de guerre is Abu Khalid al-Dulaimi, said the group's main focus now was to attack bridges, oil pipelines and telephone towers, as well as U.S. troops and their Sunni allies...
Perversely, systems disruption, while almost always the optimal core strategy for all guerrilla groups, often only gains full adoption by groups when they are weak. Why? It contrast to sexy blood and guts terrorism: it is easy to do (repeatedly), conserves scarce manpower (low attrition), doesn't require highly motivated/hardened fighters (as in: it doesn't usually require killing yourself or others and can thereby be used by groups with marginally committed members), doesn't alienate the populace (strangely, people blame the gov't), and has a large impact (high ROIs).
NOTE: this shift in approach enables al Qaeda to take back the reigns of the insurgency should the US stumble.
That's quite simple actually. System disruption is only a mean, however efficient it may be. Social policing on the other hand is an end.
They are not abstract military theoreticians trying to figure out the problem and its solution (like you).
They are not 100% focused on "what's the most cost effective and rapid way to kick out the americans".
They are ideologues with their own vision of what islamic societies should look like. They will try to impose their vision when they will get the chanche, which is to say when they are strong enough.
They will come up with effective tactics but that's it's not what the whole thing is about. Even defeating the USA is still just a mean to them, not an end.
Posted by: Marcello | February 10, 2008 at 07:39 AM