Global Guerrillas

NETWORK ANALYSIS TO PREVENT ATTACKS

A trademark of al Qaeda global operations is extensive prior preparation. Many of the larger operations have taken years to execute. This build-up period presents counter-terrorists with the opportunity to unearth potential members of the operational cell well prior to the "h-hour of the op." These early discoveries, if handled correctly can lead to the members of the rest of the operational network. Unfortunately, most of our security systems are geared towards the immediate arrest and detention of suspects, once identified. A smarter approach would be identify, observe, and act (only when a critical mass of the network is identified) -- very much like that used by financial or organized crime investigations. Perversely, new powers that enable law enforcement to arrest and detain suspected terrorists at will, with the hope of pressuring confessions in detention, works against us.

Valdis Krebs (an extremely talented analyst of terrorist networks -- which matters a lot in a field that is as much mindset as method) demonstrates this in a new article that details how the 9/11 network could have been unearthed based on the early 2000 discovery of 2 cell members (see -- Krebs, "Connecting the Dots"). In his example, he demonstrates how the careful tracking of connections between potential members -- money flows, e-mail/phone contact, and potential face-to-face contact -- can be mapped using social network analysis. Ties to known terrorists convert a suspected network into an active one. Connections of connections identify emerging network "leadership."

Action against the network should only be taken if a critical number of members have been identified (evidenced by diminishing returns from further investigation) or there is a sign of impending attack. These signs include:

• Increased activity in the network. Networks are dynamic and the rate of connection activation is a critical data point.
  
• Reversal of money flows. This happens when excess funds not needed for an operation are removed for protection from post operation arrests.
  
• Large face-to-face meetings of key members. A meetings are infrequent (they may only occur once) to prevent discovery but are necessary for pre-action coordination. A "pulsed" face-to-face meeting is a significant signal of impending attack.

IRAQ: ELECTRICITY DISRUPTION

A major failure of Iraq's CPA over the last year was its inability to increase electricity production over pre-war levels. Iraq's electricity production has been stalled between 3,000 and 4,000 megawatts (See the attached chart from the Brooking Institution), well short of the CPA goal of 6,000 megawatts. The reasons for this included:

• Antiquated and dilapidated equipment. Long term underinvestment in infrastructure and two "hot" wars had destroyed much of the electrical infrastructure.
  
• A complex network. The variety of equipment providers (from all over the globe) has made the network diffucult to fix and operate.
  
• Attacks by global guerrillas. Over 100 attacks against power lines (and over 1,200 high voltage towers) have been attacked over the last year. Additionally, attacks on fuel (oil) supplies used by powerplants has shut down production.

How a lack of power has impacted Iraq
While no one attack on power production and delivery in Iraq has been crippling, the aggregate of these small attacks has been. Today, seven of Iraq's 15 provinces get less than 8 hours of power a day. The remaining eight get only 9 to 15 a day. The direct impact of this electricity shortage is difficult to unwind, however, it is clear that it has had a signficant impact on the following areas:

• Economics (and by extension employment). Companies require power for everything from computers to manufacturing machinery. The lack of power has idled companies and prevented an increase in employment. Currently, unemployment stands at 28-45% (see attached chart on employment).
  
• Security. The rise in attacks on power systems (as well as oil systems) has caused the CPA and the Iraqi interim government to allocate nearly 30% of its forces (over 70,000 men) to infrastructure protection. This allocation of forces is at the expense of other security needs (anti-terrorism).
  
• Legitmacy. A critical aspect of legitmacy is the ability of a government to keep vital infrastructure operational. Power disruptions served to undermine the CPAs popularity and will do the same with the interim government.

What this means
The efficacy of global guerrilla strategies is being proven daily in Iraq. This success will result in the following:

• The interim government in Iraq will fail if these attacks continue. If it does, the January election will prove to be very divisive and may be a prelude to civil war.
  
• Iraqi global guerrillas will hone their skills and share them with al Qaeda.
  
• Global guerrillas will use these stategies in Saudi Arabia.

JOURNAL: The Security of Iraq's Transportation Infrastructure

How safe is Iraq's roads? Diligence LLC, a insider funded security firm (PMC -- private military company), has put this excellent graphic together showing security on roadways around Baghdad. Note that travel on almost all roads, into and out of Baghdad, are at high risk of attack.

