Global Guerrillas

NOTE TO READERS

Global Guerrillas has proven to be an invaluable analytical resource on the fast moving world of international terrorism. To wit: the recent attacks in Saudi Arabia should have come as no surprise to the site's readers. Thanks again to the thousands of current readers who have made this effort worthwhile.

Future plans. I have been recently approached by some extremely talented individuals/organizations with offers to take this to the next level. After some thought and some competitive analysis, I have decided to pursue this path. Stay tuned.

TARGET: THE PRICE OF OIL

New attacks on oil industry workers in Saudi Arabia confirm that al Qaeda has shifted its focus, via an indirect means, to a new American weakness: oil. These attacks keep the ~$8 per barrel terror premium on oil in place (effectively, a ~$600 m a day "terrorist tax" on the world), however, due to diminishing returns from these tactics, the premium will not increase much from these attacks. There are still some potential long-term returns that can be gained through the departure of foreign workers (particularly oil industry workers and their families) from Saudi Arabia. If these departures occur (Saudi Arabia relies on 6 m expatriot workers, many of them in the oil industry), they will impact the ability of Saudi Arabia to build additional capacity (which will be difficult to do under even ideal conditions) necessary to off-set rapidly rising demand from China (which according to current demand trend lines will suck up all global reserve production capacity in less than two years).

I think it is extremely likely that we will see a continuation of these attacks on personnel, however, the most gratifying feedback loop (for terrorists) is the price of oil. This price will not increase dramatically (with $50 as a target price -- which Stephen Roach indicates will result in a global recession) unless attacks shift to (primarily Saudi, although this isn't the only potential venue for attacks) oil infrastructure. As a result, expect al Qaeda to shift, soon.

To adapt successfully, the western states need to adopt market indicators as a measure of security success. A failure to do this will result in a misallocation of security resources.

JOURNAL: Saudi Oil Defenses

The oil system is on the edge.  There is little spare capacity, and all of it is owned by Saudi Arabia (of course, if Hubbert's peak is true, even this spare capacity will go away). From the Economist print edition:

Amy Jaffe of the Baker Institute, at America's Rice University in Texas, observes that in 1985 OPEC maintained about 15m bpd of spare capacity about one-quarter of world demand at that time. In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, OPEC still had about 5.5m bpd of spare capacity (about 8% of world demand). That, argues Ms Jaffe, meant that the cartel could easily and quickly expand output to absorb several disruptions at once. That is simply no longer true. Today's fast-shrinking spare capacity of about 2m bpd is less than 3% of demand and it is entirely in Saudi hands.

So how safe is the Saudi oil system? Here's the picture: the system depicted is a "fortress" style defense: 30,000 guards, surveillance sensors, aircraft patrols, and anti-aircraft hard point defense (from the Economist print edition). Here are some estimates by "security" experts:

Kevin Rosser of Control Risks Group. He observes that there is plenty of redundancy built into the Saudi network through multiple ports, pipelines and excess capacity that should ease the blow from any attack. Besides, he insists, to do any real damage terrorists would have to hit bottlenecks, not just blow up random bits of pipeline.

James Woolsey, a former head of America's Central Intelligence Agency. Guards and fences are easy to put up, but they don't defend against the real threats. Trucks have to come in and out of facilities, he observes, and Aramco employees and security guards have to move about. He thinks that several attacks, if co-ordinated by terrorists who have infiltrated Aramco, could cripple the Saudi system.  Mr Woolsey adds that an attack using weapons of mass destruction (especially dirty bombs) would be even more devastating than one that used mere aeroplanes. All told, the pessimists reckon that well-co-ordinated attacks could take as much as 6m-7m bpd of Saudi output off the market for weeks, and perhaps longer.

Robert Baer, an intelligence expert (author of Sleeping with the Devil). He reckons that Ras Tanura, a port on the Gulf, is a vulnerable terrorist target. With an output of perhaps 4.5m bpd, this is the biggest oil-exporting port in the world. Mr Baer thinks a small submarine or a boat laden with explosives (as happened in October 2000 with the attack on the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen) could knock out much of Ras Tanura's output for weeks, or even longer. An even scarier possibility raised by Mr Baer is the crashing of a hijacked aeroplane into Abqaiq, the world's largest oil-processing complex. If done with the help of insiders, he speculates that the facility's throughput (nearly 7m bpd, on his estimate) would be choked off to as little as 1m bpd for two months and might remain as low as 3m bpd for seven months.

NOTE: Fortress defenses are virtually useless. Additionally, redundancy can be defeated through good network analysis. My view is that the real vulnerability is in attacks on ancillary systems with a focus on internetwork cascades of failure.

JOURNAL: War against Networks

Interesting phraseology taken from John Kerry's speech on what his security policy would be as the President of the US. It signals a change in thinking about this conflict. It's a promised presidential declaration of war on a network and not on personalities/individuals:

"Let there be not doubt -- this country is united in its determination to destroy you," Kerry said. "As commander in chief, I will bring the full force of our nation's power to bear on finding and crushing your networks."

AUTHOR'S NOTE

Good news. I have been asked to speak at the elite Supernova conference on "Decentralization and Terrorism." Hope to see you there.

JOURNAL: An Estimate of Al Qaeda's Current Strength

The Institute of Strategic Studies estimates that al Qaeda's total strength exceeds 18,000 terrorists. Highlights:

• 2,000 al Qaeda members and more than half of the group's 30 leaders had been killed or captured.
  
• 1,000 al Qaeda militants estimated to be in Iraq were a minute fraction of its potential strength.
  
• Al Qaeda is exporting extremism on a global scale with "middle managers" providing planning, logistical advice, material and financing to smaller groups in Saudi Arabia and Morocco and probably Indonesia and Kenya.
  
• Recruitment is accelerating due to Iraq.
  
• Al Qaeda's finances are intact.
  
• The Madrid train bombings in March suggested al Qaeda had now fully reconstituted and had set its sights firmly on the United States and its closest allies in Europe.

NOTE: this estimate may be misunderstood since it is primarily an estimate of the number of people that went through the al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, before they were destroyed. Here's a better way to look at this estimate. First, only a small number of people (less than 80, see The Optimal Size of a Terrorist Networks for more) are needed for large-scale attacks. This means that Al Qaeda likely has many more potential recruits (and Afghanistan trained network members) than it is able to utilize.

Second, this estimate may serve as a good way to estimate the number of potential organizers of al Qaeda missions. A percentage, say 25% of the 18,000 (a good model may be the US military's promotion rate), of the Afghanistan trained terrorists serve as the basis for the high flow, highly connected, and very trusted network members that are needed to manage al Qaeda's large attacks (see Mapping Terrorist Networks for more). It would be difficult to develop the connections/trust necessary to manage these attacks from within al Qaeda's network structure without this common bond of face-to-face training.

