Global Guerrillas

JOURNAL: A new generation

Conventional military/regional analysts are starting to confirm the shift of al Qaeda towards a new generation of groups that have adopted many of the characteristics of global guerrillas. Here's some recent analysis by Dr. Sebastian Gorka of Germany's Marshall Center (note how he picks up on how Madrassas and radicalized Universities, a point mentioned here, are serving as a replacement for the shared experience of Bosnia and Afghanistan). He writes (for Jamestown Foundation):

In the last few months, an even newer sub-set of terrorists which could be identified with al-Qaeda, or which identifies itself with the broader aims of the original group, has emerged... Usually in their 20s, they are not linked by any particular campaign or by having trained together in one of the original al-Qaeda camps. Rather, these Islamists have shared experience at certain universities dotted across the Arab and Muslim world, universities that are home to the more virulent strains of the fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. Most often, these are establishments located in Pakistan. Very interestingly, in the case of some of the individuals that have been successfully identified or apprehended, these terrorists and potential terrorists are in fact the sons or sons-in-law of first generation members of the original al-Qaeda network. This is first and foremost an intellectual network, less reliant on the person-to-person contact so common to the original group. As a result, these cells have been found to be even more autonomous than was previously posited. They represent a broad outer circle, far more diverse than the original al-Qaeda network.

The new generations of fundamentalist terrorists do not share the same group history as the ones the U.S. and its allies have been fighting most frequently since 9/11. The non-aligned nature of many of the new cells established in Europe and Austral-Asia, for example, have a more international identity, greater independence and looser structures. Almost all the 9/11 hijackers were of one nationality, Saudi Arabian. Today, however, law enforcement agencies are, more often than not, apprehending or learning of cells with an extremely heterogeneous make-up.

Furthermore, a pattern seems to be emerging in regards to how these new iterations have managed to sustain themselves. Training facilities have moved from Central Asia to Asia: particularly Indonesia (the Sulawesi region especially), the Philippines, Bangladesh and Nepal. And more often, it appears that operational planners have begun isolating specific Islamic centers, mosques or madrassas for operational targeting and recruiting. They take control of an existing facility, typically with the assistance of a radical Imam with a suitably fundamentalist or Salafi message, then turn this facility into a recruiting center for those that will be later sent to one of the new training camps.

A WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY

Today, the price of oil hit a record high of $43.05 a barrel (UPDATE). A combination of excessive demand, uncertainty, and a lack of spare producation capacity have combined to create this price. This situation, as it persists through this fall/winter, is a window of vulnerability that can be exploited by global guerrillas. A series of well orchestrated GG attacks on Saudi, Caspian, and Iraqi oil infrastructure (while these conditions persist) would drive the price over $100 and keep it there.

The economic effects of this exploitation would be decisive. A short term spike in oil prices (2-5 months that average over $75 a barrel) would plunge the world into recession, spike the US budget deficit, and put many nations in the developing world at the brink of state failure (a good outcome for GGs). The only real question is whether operational GGs have developed a strategic understanding of their current capacity to control global markets and national economies.

If they did, they would likely attack. The negative strategic repercussions for global guerrillas would be minimal. The short term nature of the spike would not necessarily benefit OPEC, since much of the benefit in improved prices would go to financial speculators (lost to the industry). Additionally, the volatile nature of the price increase wouldn't necessarily increase the level of investment in new production (particularly if prices were allowed to drop after this period of intense activity).

JOURNAL: Halliburton targeting works extremely well

Global Guerrillas in Iraq prove yet again that "Halliburton" targeting works quickly and efficiently (and with little of the fanfare of a government policy reversal). Swarming attacks on companies that participate in targeted markets is a hallmark of global guerrilla activity:

The Amman-based firm Daoud and Partners, which provided construction and catering services for the military, said it would comply with the demands of the kidnappers, who threatened to kill the two employees, Fayez Saad al-Udwan and Mohammad Ahmed Salama al-Manaya'a, by Thursday unless the company leaves Iraq. ``I am ceasing operations and pulling out from the company's premises in Iraq for humanitarian reasons, and out of my concern for the safety and the lives of my two employees who were kidnapped in Iraq,'' the company's director Rami al-Ouweiss told The Associated Press.

GLOBAL GUERRILLA TARGET: HALLIBURTON

(UPDATED: New section added) Global guerrillas are refining their use of hostages and assassinations as a means of coercion. The real target of these efforts was revealed when the late al-Moqrin's Saudi guerrillas beheaded Paul Johnson, an engineer working for Lockheed Martin in Saudi Arabia. He justified the hostage taking and eventual beheading by claiming he was attacking Halliburton. To al-Moqrin and Islamic global guerrillas in general, all companies providing "outsourced" support services to the Saudi and American governments fall under the "Halliburton" label.