JOURNAL: Iraq's facility protection service

Iraq's CPA reports that it has hired 73,000 men for a new facility protection service to guard critical infrastructure in Iraq. It is interesting to note that this is ~ 36% of all Iraqi's in uniform (including the 77,000 police). This is an important indicator that global guerrillas are considered the most important threat to the future of Iraq. Additionally, ~20,000 international private military contractors are in Iraq to guard company personnel that are rebuilding the country and train security forces. 25% of every dollar spent on reconstruction is used for private security protection. It appears that market demand is driving this and not any coordinated planning efforts. NOTE: Saudi Arabia has 30,000 guards allocated to its infrastructure protection effort. It is considering the use of private military contractors and has recently opted to allow expatriates working in the country to carry personal firearms. What is amazing is that so much money is being spent without any understanding (framework) of global guerrilla warfare.

SCENARIO: THE DISRUPTION OF SAUDI ARABIA

Long-range scenario analysis, like that done by the Global Business Network, is a great way to understand how the interplay of multiple interrelated factors shape the future. Unfortunately, this analysis almost always misses major innovations that change the underlying assumptions by which the world works. Examples of innovations like this in the technology industry: the PC and the Internet. Examples in warfare: nuclear weapons, armored warfare, and soon global guerrilla warfare. These innovations usually invalidate the scenarios developed through this technique. However, within the context of an innovation like the development of global guerrilla warfare, descriptive scenario development is an excellent way to demonstrate how it impacts the future.

Here is a scenario for how early forms of global guerrilla warfare would disrupt Saudi Arabia. It is an inexpensive operation (less than ~$1 million) that would generate well over $1 trillion in economic damage. Specific points of comparision: 9/11 cost ~$250-500,000 and resulted in ~$80 billion in damage (although, in contrast to the operations in this scenario, it was high risk). The recent attack on Iraq's pipeline cost <$10,000 and resulted in ~$500 million in economic damage (it was low risk).

A Change in Leadership

The death of Abdulaziz al-Muqrin and other senior leaders of al Qaeda's Saudi Arabian operation created the opportunity for a change in approach. Due to the vacuum in leadership, former members of al-Zarqawi's operation in Iraq moved into leadership positions within the Saudi network. With them, they brought a deep appreciation for the success achieved through infrastructure disruption in Iraq and the techniques needed to accomplish it.

During the transition period during the summer of 2004, few operations were conducted except for two well planned assassinations of western expatriates. These operations served their purpose. The exodus of western expertise continued as tens of thousands failed to return to the Kingdom after the summer holiday. Most of the guerrilla's effort was spent on collecting intelligence about the Kingdom's infrastructure.

The three main cells were given different areas of coverage: oil, electricity, and water. The cells mapped the infrastructures, established the position and response times of emergency forces, and the viability of entrance/exit routes. The subsequent network analysis done by a central planning group determined the most vulnerable sections of the infrastructures with the greatest potential for cascading system failure. The planning group followed a golden rule of global guerrilla warfare: use the network as your weapon. The final list of potential targets were sent back to the operational cells for final target selection, additional intelligence collection, operational planning, and execution.

The attacks begin

The electricity cell was the first to take action with an attack on one of the two high voltage power lines from the Ghazlan power complex. Since Ghazlan provides over 40% of the power in the eastern province and the electrical network is sparse (and except for a single connection to the central region, isolated), this attack caused over voltages that resulted in a system wide blackout that lasted two days. Oil production from the province was cut in half as systems (refineries, pumping stations, port facilities, etc.) that supported the huge Ghawar oil field were unable to acquire the power necessary for full production. Oil prices shot up to $53 a barrel as a result of the attack. Al Qaeda financing units, with full knowledge that the attack was about to occur, were able to generate $15 m in profits from relatively small but highly leveraged positions taken by confederates with market access.

The Saudi government reacted by increasing security on the electrical grid. However, the scale of the problem -- thousands of miles of high voltage lines -- prevented any measurable increase in the effectiveness of the security effort. Al Qaeda's electricity cell was able to continue with a major attack on the al Fahdli high voltage substation in its second attack. The damage done by this attack took three weeks to repair and caused blackouts and brownouts that rippled through the eastern province for days. The lack of casualties during these attacks led the group to keep up their effort unopposed with a new attack every month.