CASCADING SYSTEM FAILURE

Global infrastructure networks are the Achilles heal of the great powers. They form the basis of our wealth and our daily function yet remain extremely vulnerable. It's then little wonder that next generation terrorists, in the form of global guerrillas, will focus their efforts on the destruction of this global infrastructure. In previous posts we explored the vulnerability of scale free networks. This analysis showed that the removal of a few highly connected nodes can cause a network to fail (by dividing the network into isolated islands of connectivity). However, the analysis of dynamic networks indicates that there may be an even easier way to collapse infrastructure networks: cascading failure.

Dynamic Networks and Cascading Failures
Static maps of a network's connectivity (like a scale free network topology) don't provide a true picture of an infrastructure network's operation. Infrastructures are dynamic. There are flows of information, power, and substances constantly coursing through them. This dynamism creates a new set of vulnerabilities that can be exploited by global guerrillas. Here's how cascading network failures occur in dynamic networks when they lose high-load nodes (the loss of even a single high-load node can result in system-wide cascading failure):

• Load redistribution. In most infrastructure networks, the loads carried by each node on the network are dynamically redistributed. If a network node is lost, due to accident or attack, the load that node carries is rapidly distributed to the other nodes on the network.
  
• Hi-load nodes and failure. If a high-load node is removed from the network, the loads it carries are redistributed to other nodes on the network. This increased flow causes less capable nodes to exceed their capacity. To protect these nodes from damage, many networks will automatically force the overloaded node to fail-over (shut down). In other networks, the increased congestion will cause the overloaded node to become inefficient (bog down). Regardless, the result is a series of shut-downs or slow-downs that "cascade" through the network as the excess load is pushed to the next available node. The end result is total network failure.
  
• Heterogeneous networks. Cascading failures only occur in heterogeneous networks where there are a few nodes that have the capacity for high-loads and many with the capacity only for low-loads. Homogeneous networks, where all the nodes handle an equal load do not suffer cascading failure. Unfortunately, all infrastructure networks are heterogeneous by design.

NOTE: Cascading failures do not cleanly apply to terrorist "social" networks. In social networks, the network nodes are people and the flow is information/knowledge/etc. When a high-load node is removed, the remaining nodes will not fail due to an increase in load. People can adapt dynamically. For example: they can prioritize the new loads they inherit which mitigates the impact of a high-load node loss to the network.

Global Guerrilla Attack Planning
The vulnerability of dynamic networks to attacks on hi-load nodes is straight forward. However, planning attacks on these dynamic networks isn't. Here's how global guerrillas will plan attacks to create cascading failures within dynamic networks:

• High-load node identification. There is a high level of correlation between the number of connections a node has and the amount of load it carries. Additionally, many infrastructure networks (oil, gas, electricity, etc.)concentrate production of the flow that travels through the network. In these networks, high-load nodes can be identified as those nodes that are immediately downstream from production facilities. In other networks high-load nodes are the most central (communication networks).
  
• Connections instead of nodes. A non obvious approach to node failure is to attack the connections radiating from high-load nodes. The result of an attack on the connections between nodes will be the redistribution of the load carried by the damaged connection to the remaining connections. This will result in the failure of a high-load node when the remaining connections fail due to overloading (see diagram).
  
• Network suppliers. Some networks are vulnerable to undersupply (gas, electricity, and water). In these networks, an attack on a supply facility or connections from a supply facility will produce network failure as undersupplied nodes pull resources from the rest of the network (see diagram).

Source: Motter, Lai "Cascade-based attacks on Complex Networks" (PDF)

JOURNAL: A Kalashnikov Moment

The more I dig into homemade HERFs (particularly microwaves), the more I think this is a Kalashnikov moment in history.

First, the potential demand is huge. HERF weapons can be used to destroy/incapacitate any system that uses microelectronics. This capability means that a simple, effective, robust, low-cost, man-portable HERF device is going to be the weapon of choice during the early 21st century. It will be very popular with nation-state militaries (which would give producers a modicum legal cover) and with global guerrillas. Part of their appeal is that these devices are so simple that almost anyone can operate them with little to no training. The upshot is that sales of tens of millions of units possible. It may someday equal the over 50 m AK-47s in circulation today.

Second, the supply is potentially plentiful. All it takes to make this weapon is a entrepreneur/designer willing to manufacture it. All the parts necessary for these devices can be easily acquired (global suppliers) or easily manufactured. The design expertise needed is relatively low. It is also possible to vary the capabilities easily. A component design with snap-on elements (like different magnetrons (frequencies), power packs, antenna designs (wide-area or focused depending on frequency used), etc) would enable the device the flexibility to meet the needs of different users/missions.

Frankly, it's only a matter of time before we see the emergence of a replacement for the Kalashnikov and 'herfing' systems enters into our vocabulary.

JOURNAL: GG Equipment

When I used to do night ops in special operations, the NVG (night vision goggle binoculars) I used cost over $20,000. GPS navigation was available at a similar price. Like so many other technologies, prices have fallen. Alot.

Here's a binocular set-up for less than $500. These look exactly (including the head net) like the ones I used to use.

Here's a GPS navigation device that stores 20 routes/500 waypoints, has full maps of North and South America, accurate up to three feet, and calculates airspeed/time to target. Nice! All for ~ $200.

GLOBAL GUERRILLA AIRPOWER

Global guerrilla swarming attacks on infrastructure represent a strategic threat to nation-states, particularly when combined with easy to use, low cost, homemade microwave weaponry (and other homemade HERFs). NOTE: This brief is focused on advanced tactics and not likely to occur in the shortrun. However, mobility within an urban environment is difficult to maintain when critical infrastructure (like transportation networks) are disrupted. A good method by which global guerrillas can gain and maintain a significant mobility advantage over emergency reponse forces is by using ultralight aircraft (unregulated, inexpensive, lightweight aircraft that don't require pilot licenses or airfields).

Ultralight aircraft are the equivalent of the horse used by horse archers (the original swarmers). They add a level of mobility to global guerrilla operations necessary for a comprehensive urban take-down. Here's why ultralights are effective for this:

• Inexpensive. The cost of an ultralight range between $15-20,000. Fuel costs are in the low hundreds per flight.
  
• Relatively easy to use. In contrast to commercial aircraft operation, ultralight training is easy (only ten to twenty hours of flight time is necessary for competance).
  
• Easy to navigate. The combination of slow speeds and handheld GPS devices makes navigating a complex attack pattern extremely simple.
  
• Night flight possible. Low level night flight with commercially available night vision goggles is easier than conventional aircraft (due to low speeds). This altitude would make extremely hard to detect and neutralize (it would look like a ground vehicle).
  
• Runways are plentiful. Virtually any road or field of of 300 ft can launch an ultralight.
  