A focus on "Halliburton" is in line with global guerrilla strategy. The market for outsourced services provided by western and associated companies are critical to the reconstruction of Iraq, the logistics of the US military, and the operation of critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. It's our "soft underbelly." Because these services form a market network, global guerrillas can use the dynamics of the marketplace to amplify the impact of their attacks.

How these attacks work
The endless series of hostage dramas and assaults on contractors in Iraq form a pattern. They are aimed at the fault lines in the "outsourced services" market. This pattern is quickly being copied via stigmergic learning by a rapidly proliferating number of groups that swarm on targets. Global guerrillas are using the following methods to disrupt this market:

• Companies. Assaults on employees in Saudi Arabia forced the engineering company ABB to withdraw their employees. Within Iraq: Siemens, Tekhnopromexport, GE, etc. have withdrawn employees due to direct pressure. Focused attacks on specific employers can create pressures within boardrooms and among employees/families back home to withdraw.
  
• Nations. An indirect method of coercing companies is to target employees of specific nationalities. Attacks on South Korean, Chinese, and Russian employees have resulted in government pressured evacuations of workers of those nationalities from Iraq. The attacks in Saudi Arabia targeting Americans, has caused the US government to urge that all Americans leave the country. This strategy will increasingly widen to include nations outside the US coalition (Egypt, Kenya, China, and Russia have already been targeted). Nations will increasingly tire of the crisis management and domestic political fallout caused by these attacks.
  
• Individuals. Beheadings and seemingly random assassinations, in particular, have created a climate of fear among employees of outsourced service companies. This fear has driven thousands of Americans and Europeans working for companies in Saudi Arabia and Iraq back home.

The impact of this disruption
The ongoing attacks against these companies and their employees are increasingly undermining the operation of the market for outsourced services. In large part this is due to the reaction of the marketplace to these systemic insults. These reactions include:

• Higher transaction costs. The need to protect employees has driven up costs across the board. Approximately 25% (although recent reports indicate that this may have risen to as high as 50%) of all reconstruction expenditures are now for private security services to protect employees (an impact that will be measured in billions of dollars). Lengthy security procedures severely limit the workday (by up to 1/3) for domestic employees of "Halliburton" companies. Companies are also being forced to offer substantial bonus pay (often exceeding 100% of pay) as a risk-premium to entice expatriate employees to work in these areas. Additionally, insurance costs have skyrocketed.
  
• Systemic chaos. Many of these attacks have been focused on workers involved in corporate logistics/transportation. This disruption has had a systemic impact on all work being done in Iraq. Critical parts, military supplies, food, etc have been interdicted. The loss of key engineers, through departures or injury/death due to attacks, has left critical projects in Iraq's electricity reconstruction in piles of parts on the floor.
  
• Stalled decision-making. These attacks have increased uncertainty to the level necessary to impair the allocation of investments and the contracting process. The recent disclosures that the vast majority of Iraq's reconstruction funds are still uncommitted, demonstrate this problem. This uncertainty makes it difficult to: entice companies to participate in reconstruction work, to determine metrics of success (profit/loss), to secure insurance, etc. (basically, everything necessary to build plans for the future). The end result, is that business decisions are put off into the future in the expectation that eventually, the security situation will improve and uncertainty will be reduced.

What this means
Global guerrilla attacks and abductions will continue. However, the bazaar of violence in the country will continue to reward innovation and its networked participant organizations will quickly implement these advances. The result will be an acceleration of the outsourcing market's current distress. While many new methods will be tried, the innovations that will gain the most traction are the following (although they will require participation of al Qaeda or al Tawhid for international operations during the initial phases):

• Attacks on a company's stock price. GGs will increasingly single out companies out by name (other than Halliburton) for particular attention. Halliburton's status makes it immune to this type of pressure. Other companies are not as prepared. This can be amplified through increasing the geographic zone of a company's operations that are under threat. A world-wide threat against a company will depress stock values and radically improve the potential of share-holder pressure to leave the region. Companies are not countries and much less likely to hold out against a threat of terrorism when significant monetary loss is involved.
  
• Threats against senior corporate management. GGs will increasingly target senior management in participating companies (wherever they are located). This will be used as a means of amplifying any specific corporate targeting. The identification of senior executives by name for assassination, even if it is only a bluff, is more than enough to accomplish much of this effect. A single assassination of a corporate executive would be sufficient to make these threats real. By piercing the corporate veil of executive anonymity and immunity, decision making within participating companies will be radically altered.

JOURNAL: The Global Guerrilla Venture Model

The 9/11 report provides excellent examples of the early global guerrilla venture capital model. This includes:

• Entrepreneurial business plan presentations: Bin Ladin was receiving numerous ideas for potential operations — KSM’s proposal to attack U.S. targets with commercial airplanes was only one of many. KSM presents himself as an entrepreneur seeking venture capital and people. He simply wanted al Qaeda to supply the money and operatives needed for the attack while retaining his independence.
  