Just after the second attack, the water group attacked their first target. It was one of the three major seawater pipelines feeding the water injection systems of Ghawar. Since seawater is injected into oil fields to maintain positive pressure, the loss of one of the major sources of water caused engineers to shut down oil production. This was due to the fear that asymmetrical water flows in the field could result in the flow of oil into unrecoverable pockets. At this point oil surged again to $75 a barrel. Al Qaeda financing units were able to generate an additional $30 m in short term positions. Saudi government forces, caught unaware by this new attack, were immediately dispatched to the seawater pipelines. Again the length of the pipelines prevented adequate security.

With a large proportion of its meager security forces allocated to the defense of western workers, electricity infrastructure, and water conduits the defense of oil infrastructure suffered. The attacks on the eastern province also resulted in the full utilization of the east-west oil pipeline called the Petroline. The oil cell took advantage of this by attacking the #5 pumping station on the pipeline. As part of the attack it damaged the adjacent natural gas liquids pipeline. The resulting explosion burned for three days and took two weeks to repair. The long length of the pipeline, at 1,200 km, allowed the oil group to safely make three additional attacks over the next year with the same level of impact.

The impact

The combination of these attacks reduced Saudi oil production by 1/3 over the first year of action (a loss of over 3 m barrels a day). In combination with continued losses in production in Iraq, oil was now trading at $90 a barrel. Saudi Arabia was able to generate as much revenue from its limited production as it did before the attack started but the vast majority of the profits from this price increase went to multinational hedge funds. The global economy entered a recession and many developing nations were put onto the ropes. The Chinese economy, in particular, was extremely hard hit and suffered its first quarter of negative growth in this century.

The record of low casualties among attackers, only one team of three people had been killed subsequent to an attack, and the drastically increased funding generated through market-based methods, allowed al Qaeda to hire mercenaries to expand their operations. The operational tempo was up to five organized attacks a month on different portions of the Saudi infrastructure by the fall of 2005. In addition to these larger attacks, al Qaeda's call for the greater participation and the general distribution of plans for how to do this, was able to generate three small attacks on random portions of the infrastructure each month.

The Saudi government was in crisis. Both internal and external pressure to resolve the crisis was intense. It was unable to raise funds for new infrastructure development from international capital markets needed to meet demands from population growth. In a sign of things to come, demonstrations were held in several cities to protest the inability of the government to keep services working. These demonstrations were brutally put down which further increased the tension and improved al Qaeda recruitment. With its hands full in Iraq, which had not calmed down despite great efforts during 2005, the US was unable to provide support to the Kingdom in any meaningful way even if they had asked for it.

The realization had finally arrived. The epochal war of the 21st century had arrived.

JOURNAL: Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia?

Whither al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia? If al-moqrin (al-muqrin) is indeed dead (he is the al Qaeda entrepreneur in Saudi Arabia), it may signal a shift in strategy. The al-Qaeda operations that are working are focused on Iraqi infrastructure. Virtually none of the cell members that have disrupted Iraqi infrastructure have been captured/killed. The results of these attacks -- on both electrical and oil networks -- have caused massive damage to the Iraqi government. This demonstrates the extremely positive feedback loops driving strategy development in al Qaeda. Additionally, if this strategy is ported to Saudi Arabia, new market-based financing mechanisms open up. This would open up a self-reinforcing process of mercenary action and market financing. Perversely, it will likely be al Qaeda's inability to sustain terror operations in the face of intense pressure that will force them to adopt more effective strategies.

JOURNAL: Terror and infrastructure disruption

Unfortunately, global guerrillas are on the right track in Iraq. Infrastructure disruption strikes at core layers of the newly emerging state's legitimacy. It also acts synergistically with terror attacks. Terror attacks impact the psychological perception of a citizen's physical security, the state's primary responsibility (state's claim a monopoly on violence). However, terror attacks don't directly impact the vast majority of people. In contrast, global guerrilla infrastructure attacks directly impact the lives of average citizens and reinforces the psychological trauma of terrorism. Picture this: terror attacks occur in your city and then your lights are cut off. This turns anxiety into anger against those in charge. Additionally, infrastructure disruption robs the state of the revenues it needs to fight the guerrillas it faces.

Robert Kaplan, the author of many great articles on the developing global turmoil, has some comments relevant to this based on his recent visit to Iraq (Iraq is the test bed of global guerrilla strategies):

The Iraqis I met while I was with the Marines were angry about the lack of basic utilities... Iraqis can't understand how a country can overthrow their hated dictator, but can't get the water running.