• Logistics and transportation are less difficult than conventional aircraft. Ultralights can be packed into a van and driven to any location. Ultralights use standard liquids.

Operational Overview
The addition of ultralight mobility to global guerrilla swarming operations provides a mobility advantage that would be very difficult to defend against (even in a military intensive environment like Iraq, so knowledge of an operation of this type will likely not result in any meaningful defense). In combination with stand-off capability afforded by homemade HERF devices (particularly in the 20-30 GHz range) the weapon system becomes very potent. Ultralights would allow maneuver to the target facility within the 200 ft range of such a device (these HERF devices can even burn out auto electronics for transportation disruption). The 100 lb payload capability would more than handle a portable generator, additional fuel, and the device electronics. GPS navigation would allow precise attack patterns that would allow the guerrilla to hit dozens of critical targets in a short period of time (< 1 hour). Recovery of aircraft could be accomplished within hours of landing and enable transportation to another urban location for repetition of the operation.

The elements required for an ultralight, HERF-enabled swarming operation are basic (think about this with Ghawar in mind). They include:

• Two cells of 5 people (warm bodies are all that are required).
  
• $100,000 in funding.
  
• Two months of time for training, equipment consolidation, and planning.
  
• Less than $30,000 for ultralights.
  
• Less than $20,000 for HERF electronics (magnetrons, etc.).
  
• Less than $10,000 for NVGs (night vision goggles) and GPS navigation devices.
  
• Less than $10,000 for vehicles, fuel, etc.
  
• Less than $30,000 for housing, food, transportation, etc.

HOMEMADE MICROWAVE WEAPONS

The US military is hard at work designing, building, and using directed energy weapons (HERFs -- high energy radio frequency or microwave weapons) for use against micro-electronics and fuel vapor. Unfortunately, directed energy weapons are much more valuable to global guerrillas than nation-state militaries due to the target imbalance between nation-states and non-state foes. The technology needed to build these weapons is generally available and inexpensive (numerous experiments, including this one, scroll to bottom, with a converted microwave oven demonstrate this). Homemade directed energy weapons will eventually become the weapon of choice for global guerrillas intent on infrastructure destruction.

A good reference on this is Col. Eileen Walling's "High Power Microwaves: Strategic and Operational Imperatives for Warfare" (PDF). She lists four distinctive characteristics of a microwave weapon:

• They don't rely on knowledge of the system.
  
• They leave persistant and lasting effects on the system through destruction of circuits and components.
  
• They can impact systems even when they are turned off.
  
• To counter the weapon the entire system must be hardened.

Here are some attributes of a microwave weapons:

• Entry to a system can be direct or indirect (through a variety of backdoor channels).
  
• Destruction occurs from the inside out.
  
• Extreme lethality for electronic components (and fuel systems).
  
• Repair is extremely difficult -- it requires high level systems analysis.
  
• Most systems are not hardened against microwave frequencies.
  
• Area attacks are possible.
  
• Insensitive to weather (rain, fog, etc.).
  
• Long reach depending on power used.
  
• Replenishment is easy (nothing except power is expended).
  
• Scalable size (a weapon that weighs less than 10 lbs is possible).
  
• Logistics are limited to battery/power source replacement.
  
• Limited collateral damage.

GLOBAL GUERRILLA SWARMING

Swarming tactics have been used successfully in wars throughout history by a variety of organizations from the tribal Parthians (horse archers) to 20th century Germans (U-boats). Global guerrillas (next generation terrorists) will likely use swarming tactics as part of their doctrine. This technique, in combination with new market-based financing techniques is what's called a killer combo.

Definition.
A good place to start an analysis of swarming is Sean Edwards' "Swarming on the Battlefield (PDF downloads). Here's his excellent definition of swarming: a primary maneuver that results in an attack from multiple directions (all points on the compass) by 5 or more (semi) autonomous units on a single target/unit.

Benefits.
It's easy to see the advantages of this type of maneuver:

• It cuts the enemy target off from supply and communications.
  
• It adversely impacts the moral of the target.
  
• It makes a coordinated defense extremely difficult (resource allocation is intensely difficult).
  
• It radically increases the potential of surprise.

Types.
Swarming is typically divided into two types:
Massed swarming -- Swarmers begin as a massed unit. They break apart and then swarm on target.
Dispersed swarming -- Units are dispersed (geographically) from the start. Once a target is identified, they converge to attack. This is the most difficult of the two types of swarming to defend against since the attacker never presents a massed target.

Effectiveness.
Historically, swarming is successful only when it scores high in the following areas:

• Elusiveness -- either through mobility or concealment.
  
• Long range firepower -- standoff capability.
  
• Superior situational awareness -- having more information about the enemy than they have about you.

Swarming contra infrastructure systems: guerre de course
Given this background, how will global guerrillas use swarming? First, the target for global guerrillas won't be isolated military units but rather urban infrastructure systems. The objective of these attacks will be damage that results in economic attrition. Let's examine how global guerrilla's will leverage swarming tactics to accomplish this objective.

The effectiveness of Global Guerrilla swarmers.
Global guerrilla swarmers will maintain their effectiveness across the vital swarming attributes in the following ways:

Elusiveness. Global guerrillas attain concealment through anonymity in large urban environments. Reliance on the local population isn't necessary. High degrees of mobility are accomplished by leveraging public transportation networks.

Superior situational awareness. Open source intelligence is easy to accomplish (via the Internet, the media, and other sources). Further, encrypted global communications, via the Internet, enables global intelligence sharing information sharing. The small size of operational cells limits the potential of discovery and counter-guerrilla intelligence development.

Standoff attacks. Like many historical swarming attacks, global guerrillas will have significant standoff firepower potential -- the ability to attack from a distance. However, this firepower isn't a traditional weapon, rather, its the global guerrilla's ability to use attacks on infrastructure to impact downstream systems miles (perhaps hundreds of miles) distant. Attacks will be rotated among infrastructures in a modern variant of horse archer tactics.

How global guerrilla swarmers will surmount traditional limits to operations.
Historically, swarmers have been limited by terrain, logistics, and communications. Global guerrillas will not be constrained by these limits. This makes global guerrilla swarming unique to history as can be seen in the attached 2x2 matrix. The upshot is that global guerrillas will be able to conduct dispersed swarming maneuvers on the operational level. Here's how global guerrillas will surmount the traditional limits on swarming:

• Ubiquitous public transportation networks (roads to airlines) enable rapid, low-cost transportation for dispersed units.
  
• Logistics requirements can be met via open economic transactions and don't require population support. The requirements for operations are relatively limited (damage to infrastructure requires low-tech tools). Additionally, the small size of the cells (~5 people) requires little housing/food/etc and in most cases would fall well below the threshold of detection.
  