• Internal studies and reports: A study reportedly conducted by Atef, while he and Bin Ladin were still in Sudan, concluded that traditional terrorist hijacking operations did not fit the needs of al Qaeda, because such hijackings were used to negotiate the release of prisoners rather than to inflict mass casualties. The study is said to have considered the feasibility of hijacking planes and blowing them up in flight, paralleling the Bojinka concept.
  
• Funding: He (OBL) directed Nashiri to start the planning and send operatives to Yemen, and he later provided money.
  
• Intelligence: When Nashiri had difficulty finding U.S. naval vessels to attack along the western coast of Yemen, Bin Ladin reportedly instructed him to case the Port of Aden, on the southern coast, instead. The eventual result was an attempted attack on the USS The Sullivans in January 2000 and the successful attack, in October 2000, on the USS Cole.
  
• Training: In the fall of 1999, the four operatives selected by Bin Ladin for the planes operation were chosen to attend an elite training course at al Qaeda’s Mes Aynak camp in Afghanistan. Bin Ladin personally selected the veteran fighters who received this training, and several of them were destined for important operations.

JOURNAL: Global Guerrilla Math II

For global guerrillas, size (the number of group members) doesn't matter. In fact, it is a liability. Strategic global guerrilla groups will remain small. The reason is that larger groups are vulnerable. They couldn't maintain the high level of operational security (OPSEC) necessary to stay alive if they were any larger. Size isn't necessary for impressive results. Global guerrilla tactics of network disruption provide extreme levels of leverage. Additionally, attrition can easily be compensated for. Frankly, Islamic global guerrillas have an unlimited number of recruits to draw from, more than enough to replace any losses. They can now afford to take only the best. On the tactical/local level within failed states (Iraq for example); global guerrillas can create the conditions necessary for the rapid proliferation of groups via a bazaar of violence. These local GG clones both amplify (through stigmergic imitation) and protect (through white noise) global guerrillas operating in the country.

A SHADOW OPEC

Global Guerrillas operating in Iraq are rapidly developing the ability to disrupt oil exports at will. The tactics they are refining will play a significant role in global guerrilla strategic operations in other regions (this is part of more extensive analysis I have done for my book on GGs). Over time, these global guerrilla operations may yield enough control over global oil supply to replicate the power of OPEC.

One potential target region is Caspian Sea oil -- particularly from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. This production is well within the "easy" zone of operations of active GG groups (particularly Chechen mercenaries). Increased production from the Caspian Sea area is a critical part of the plan to meet the world's ravenous demand for oil. As a result, these pipelines offer extremely attractive targets for global guerrilla operations in central Asia. The potential of millions of barrels a day of production from the region has led to several major pipeline projects (new and upgraded pipelines to the north and west). Unfortunately, complex geopolitical and geographical hurdles make transporting this oil to major markets extremely difficult. For example: pipeline projects to China and through Afghanistan have been put on hold. These considerations have narrowed the list of active targets and simplified the problem for GGs. Here's a wrap-up of the major pipelines:

• The CPC. A pipeline that runs from Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil field to the Russian Novorossiisk black sea port. 0.56 million barrels a day. Ultimate capacity: 1.34 m barrels a day. 990 miles.
• The BTC. A new pipeline that runs from Baku (Azerbaijan) to the Ceyhan (Turkey) Mediterranean sea port. Construction on this 42-inch pipeline will be complete in less than a year. It will have the capacity of 1 m barrels a day. 1,038 miles. This pipeline also has co-location vulnerabilty with the Baku to Supsa (on the Black Sea) spur within Azerbaijan (115,000 barrels a day). Azerbaijan should ramp up production sufficiently to fill this pipeline over the next four years.
• The Baku to Novorossiisk (including the Chechnya bypass). 360,000 barrels a day. ~1,000 miles.
• The Atyrau (Kazakhstan) to Samara (Russia). This connects Kazakhstan's fields to the large central pipeline system in Russia (which offers another whole set of targets and analysis). 310,000 barrels a day. 432 miles (with some minor co-location vulnerability with the CPC).