This combo is going to be much more effective in Saudi Arabia given 1) the lack of a nation-state identity, 2) its legitimacy is strongly tied to continued tranquility, and 3) its reliance on highly paid western experts, 4) almost all of its income is tied to a highly leveraged, tightly coupled infrastructure, and 5) there is already signficant dissatisfaction with the quality of services supplied by the government. Counter-intuitively, the death of al-Muqrin may force al Qaeda's Saudi Arabian cells to adopt global guerrilla strategies.

GLOBAL GUERRILLA TARGET: INVESTMENT

Iraq's April 2004 Basra conference was an event planned to showcase investment opportunities in its oil industry. Iraq has reserves on par with Saudi Arabia that are far from fully exploited. Hundreds of billions of dollars is needed to transform Iraq into an oil powerhouse able to handle the rapid increase in demand expected over the next decade (the world economy needs Iraq to do this if oil prices are going to remain stable). Expected attendees included industry powerhouses like ExxonMobil and BP. However, things didn't work out as planned. The conference was cancelled due to security concerns (nobody wanted to come). Iraq's global guerrillas scored another tactical victory in their war on global markets.

While the continued dearth of investment in Iraq is bad, it pales in comparison to what is about to happen to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia needs over one hundred billion dollars of outside investment in each of its major infrastructure categories: oil, electricity, and water. Global guerrillas operating in the Kingdom have this investment in their sights. Years ago, nation-states had the resources necessary to make investments in uncertain environments like Iraq. That is not possible today. The scale of what is needed is beyond the grasp of any nation or even groups of nations. What is needed are the deep pockets of global capital markets, and that money is flowing out of this region rather than in.

The fact that this aspect of the war against global guerrillas is off the map of our $700 billion (all-in cost) security establishment demonstrates how out of whack our approach to security is. In order to win this war we will need to change. Unfortunately, that change will probably take a decade or more.

Here's how the global guerrillas will attack investment. Corporate investors can handle risk. They run from uncertainty. Uncertainty in this context is an immeasurable threat to an investment. Because it can't be quantified, the expected returns can't be calculated. Without knowledge of a range of expected returns, particularly on investments of this size, they aren't made. Global guerrillas create uncertainty through the following mechanisms:

• Attacks on personnel. Global guerrilla attacks on key corporate personnel in country is already underway. The loss of this personnel is a direct attack on a long-term asset of a company that transcends the current investment they are working on. It also impacts future hiring. Most unsettling to CEOs is that an investment may result in attacks that follow the corporation back to the country of origin. CEOs do not want to become targets of terrorist assassination.
  
• Attacks on facilities. Ongoing attacks on investment properties in these countries can reduce an investment into a blackhole for cash. The potential that an investment can put an entire company at risk is not something most companies are willing to consider.
  
• Attacks against guarantors. Ultimately, companies can't turn to insurance companies for protection against this type of uncertainty. The rates they will charge would eliminate any potential returns (we are already seeing this in Iraq's reconstruction). This task will likely fall to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Continued attacks on their sources of their revenue as well as key government figures makes their status as a guarantor of any investment questionable. The only remaining source of guarantees in the USA and it is unlikely that, given its current budget deficits, that this will occur.

JOURNAL: A quote that sums it up

Nicholas Blanford at the Christian Science Monitor was able to get the classic quote that epitomizes global guerrilla warfare:

"It would take the whole Chinese Army to protect all of our pipelines,'' says an Iraqi oil official, who asked not to be named.

JOURNAL: GGs attack Basra

New report (15 June 2004), that al qaeda's global guerrillas have hit pipelines to a major oil storage facility in Basra. Oil production was halted.

The main oil pipeline, that carries 50,000 barrels per hour was sabotaged. Oil workers shifted the flow to the back-up pipeline. However, that pipeline was only able to withstand a flow of 30,000 barrels and hour and was damaged as a result (this is an example of the network attacking itself). The current story is that this second pipeline was sabotaged too. The main pipeline will take weeks to fix due to large pools of burning oil. The smaller pipeline will take several days.

Retail value of the oil not shipped over 10 days is $600 m. The previous major attack on a Basra pipeline took two weeks to fix and resulted in a loss of 9 m barrels or a loss of $315 m (retail value). This recent attack will likely treble the $200 m in lost revenues suffered by the Iraqi government due to sabotage attacks over the last year.

All Iraqi oil exports are accomplished via the Basra terminal. The northern pipeline to Turkey has been mostly inoperative due to ongoing attacks. In a related attack, the top security official of Iraq's northern oil company was assassinated. This attack will serve to support oil prices at their current levels despite a general downward trend due to increased Saudi production.