• Real-time, anonymous, wireless communications (both data and voice -- VoIP, e-mail, Web, cellphones, etc.) enable global guerrillas to coordinate dispersed operations on the operational level. Tactical operations will be of a conventional type, typically by a single unit or individual.

JOURNAL: Iraq and Islamic terrorism

Here's an interesting interview with Dr. Mustafa Alani (PDF), an Iraqi nationalist and an expert on Islamic terrorism. Topics covered include: goals of al Qaeda in Iraq, the authenticity of the Zarqawi letter (which I doubt since it wasn't encrypted), and the roots of the conflict in Fallujah. Worth a read.

DESIGN FLAWS: METHODS OF ATTACKING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Complex infrastructure often exhibits extreme levels of vulnerability to non-planned events. The reason for this is may be found in an area of complexity research called highly optimized tolerance (HOT). HOT research has found that complex networks, like most global infrastructure, exhibit behaviors explained by the design considerations of its makers. The end-result of this planning is a network that is extremely robust against certain types of anticipated failures/insults but conversely is hypersensitive to unanticipated classes of uncertainty. NOTE: this isn't as obvious as it seems. Complex systems, like the Internet, operate well beyond the influence of any central management group and the thinking of the original designers. This research shows that the core design and operational decisions made by these groups does have a major impact on the ability of the system to respond to damage.

Design Flaws
The crux of this analysis is that global guerrillas can exploit the assumptions of designers to create major distruptions in complex networks. Further, once this is done, the network will likely work for the attacker by causing damage to itself (from outage responses gone awry to increased costs of operation). NOTE: This is very much the approach Lawrence of Arabia used in his Arab revolt. He attacked the Turk's train system which the designer's/users assumed to be safe because it was well to the rear of the front lines and it traversed remote areas.

NOTE: This next section is an area that I am spooling up on. I do think it is possible to exploit system designer/operator assumptions. These assumptions create systemic flaws and not just spot opportunities. When I get it right, this will be a very useful section.

Global Guerrilla Operations Manual>Infrastructure Attack>Planning
(NOTE: this is a red-hat/oppositional approach to diving into a topic, don't be alarmed). When planning an attack on infrastructure (oil, electricity, gas, etc.), it is important to consider what the designers of the network had in mind. An examination of assumptions can lead to methods of exploitation. Let's walk through the exercise.

General considerations. All large-scale infrastructure network designers follow the same general process:

• The economic performance of the network needs to be optimized (efficiency often trumps safety).
  
• They don't have sufficient resources to defend against all potential threats (limited means).
  
• Security is focus on the most recent, highest profile, and common threats (all of which have some historical basis) NOTE: I know that good network designers would say they make no assumptions as to what future threats would be and they are constantly updating systems in response to new threats and ongoing assessments. However, that isn't the case in the vast majority of deployed systems, particularly large infrastructure networks.

Here are some general assumptions planners use in network design. They will not apply to all systems. These questions are better used as a way to start a thinking process on the topic (NOTE: I am working on these. This list is in the process of revision.).

Assumption: the lowest cost routes are often best (Oil, Gas, and goods transport).

Assumption: Large nodes (those that handle more load than others) are efficient (All networks).

Assumption: the shortest path is the best path (Internet and Power).

Assumption: hub and spoke systems are often efficient (Airlines).

Assumption: outsourcing of network elements is often efficient (deregulated networks).

Assumption: the systems environment is permissive (all networks -- in that crews will not be attacked).

Assumption: parts of the system in remote areas are secure due to their inaccessibility (oil and Power).

Assumption: external support networks will work as advertised (Oil, Power, .

Make your own list of design assumptions that can be exploited within the system you are focusing on. Rank the potential attacks unearthed through this process according to operational factors.

Sources: Carlson, Doyle (1999) "Highly-optimized tolerance: A mechanism for powerlaws in designed systems."

TARGET: GHAWAR

Global economic networks, like today's oil networks, are typically sparse (few nodes), hierarchical (an inverted pyramid of distribution), concentrated (big hubs), and vulnerable (not built with security in mind). When we look at the global oil network we find that the biggest network hub is Saudi Arabia. Within Saudi Arabia, production is highly concentrated with few major hubs --a handful of fields produce the vast majority of its oil. This pattern of field concentration follows the King (the supergiant), Queen (giants), and Lords (large) rule, which is true for all major oil basins. Let's sort the Saudi fields according to this rule:

• The King. Ghawar. The world's King of Kings. Discovered 1948/49. Ghawar has produced 60-65% of all Saudi oil between 1948-2000. It produces over 5 m barrels a day (~6.25% of global production). There is even zonal concentration within Ghawar -- Arab D.
  
• The Queens. Abqaiq (1940) and Safaniya (1951).
  
• The Lords. Berri, Zuluf, Marjan, Abu Sa'fah, Shaybah, and Qatif (1945-1967)

The strategic risks
This pattern of concentration indicates that the global focal point of the world's oil system is Ghawar. It's the mega-hub of the global oil network. Let's therefore examine the risks to Ghawar. There are three main categories of risk:

• Data risk. There is very little reliable data on oil production/reserves in OPEC nations (for example: reserve estimates are often inflated). The recent Royal Dutch/Shell experience (they downgraded reserve estimates by 20%, twice due to optimistic estimates) demonstrates the dire financial consequenses of this behavior. There is reason to believe that ARAMCO may be following a similar policy given the fuzzy data on Ghawar's reserves.
  
• Technology risk. Technological improvements may not be sufficient to radically extend the lives of large fields. The rapid decline of Oman's Yibal field, despite its use of advanced technology, is an example this. Recent indicators imply that Ghawar is running into the same problems as Yibal did.
  
• Global guerrilla risk (terrorism). As seen in the recent attacks on oil facilities/personnel in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. An attack on Ghawar, particularly Arab D, could radically impact world oil supply.

The implications
The global oil network is tightly coupled to global economic activity (via inflation). There is robust historical data on the economic costs of previous disruptions. Further, the global oil market is very inelastic in the short-term (this means that even minor decreases in supply result in large price increases). The reason for this is that it takes a significant amount of time for customers to switch to alternative fuels or implement conservation measures. Here's how oil network disruptions would cascade into global economic activity if the risks detailed above are realized:

• Fear of attack or disclosure of error. Current oil prices (over $40) are the result of a fear of terrorism and increased demand. A similar price could be expected if data or technological risk are proven to be real. A sustained price of $40 will reduce global growth by 1% (-$500 billion in the first year).
  
• Moderate attack. If global guerrillas attack Ghawar successfully, the price of oil will likely spike to $75 a barrel. This would slow global economic growth by 2.5% (a -$1.25 trillion loss).
  
• Large attack. A successful attack on Ghawar and Basra would result in a price of $160 a barrel. Global economic growth would slow by 4.55% (a -$2.25 trillon loss) -- essentially a global depression.

