The first effective use of conventional forces against guerrillas was Alexander the Great's Scythian campaign. As a military force, the Scythians were very much like terrorists. Here are some points of comparison:
- They were nomads, with no fixed location or base.
- They had no set organizational structure (hierarchy) that could be leveraged through a decapitation attack (as Alexander used against the Persians by attacking Darius).
- Their force was self-contained and therefore didn't present any vulnerable lines of communication or material.
- The Scythians were very mobile horse archers that could could attack from a distance, swarm on vulnerabilities when exposed, and flee to safety when engaged.
The totality of these strengths allowed the Scythians to defeat all conventional enemies sent against them. Alexander changed this. Here's how. Alexander recognized that the only way to defeat the enemy was to trap the enemy in a situation where their mobility was negated and they were forced to engage. There are two ways to do this. The first way is to trap the enemy on ground that prevented mobility. However, the Scythians were unlikely to fall into this trap.
The second solution was to create a situation where the enemy was trapped by the maneuver of forces in a way that restricted mobility. Alexander chose this solution. To do this, Alexander sent a small force of vulnerable calvary forward against the Scythians. The Scythians quickly began to swarm on this small force by riding around them in a circle and pelting them with arrows. While this "bait" was engaged, he moved forward light missile infantry as a screen to his maneuvers.
Behind the screen, he moved his remaining calvary in three columns (left wing, center, and right wing) to positions that would allow him to trap a segment of the encircling Scythians between the calvary "bait" and his main force. Once positioned, he charged forward, springing the trap. A large segment of the Scythians were thereby trapped, where they were either cut down or captured.
The result of this action quickly resulted in the capitulation of the Scythians. The reason was that their tactics had been defeated. Without an ability to attack with success, they were without recourse.
Here are the lessons that we can derive from this:
- Guerrilla and terrorist forces have a tendency to form into semi-conventional targets when presented with an opportunity free from threat of attack.
- Vulnerability attracts guerrilla and terrorist swarming attacks which thereby presents opportunity. In cyberwarfare, this is called a honeypot.
- The main conventional thrust should be held back until the enemy is surrounded with overwhelming force. Extreme efforts should be made to screen this maneuver and to limit attacks on the enemy until the vital moment.
Compare this to the way we are fought the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. In Afghanistan, we broke apart enemy forces (in large training camps of conventional organization) from a distance with indecisive force (air power). Further, we attacked enemy forces in fortifications that restricted mobility (Tora Bora) with insufficient ground forces (special operations forces) and allowed them to escape. In Iraq, we continue to pacify the whole of the country which prevents the guerrillas/terrorists from forming into larger semi-conventional formations (organizations with middle management of 350 people or greater) that can be engaged. In both locations, were are loathe to create vulnerabilities that may be used as traps (due to the fear of casualties). In all locations (across the globe), we are quick to disrupt terrorist networks and are likely to decapitate leadership when the opportunity presents itself. This is done even when terrorists operate in permissive environments (where police presence is in place).
Taken in their entirety, the tactics we have used are indecisive. Alexander points to a potential alternative.