JOURNAL: Global Guerrillas test tactics in Iraq

Global guerrillas are stepping up their ongoing attacks on the power infrastructure in Iraq. Today (June 14, 2004), westerners (employees of General Electric and their security guards from Olive Security) working on the Iraqi electrical infrastructure were killed in a targeted car bomb attack. This follows an earlier attack on Russian electrical system workers that resulted in a general pull-out of those workers.

The upshot of this and other attacks is that production is stalled at ~4,400 megawatts (prewar levels) depsite $5.5 b in reconstruction funds allocated last fall. This is less than estimated demand of 5,000 megawatts (which is expected to rise to 7,000 megawatts with a peak of 8,000 megawatts this summer).

Some interesting items:

• Current production numbers have been kept private to prevent saboteurs from getting feedback on the effectiveness of their attacks.


• Instead of a SCADA system, Iraqi's use a combination of phone calls and intuition.


• The system's complexity as well as the American tendency to centralize production with efficient, expensive equipment is also working against rapid repair. Some Iraqis also complain that Western engineers have been unable to grasp the complexities of a creaky electrical grid that is a patchwork of ancient Russian, German, Yugoslavian, Chinese and American equipment. The Iraqis say that the engineers, often Americans, reflexively reach for fancy new gear costing tens of millions of dollars that can take months or years to order, ship and install.


• Before the war, Baghdad had 20 hours of power today. Currently power is allocated is spread across the country evenly at 8-12 hours a day.

Power infrastructure is key to almost all forms of reconstruction and development. Again, Iraq is proving to be the test lab of global guerrilla warfare.

JOURNAL: New Global Guerrilla Operations

Here are some recent news reports on two new global guerrilla operations. The first is a network enabled attack for propoganda purposes. Wired reports on spam zombies (virus infected PCs) being used to distribute a huge volume of German anti-immigration e-mail to recipients across the globe. The second is a LA Times report on how global guerrillas in Iraq are targeting doctors (the high load nodes of the medical services network).

JOURNAL: Global Guerrillas in Iraq

Global Guerrillas are on the march in Iraq. Here's a report from the New York Times on recent attacks near Baghdad:

An enormous power plant south of Baghdad was shut down last weekend by coordinated attacks on fuel and transmission lines, American and Iraqi government officials said Tuesday. The sabotage raised new fears that insurgents were beginning to make targets of major sectors of the infrastructure as part of an overall plan to destabilize the interim Iraqi government.... A second senior official in the Electricity Ministry said that the weekend attack was the latest in a series in the same area, and that repairs on the lines had repeatedly been followed by new strikes.

More worrisome than this specific act of sabotage, said Mr. Haris, the Iraqi minister, is the pattern of attacks on the country's electrical grid. He estimated that the high-tension lines that are the backbone of the grid had been attacked an average of twice a week recently, and he expressed irritation at what he said was a refusal by the Coalition Provisional Authority to provide security for the lines.

and the futility of defensive efforts:

But the American official who confirmed the weekend attack said that the authority was helping train thousands of Electricity Ministry guards, but that no force could provide 24-hour-a-day security for the more than 10,000 miles of major power lines in Iraq... "If there is no electricity, no water, whatever, the government will fail," Dr. Tawfiq said.

This is further confirmation that al Qaeda is shifting to global guerrilla strategies. If you would like a peak 5 years into the future, you will have to read my new book (I am working hard on it right now).

AL QAEDA'S SILENT ALLY: HEDGE FUNDS

In the global war against market-states, al Qaeda can rely on hedge funds to amplify the economic damage of their attacks. If well executed, these attacks could result in catastrophic damage to the global economy. As an early example of this, Al Qaeda's campaign to destabilize the world's oil market is going well. The price of oil rose from April's average of ~$33 to a spot high of over $42 a barrel in May. The following factors made this rise possible:

• Rapidly growing global demand. Particularly from China and the US.
  
• Little excess capacity. Current demand for oil is nearing the limits of current capacity.
  
• The fear of a future al Qaeda attack on Saudi facilities that could impact production.

Hedge Funds
These factors, taken by themselves, are insufficient to explain the rapid run-up in oil prices. Al Qaeda has not proven they can disrupt Saudi oil production and excess Saudi capacity is more than sufficient to cover the vast majority of potential threat scenarios (from my red-hat review of the potential of attacks). The real cause of the run-up in oil prices were that actions of speculators, in the form of hedge funds armed with complex derivatives. The results of this were:

• A huge transfer of wealth. These hedge funds, and not in large part the oil producers themselves, have been able to extract upwards of $600 m a day throughout May 2004 from the oil market -- a total of ~$19 billion for May alone.
  