Our response should be
Given this analysis, global guerrilla risk to Ghawar, as the global mega-hub of oil production, is the most dangerous of the risks we face. In 4GW terms, the miracle of Ghawar's production is a great strength but it can be turned against us. To mitigate this we should undertake the following:

• A push for better data. Transparency is a must for data an technological risk reduction.
  
• Conservation and alternative energy sources. This is a long-term solution but is necessary to reduce the our exposure to oil concentration.
  
• Increased protection of Ghawar and Basra. Protection of Ghawar is extremely important. Unfortunately, this is not as simple as it seems. There are lots of targets. Ghawar is vulnerable to attacks on: wells, personnel, management systems, pipelines, water facilities (water is injected into the field to push out oil), power facilities, power transmission, and more. A creative global guerrilla could have a field day given the number of potential targets that would directly impact production at Ghawar.

Sources:
Perry (Brookings): Terrorism and oil (PDF).
Simmons: "The Saudi Arabian Oil Miracle" (PDF).

JOURNAL: Becoming Israel

Given a combination of Boyd's and al Faqih's analysis, Al Qaeda does have a strategy for this phase of its war with the US. It's called "superpower baiting." This strategy works on the simple premise that the US over responds to humiliation.

Our over response to humiliating attacks usually takes the form of conventional military force: invasions, bombings, sieges, and search/destroy missions. These conventional attacks are easy and provide immediate gratification, however, everytime we do respond in this manner, the US becomes more isolated. Isolated from our allies and each other. Isolated from our real objectives based on the facts available to us. Isolated from our morals and codes of conduct. In the end, when we are fully isolated, we become Israel.

If this is al Qaeda's strategy -- to goad the US to transform itself into Israel -- then the beheading of Nick Berg makes sense. This act of humiliation serves to steel our resolve to stay in Iraq, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib debacle. It keeps us in place to continue the process of isolation.

JOURNAL: Infrastructure attacks in Iraq

Iraq's southern oil pipeline was shut down Saturday morning due to an attack. Some (20%) of the country's 1.8 m barrels a day of oil exports will be impacted. The attack site, located on the tip of the Faw peninsula near Basra, was still ablaze after two days which indicates a high level of severity. This attack follows similar attacks on northern (Mosul) pipelines that have shut down regional production for months. There are indications that these attacks were done by al Qaeda. The terrorist network may now realize that in order to win against western nation-states they must shift to global guerrilla style systemic disruption. This is a very troubling development.

BOYD ON AL QAEDA'S GRAND STRATEGY

Col. John Boyd (he died in 1997) is considered one of America's best military thinkers. His thinking dramatically influenced the plan of attack in the first gulf war. Boyd's thinking also serves as a good basis for a deeper understanding 4GW (fourth generation warfare).

Grand strategy, according to Boyd, is a quest to isolate your enemy's (a nation-state or a global terrorist network) thinking processes from connections to the external/reference environment. This process of isolation is essentially the imposition of insanity on a group. To wit: any organism that operates without reference to external stimuli (the real world), falls into a destructive cycle of false internal dialogues. These corrupt internal dialogues eventually cause dissolution and defeat.

The dynamic of Boyd's grand strategy is to isolate your enemy across three essential vectors (physical, mental, and moral), while at the same time improving your connectivity across those same vectors. Here's more detail:

• Physical isolation is accomplished by severing communications both to the outside world (ie. allies) and internal audiences (ie. between branches of command and between the command organization and its supporters).

• Mental isolation is done through the introduction of ambiguous information, novel situations, and by operating at a tempo an enemy cannot keep up with. A lack of solid information impedes decision making.

• Moral isolation is achieved when an enemy improves its well being at the expense of others (allies) or violates rules of behavior they profess to uphold (standards of conduct). Moral rules are a very important reference point in times of uncertainty. When these are violated, it is very hard to recover.

Our progress so far
When we evaluate our progress in the war on terrorism based on Boyd's measures of isolation, the following is seen:

• Physical isolation. America has been physically isolated from many of its allies due to its rush to war in Iraq. It also has demonstated (via the slow process by which news of Abu Ghraib reached the President and Congress) that internal communications have been disrupted. The destruction of al Qaeda's training camps and visible communications systems have resulted in a degree of isolation. However, the network-based organizational structure of al Qaeda and its ability to manipulate the media to send messages to supporters has mitigated this effort.

• Mental isolation. The rapid emergence of new threats (al Sadr, al Zarqawi, and Fallujah) and the myriad of geographically dispersed attacks that require response (from Spain to Saudi Arabia -- from Basra to Mosel) have served to isolate the US on the mental plane. It is also very difficult, due to ambiguity of information, to determine who the enemy is (this is true in Iraq and across the world from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia). The bulk of the early effort to continuously attack al Qaeda has subsided as the US concentrates on Iraq -- our early gains have been squandered.

• Moral isolation. The excesses at the Abu Ghraib prison demonstrate a classic violation of moral codes of conduct. The evidence indicates that the US intentionally (in that there was a climate of urgency that permitted it) violated these rules due to desire to gain information needed to fight guerrilla groups in Iraq. Another example of moral isolation is America's insistance on the right to self-defense, at the expense of the rest of the world. There has not been any evidence that al Qaeda sponsored operations have drastically violated any internal moral codes. However, the proliferation of groups associated with al Qaeda have resulted in attacks (for example: attacks on Shiites in Pakistan and Iraq that are against al Qaeda policy) may serve to isolate al Qaeda if their actions are adopted by the main organization.

A vision statement for this conflict
From this analysis it is clear that the US is, as the result of this war, more isolated than our enemy. However, Boyd suggests that the best corrective action is for the US to articulate a grand unifying vision for this war. A "with us or against us" approach and unilateral military action is not productive (it drives isolation). A better vision statement (we should have a contest for this):

The United States will commit all of the resources at its disposal to help nations everywhere preserve those values that we all hold as vital to our future success."

NOTE TO READERS

Thanks to all of the readers of this weblog. The site is now attracting 1,300 people a day, up from nearly zero a month ago. Thanks again for the readership, the comments, the e-mail, and the links (which help promote this site on Google -- which in turn helps to expose more people to contextual insight on these issues rather than regurgitated news and political spin).

4GW -- FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE

4GW (fourth generation wafare) is the term used by military thinkers to describe conflict at the end of the 20th century. In general, 4GW is an extremely effective method of warfare that the US and its allies will find very difficult to defeat (a slow burn, rather than complete eradication, may be the best possible outcome). I have outlined the basics of 4GW warfare below to enhance your understanding of the term.

Definition
4GW can be defined as a method of warfare that uses the following to achieve a moral victory:

• Undermines enemy strengths (this may seem obvious, but most of modern warfare has involved direct attacks on enemy strengths -- find the enemy army and destroy it).
• Exploits enemy weaknesses.
• Uses asymmetric operations (weapons and techniques that differ substantially from opponents).

Drivers
The rise of 4GW is both a product and a driver of the following:

• The loss of the nation-state's monopoly on violence.
• The rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict.
• Globalization (via technological integration).

Tactics
4GW is fought on the tactical level via:

• Rear area operations -- 4GW warriors do not confront a nation-state's military but rather it society. 
• Psychological operations -- terror.
• Ad-hoc innovation -- use of the enemy's strengths against itself.

Generations of Warfare
The generational development of warfare can be outlined as:

• First generation -- wars of Napoleon, conscription and firearms (the decline of mercenaries).
• Second generation -- the US civil war and WW1, firepower and nation-state alignment of resources to warfare.
• Third generation -- WW2, maneuver and armored warfare.
• Fourth generation -- ad hoc warriors and moral conflict.

Differences
Many of the methods used in 4GW aren't new and have robust historical precedent. However, there are important differences in how it is applied today. These include:

• Global -- modern technologies and economic integration enable global operations.
• Pervasive -- the decline of nation-state warfare has forced all open conflict into the 4GW mold.
• Granularity -- extremely small viable groups and variety of reasons for conflict.
• Vulerability -- open societies and economies.
• Technology -- new technologies have dramatically increased the productivity of small groups of 4GW warriors.
• Media -- global media saturation makes possible an incredible level of manipulation.
• Networked -- new organizational types made possible by improvements in technology are much better at learning, surviving, and acting.

Winning a 4GW conflict
Victory in 4GW warfare is won in the moral sphere. The aim of 4GW is to destroy the moral bonds that allows the organic whole to exist -- cohesion. This is done by reinforcing the following (according to Boyd):

• Menace. Attacks that undermine or threaten basic human survival instincts.
• Mistrust. Increases divisions between groups (ie. conservatives and liberals in the US).
• Uncertainty. Undermine economic activity by decreasing confidence in the future.

JOURNAL: Is Nigeria the next failed state?

State failure, particular states with large muslim populations, is a catalyst for the growth of non-state terrorism. So, recent reports genocide in Nigeria should be setting off alarm bells throughout the US national security establishment. It isn't. This is particularly worrisome given Nigeria supplies 15% of US oil. For more on what the US should be doing see the post: WEAK, FAILED, AND COLLAPSED STATES. Remember, it is much less expensive to prevent state failure than to resurrect a state that has failed.

AL QAEDA'S GRAND STRATEGY: SUPERPOWER BAITING

What is al Qaeda's grand strategy? An in depth interview with Saad al-Faqih, an expert on al Qaeda, provides some insight into this. Dr. al-Faqih (picture) highlights the role of Dr. Zawahiri in evolving the strategic thinking of bin Laden:

Zawahiri impressed upon Bin Laden the importance of understanding the American mentality. The American mentality is a cowboy mentality-- if you confront them with their identity theoretically and practically they will react in an extreme manner. In other words, America with all its resources and establishments will shrink into a cowboy when irritated successfully. They will then elevate you and this will satisfy the Muslim longing for a leader who can successfully challenge the West. Zawahiri advised Bin Laden to forget about the 12 page statement as nobody had read it and instead issue a short statement identifying every American as a target. Even though this was controversial from an Islamic perspective, Zawahiri argued on pragmatic grounds that it had to be sanctioned. The statement in February 1998, which was only 3 or 4 lines, effectively sanctioned shedding the blood of every American.

This decision resulted in the east African embassy attacks of 1998. The result of these attacks were as follows:

Zawahiri had prophesised correctly—the Americans over-reacted by bombing Afghanistan and Sudan and consequently shifted the focus of blame away from al-Qaeda. If the Americans had not over-reacted to that attack they would have won a great moral victory. Clinton himself identified Bin Laden as the enemy and, in effect, delivered a hero to the Muslims. Before the embassy attacks only a few intellectuals and people with scholastic and practical interests in Jihad remembered Bin Laden but after the attack Bin Laden was transformed into a popular hero. The Americans thereafter persisted in turning Bin Laden into an obsession. The immediate effect of this was that thousands of Muslims travelled to Afghanistan. I was told that before the Kenya and Tanzania bombings hardly one or two people from the Arab countries would make their way to Afghanistan in any given month but after the bombings almost ten people would make their way there on a daily basis….

He goes on to explain the motivation for 9/11 and the result of the American reaction:

The next stage involved initiating a full scale polarization between Muslims and America. Therefore, even if al-Qaeda disappears there would be a huge interest in fighting the U.S. and its allies. This underpinned the planning of the 9/11 attacks. The purpose was not to kill thousands of people. Nobody saw the attacks as an assault against buildings and people, almost everyone saw it as a symbolic action. And everybody is agreed that the world changed after 9/11. The way the attacks were orchestrated had a lot to do with this—those young boys came with nothing and only relied on their will, secrecy, devotion and great perseverance. How on earth could 19 young men with box cutters wreak such humiliation on the sole Super Power of the world? The answer is linked to the “asymmetrical warfare” that I will address later. The 9/11 attacks forced America into a cosmic battle with Muslims. Of course America claims it is waging war against terrorism but actually Muslims perceive this war as an unprecedented assault on Islam. Ultimately the real issue here is the perception of Muslims and the vast majority of Muslims around the world feel besieged by America.

The result of this, according to al-Faqih will be internal turmoil in America and its eventual adoption of an isolationist policy:

Now strategically I think America has not only lost but it is likely to vanish. It has started a campaign which has forced the majority of Muslims against it. But of course tactically it has scored major gains. A lot of these so-called strategic analysts mistake these tactical gains for strategic leverage. The point is that these people are not strategic analysts because they never bring the historical, ideological and social dimensions into their calculations. They only consider political and military factors....

There are many people in America who want to tackle the matter in a much more intelligent manner but they have been silenced by this pervasive McCarthyism. There are people that are very tired with this cowboy attitude. Once the next attack occurs they are likely to say that Bush has had two years of this cosmic battle against terrorism and we ended up with an even bigger attack. Now is the time to try a different approach. Now of course the right wingers, the Zionists and the arms lobby will refuse to give ground and then a clash inside America is likely to ensue.

SCALE-FREE NETWORKS

Scale-free networks are everywhere. The can be seen in airline traffic routes, connections between actors in Hollywood, weblog links, sexual relationships, and terrorist networks. So what exactly is a scale-free network? A scale-free network is one that obeys a power law distribution in the number of connections between nodes on the network. Some few nodes exhibit extremely high connectivity (essentially scale-free) while the vast majority are relatively poorly connected. The reason that scale-free networks emerge, as opposed to evenly distributed random networks, is due to these factors:

• Rapid growth confers preference to early entrants. The longer a node has been in place the greater the number of links to it. First mover advantage is very important.
  