• Inflation pressure on the world economy just as it is climbing out of recession.
  
• Significant damage to key industries that are heavily dependent on oil prices -- for example, the airlines.

Future Dynamics
This example indicates that al Qaeda has an important new ally in their war on the global market-states: Global hedge funds. Global guerrillas, which al Qaeda is an early example of, will use the speculative power of global hedge funds to leverage their disruption into economic damage. The upper bound on this damage is unknown. Experience with the failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) implies that this damage could be extreme.

GG Technology: WiFi Hacking for secure voice commnications

Secure communications are key to global guerrilla ops. One way to accomplish this is through the use of wireless network hacking and Skype. A simple process (amplifications are welcome):
1) Sniff for an unguarded WiFi access point using a tool such as Netstumbler ($150). Focus your efforts by using a map of known networks.
2) Connect to the network using a WiFi enabled PDA or laptop. IP address will be delivered from the network (not likely to be on the FBI's Dragonware list). A low cost directional antenna can extend range markedly (a wok, Chinese parabolic cookware, or the venerable Pringles can -- using Chinese cookware is new but effective).
3) Launch Skype using an ad-hoc profile (change frequently). Skype will provide P2P voice and chat communications with strong encryption.

JOURNAL: Al Qaeda Strategy in Saudi Arabia

Here is a very short mention of an element critical to global guerrilla strategy. It is taken from a recent letter by Abu Hajir Abd al-Aziz bin Isa al-Muqrin, the leader of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. I will put this in context at a later date.

A particularly important matter is spreading the enemy thin and dispersing his forces

INFRASTRUCTURE MELTDOWNS

In today's complex world, infrastructure failures aren't limited to a single network. They spread across networks due to a complex interplay of interdependencies. What's worse is that these interdependencies are often both tightly coupled (connections that rapidly spread a failure to other systems) and non-linear (feedback loops magnify the impact of failures). Global Guerrillas will use these interconnections and interdependencies to take-down complete infrastructures through seemingly small attacks.

Network Interdependencies
Network interdependencies fall into five categories:

• Input -- material delivered by one network is used by another.
  
• Mutual -- networks that serve as inputs for each other. Example: oil and power generation.
  
• Co-location -- different networks that are located in the same geography.
  
• Shared -- networks that share physical components, transport, or facilities.
  
• Exclusive -- a network that can only support one or few outputs, may be transient. Example: Oil/Gasoline pipelines.

Types of Failure
Global guerrillas will plan attacks to create the following types of failure.
See inset diagram to understand how a failure in electricity production can impact other networks.

Cascade Failure: cascades of failure (see Cascading System Failure for more background) can spread quickly from one network to another through "input" and "mutual" interdependencies.

Escalating Failure: the failure in one networked infrastructure can exacerbate a failure in another network. This failure is typically due to "shared" or "exclusivity" interdependencies. For example: an attack against transportation network would slow repair of an electricity failure.

Common Cause Failure: this failure is due to a single attack that directly impacts two or more networks. This failure is typically due to geographical "co-location."

Infrastructure Meltdowns
Given these attributes, how will global guerrillas attack infrastructures? They will likely follow this basic formula (I will go into this in much more detail in my book on Global Guerrillas, out this fall):

• Map infrastructure interdependencies according to the five types.
  
• Identify potential cascades, common cause failures, and escalating failures.
  
• Physically attack or isolate the communications of response/control center personnel and/or corporate senior management to delay recovery. An example of a previous al Qaeda op from Navy Commander James Pelkofski: In the attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, a truck carrying explosives approached the main embassy gate, possibly posing as a delivery vehicle. It was redirected by guards to a back gate. There, a gun and grenade attack on security personnel by as many as three assailants preceded the explosion that destroyed the embassy. The preliminary gun and grenade assault ensured the primary weapon, the truck bomb, was delivered into the compound with devastating effect.
  
• Use combined arms to attack critical points. A combination of explosives (or equivalents), high energy radio frequency weapons (HERFs or "herfing" -- see "Homemade Microwave Weapons" for more), and computer hacking of control systems (SCADA).
  
• Conduct sequential attacks across multiple infrastructures to amplify and extend the impact.
  
• Depart the area.