• In an environment of too much information people link to nodes that are easier to find. This preferential linking reinforces itself by making the easier to find nodes even more easy to find.
  
• The greater the capacity of the hub (bandwidth, work ethic, etc.) the faster its growth.

The Strength and Weaknesses of Scale-Free Networks
The proliferation of scale-free networks and our increasing dependence on them (particularly given their prevalence in energy, transportation, and communications systems) begs the question: how reliable are these networks? Here's some insight into this:

• Scale-free networks are extremely tolerant of random failures. In a random network, a small number of random failures can collapse the network. A scale-free network can absorb random failures up to 80% of its nodes before it collapses. The reason for this is the inhomogeneity of the nodes on the network -- failures are much more likely to occur on relatively small nodes.
  
• Scale-free networks are extremely vulnerable to intentional attacks on their hubs. Attacks that simultaneously eliminate as few as 5-15% of a scale-free network's hubs can collapse the network. Simultaneity of an attack on hubs is important. Scale-free networks can heal themselves rapidly if an insufficient number of hubs necessary for a systemic collapse are removed.
  
• Scale-free networks are extremely vulnerable to epidemics. In random networks, epidemics need to surpass a critical threshold (a number of nodes infected) before it propogates system-wide. Below the threshold, the epidemic dies out. Above the threshold, the epidemic spreads exponentially. Recent evidence indicates that the threshold for epidemics on scale-free networks is zero.

What this means for Counter-terrorists
Given the vulnerability of scale-free networks to intentional disruption, what does this mean for counter-terrorist planners (which I hope, but doubt, they are thinking about)? This theory has strong implications for defense as well as offense given that terrorist networks are likely highly heterogeneous. Here's what it means:

• Eliminating terrorist network hubs will likely not be effective. Non-state terrorist networks exhibit small world properties (see "TERRORIST CELLS" for more). This means that while large hubs still dominate the network, the presence of tight clusters (cells), continues to provide local connectivity when the hubs are removed. This implies that the attack on al Qaeda's Afghanistan training camps (the location of multiple hubs) did not collapse its network in any meaningful way. Rather, it atomized the network into anonymous clusters of connectivity until the hubs could reassert their priority again. Additionally, many of these clusters, even without the global connectivity provided by the hubs, will still be able to conduct attacks if they are of sufficient size and complexity (a variety of skill sets). A better approach may be to observe the hubs covertly to assertain the location of local clusters that need to be shut down.
  
• Critical terrorist social network hubs cannot be identified based on the number of links alone. Hubs vary in value depending on multiple vectors such as depth of connections (strong face-to-face social history is extremely important for trust development in covert networks -- see MAPPING TERRORIST NETWORKS for more), frequency of contact (which may indicate the individual is a conduit for information flow rather than an resource), and duration of links (which is tied to the importance of that individuals skill set to ongoing operations of cells they connect to). Analysis of the network along each of vectors can make for better decision making.
  
• Defense against attacks on hubs can be achieved in ways other than physical defense. These methods include: increasing the capacity of all hubs to absorb the taffic of failed hubs (a kind of surge protection), limiting or decreasing the maximum number of connections to any one hub (reduction in criticality), and increasing the cross connectivity of the network (local pooling of resources).

JOURNAL: How to win a war of attrition

Can terrorists win a war of attrition? One of the best ways to answer to this question is to compare the relative cost/benefit ratios of the combatants. Currently, this comparison is decidedly against nation-states. For example, the economic cost of 9/11 to the US ($83 billion) was five orders of magnitude higher than the costs of the attack to the terrorists (estimated to be $500,000). As Donald Rumsfeld said, "The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' cost of millions." Fortunately, many terrorist attacks today do not fit the model of 9/11 given their focus on bloodletting and bodycounts. Unfortunately, that will change as terrorists become global guerrillas and begin to focus on the disruption of systems.

JOURNAL: The role of transnational corporations in global violence

The role of transnational corporations in supporting repression, promoting regional unrest, and creating new shortages that will lead to resource wars is largely unexplored. The Swiss security analyst, Daniele Ganser, is on a mission to change that. If nation-states want to avoid being drawn into future conflicts started and abetted by transnational corporations, they need to focus on this topic by creating and enforcing standards of conduct for corporate behavior.

THE NEW BLITZKRIEG

In all cases of radical improvements in warfare, the actual improvement is made much more through new thinking on how to fight than from innovations in weaponry. These innovations in theory typically don't occur via a linear process of evolution but rather through rapid breakthroughs. A breakthrough of this type was made by the German General Heinz Guderian. In the early 1930’s he read the innovative theories of armored warfare written by Liddell Hart and JFC Fuller as was convinced they represented a radical change in how war can be fought -- as opposed to the stalemate of defense typified by WWI. In secret he practiced the methods he learned with cardboard tanks. Years later, he rode real tanks in a Blitzkrieg across France in 1940 with devastating effect.

Our current situation is characterized by a similar stalemate of defense. America and Israel are fighting a bloody war of attrition with terrorists with neither side able to achieve a decisive result. To trace the development of this new form of warfare, it is necessary to examine the how armored warfare achieved its success. There are strong similarities between it and what is coming.

The success of Blitzkrieg rests on a brilliant insight: modern militaries are heavily reliant on extremely large and ponderous logistics and communication systems. The relationship between fighting men and the people that support them is called the tooth-to-tale ratio. That ratio has been growing at a furious rate over the last century -- it is currently at high of 10 support people for every “trigger-puller.” The objective in maneuver-based armored combat (Blitzkrieg) is to separate the forward deployed fighting forces from their logistics and command system by driving to the rear of the enemy. Given the ongoing and immediate needs of the mass of forward deployed soldiers for copious supplies and strict command/control, the interruption caused by armored forces operating in rear areas rapidly results in a collapse along forward deployed line, pell-mell retreat, and capture.

In this new substrate (nation-states vs. non-state networks within a global, information economy), global guerrillas will use a similar insight to win decisive battles. In this context, the conventional armies of nation-states aren't the target, a nation-state's economic and societal infrastructure is. Specifically, our large urbanized population centers are reliant on a complex set of relatively automated infrastructures. The operational objective of the global guerrilla warfare will be to separate a large urban population from its infrastructure and take advantage of the collapse and chaos that results. Global guerrilla operations will rapidly maneuver to or swarm on an urban center's infrastructure, attack it as quickly as possible at critical junctures to cause systemic collapse, continue the attacks as long as practicable, and disappear until the next operation.

JOURNAL: Supreme Vulnerability?

Supreme Court Judge David Souter was injured in an attack while jogging alone at night. This brings up an important question: where is his security detail?? It turns out that the Supreme Court Justices do not have a dedicated security detail. Let's fix this.

A NATIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK

Non-state terrorist networks enjoy many advantages over the traditional hierarchies of nation-states. They learn, share, innovate, and survive disruption better than hierarchies. This strongly implies that best way to defeat these terrorist networks is to adopt a network architecture ourselves. The best approach to begin this process of transformation is to establish a nation-wide intelligence network. The advantages of a national intelligence network are real. For example: almost all of the information needed to identify and stop 9/11, the DC sniper, and the first World Trade Center attack was present in the nation's intelligence/information system prior to the occurance of the events. It was the current network's flaws: stove piping, one-way flows, gaps, over centralization, security restrictions, interfaces, and multiple technologies that prevented the timely use of this information. To prevent future attacks, the Markle Foundation has prepared a 2003 report, "Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security" (PDF) that recommends building a dynamic and decentralized national intelligence network.

Their proposed national intelligence network (dubbed SHARE -- Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange) includes the following:

• A decentralized architecture.
  
• Real-time information flow.
  
• Two-way publishing.
  
• Ad hoc connections/information flow.
  
• Scalable systems (to hundreds of thousands of participants -- 14 federal intelligence agencies, state and local law enforcement, hospitals, fire departments, and private industry).
  
• Easily filterable.
  
• Provides multiple nodes of analysis.
  
• Many-node information sharing (within limits of security access level).
  
• Easy directory development.
  
• Open architecture (XML).
  
• Able to handle multiple data types (docs, spreadsheets, multimedia, etc.).
  

What's needed: A national Weblog/Wiki network
These requirements beg the question: what system would enable all of this functionality? The simple and powerful answer is (it is the only system I know of that can accomplish this): a weblog/wiki network with fast search indexing (along the lines of what we have been talking about on K-logs for the last three years). A network of this type will:

• A decentralized architecture for publishing and consuming information (via Really Simple Syndication -- RSS).
  
• Real-time information flow through the use of a search engine (ie. Google appliances) and prompted indexing (through weblog pings to the search engine when new posts are published).
  
• Ad hoc connections and information flow through RSS subscriptions (an RSS aggregator ala Bloglines, NewsGator, Radio, or Technorati).
  
• Scalable systems -- already demonstrated via the millions of weblogs on the Web today.
  
• Easily filterable through Intranet search and through applications built on an expanded Google API (or something like it).
  
• Provides multiple nodes of analysis (filtering and independent analysis) through analyst weblogs. The operation of the weblog world demonstrates this everyday.
  
• Provides many node information sharing through easy to use Web interface standards (which implies zero training for users).
  
• Easy directory development through a Wiki (see the Wikipedia for an example) and OPML (Outline Processor Markup Language -- based on XML).
  
• Open architecture using XML. Weblogs use XML. Both RSS and OPML are XML based.
  
• Able to handle multiple data types. Weblogs allow the publishing and the reciept (automated if necessary through RSS enclosures) of multiple data types. Also, search engines like Google allow these data types to be easily searched once published.

Let's get moving!
A national intelligence system of this type can scale to a global level, linking up open societies everywhere there is an Internet connection. The only requirement necessary to start this is the decision to start -- the expense would be negligible (tens of millions), training would be almost unnecessary (Web standards are used -- almost everyone knows how to type an e-mail or search using Google), and time needed to impliment short (less than a year from the word go to launch of the basic system). If you would like to discuss this in depth, please contact me directly.

US OIL SYSTEM VULNERABILIY

As terrorists move the global guerrilla war paradigm, infrastructure becomes the main focus of attacks. The recent attacks on the Iraq's al Baqra oil terminal (see Journal: Attacks on systems?) and the deadly attack on western petroleum employees in Saudi Arabia, indicate that this shift is already going on. However, US oil infrastructure vulnerability isn't limited to international production and transport, there are significant vulnerabilities within US borders. As with most US infrastructure there are extreme levels of concentration due to under investment and efficiency. Allegro Energy Group's, "How Pipelines Make the US Energy System Work," (PDF) provides insight into this issue.

• Transport concentration. A large majority of US oil (68%) is delivered by domestic pipelines. The US oil pipeline infrastructure is extremely concentrated with relatively few large pipelines. Additionally, US pipelines ship more than just oil. They also provide transport for: diesel and gas. An attack on a pipeline will have an impact on multiple markets. Experience in Iraq shows that even limited physical attacks against oil pipeline infrastructure can disrupt transport for extended periods (months). These physical attacks can be made with relative ease.

• Control system concentration. As with the power system, the US oil system relies on a security-free command and control system (a SCADA network). This system lacks encryption, operates on open networks, and is easily hacked (see "Power Peril" for more on control system vulnerabilities).

• Production concentration. The Gulf Coast provides 55% of domestic crude and 47% of refined product production. This presents a similar vulnerability to the al Baqra oil terminal. A single, well planned attack could provide strategic impact that could not be easily replaced.

How to Limit this Vulnerability
The US oil industry has made some efforts to improve security on our pipeline infrastructure including: increased security for critical facilities, improved coordination with law enforcement, and an Internet mapping system. Unfortunately, the industry is in deep denial as to the potential threat. For example, here's a recent quote form an industry body: "When it comes to pipeline safety and security, Americans have little to fear." A more realistic response would be to add the following security measures:

• A system wide security sensor network and an encypted/secure command and control network. Sensor and wireless technology has made amazing strides over the last decade. It's time to bite the bullet and invest in these networks.

• An industry sponsored private military rapid response team. Infrastructure industries should not rely on US law enforcement for dedicated help. The private military market (which has become both large and sophisticated over the last decade) can provide a high quality dedicated force that can quickly respond to incidents to limit damage.

• Redundancy and local stockpiling. This approach requires a change in mindset from just-in-time delivery (which is efficient) to continuity of supply (which takes into account customer costs due to a disruption of supply).

JOURNAL: Reducing the need to connect

In his book, "Linked: The New Science of Networks," Albert Laszlo Barabasi concluded, “We must help eliminate the need and desire of the nodes [the people] to form links to terrorist organizations by offering them a chance to belong to more constructive and meaningful webs. No matter how good we become at winning each net battle, if we are unable to inhibit the desire for links [for destructive purposes], the [terrorist] net war will never end.”

Reflect on this when reading about the systematic humiliation and torture of Iraqis in Abu Ghraib prison (this was systematic in that it was part of a larger effort to break down prisoners for interrogation). Humilation is driving the growth of terrorist networks in the Middle East by increasing the susceptibility of people to terrorist recruitment (see Atran, "The Genesis of Suicide Terrorism" PDF). This is an excellent example of why the occupation of Iraq is working at cross-purposes to the GWOT (global war on terrorism). It is also a good demonstration of what military thinkers mean when they advocate a policy of de-escalation in Iraq and the GWOT. De-escalation is the systematic reduction of factors that drive people to terrorism and not a sign of weakness.