Isolate, Control, and Profit
Given this sparse and undefendable network, the potential for GG control of oil production from the Caspian region is extremely likely. There is also the potential for cascading failures with the right analysis. Growth in the global demand for oil (particularly from China) and the ongoing disruption of Iraq's oil has reduced excess global production to less than 750,000 barrels a day. This makes even small disruptions in production extremely potent as a means of controlling oil prices. Here's the dominant strategy:

• Isolate the Caspian region from the Samara connection to the Russian pipeline grid (Transneft) through continuous attacks (akin to the attacks on the Kirkuk pipelines in Iraq). Given Transneft's limited transportation capacity (only 4 m barrels a day), it is possible that attacks on any major east-west pipeline will bump production from the Caspian.
• Control. Conduct regulated attacks against the BTC and CPC to control transport of oil to global markets. The key to maintaining the effectiveness of these attacks is to use them sparingly (a lesson drawn from Lawrence of Arabia's campaign). Extended shutdowns aren't necessary to exercise control and increases the potential of the development of alternative pipelines (ie. through Iran). If done correctly, these attacks alone will have the potential to turn participating GG groups into a "shadow" OPEC, with a pricing power akin to Saudi Arabia.
• Profit. Use control of the price of oil to coerce nation-states and profit from market timing investments. The elimination of ~2 m barrels (at its estimated peak) of production from global markets can produce significant (potentially $30-$50) price movements. These market fluctuations will provide participating GG groups the income potential necessary for funding ongoing operations (and expand operations using mercenaries).

GG TECHNOLOGY: Secure P2P Communication

Here's a trend in technology that will provide Global Guerrillas with a nearly zero cost global communications system with military level encryption. Secure (encrypted) P2P (desktop to desktop communication) is on the rise due to the legal onslaught of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) on open file sharing networks. New software of this type is in development almost everywhere you look. An example is Kdrive from the creators of eDonkey (an open P2P network that has over 2 m active users at any one time). It includes file sharing and chat (although voice is possible later on). Here's the download of the beta Windows version with a GUI. It uses a two layer distributed security managment system. One layer is generated the group manager (admin) and the second is built by the two desktops that want to connect. The result is a system is secure for person to person communication. The distributed management system means that if the central company is shut down by legal pressure, the network will continue to operate via any admin that runs the software. The plethora of software providers in this space, as well as the ease of installation, will make it possible for GG's to stay ahead of slow moving government law enforcement.

JOURNAL: Global Guerrilla Math

A major allure of global guerrilla operations is the extreme leverage gained from attacks on critical infrastructure networks. In a recent interview with the AP, Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi stated that attacks on oil and electrical infrastructure over the last 10 days cost Iraq $1 billion. These attacks include multiple disruptions of electrical infrastructure (particularly fuel for power plants) and interdiction of both the northern and southern export pipelines. A good estimate of the total cost of making these attacks is little more than $10,000. That is a rate of return (ROI) of 100,000 times the initial investment.

STIGMERGIC LEARNING AND GLOBAL GUERRILLAS

Stigmergy is a term used in biology (from the work of french biologist Pierre-Paul Grasse) to describe environmental mechanisms for coordinating the work of independent actors (for example, ants use pheromones to create trails and people use weblog links to establish information paths, for others to follow). The term is derived from the greek words stigma ("sign") and ergon ("to act"). Stigmergy can be used as a mechanism to understand underlying patterns in swarming activity. As such, it can be applied to the understanding of swarming attacks by diverse bands of global guerrilla. The stigmergic information system that operates in Iraq is the bazaar of violence. A knowledge of stigmergy is a key to understanding how these groups learn.

Stigmergic systems use simple environmental signals to coordinate that actions of independent agents (each with their own decision making process). These signals are used to coordinate scalable, robust, and dynamic activity. This activity is often much more intelligent that the actions capable by the individual actors (in this case individual global guerrilla groups). There are four basic mechanisms of environmental coordination. They are:

• Marker-based. Markers or signs left by actors influence the action of other actors. In the GG (global guerrilla) context this is the site of an attack and the news of the attack that is delivered by the media. The description of the attack in the media is stigmergic marker for others to follow.
  
• Sematectonic. Environmental conditions influence the behavior of all actors in the system. For GGs, multiple attacks on a certain type of target can generate a security response by the nation-state that changes the potential of attacks against that type of target in the immediate future. An increased security presence for those types of targets is a sematectonic signal to select something else.
  
• Quantitative. The environmental signals are of a single scalable type. The size of a Global Guerrilla attack on a given location can meter the scale of the security response.
  
• Qualitative. The environmental signals are of a varied type that change the message based on their combination. Different types of attacks on the same target (the length of power outages in Baghdad) will yield information on the type of attack that is the most effective.

A deeper understanding of the stigmergic signaling between global guerrillas will enable the development of ways to disrupt their activity. The examples listed above are by no means exhaustive (I will include a longer list in my book on Global Guerrillas).

JOURNAL: HERFs in the marketplace

HERFs, or high energy radio frequency weapons (particularly microwaves), will become the weapon of choice for many global guerrilla operations (see Homemade Microwave Weapons for more). There are signs that these weapons are just starting to make it into the mainstream. David Giri, of ProTech, is currently building HERFs for the Marine Corps and the LA Police department. Here is more on the device, which has trialed at up to 50 meters away:

The bulk of the device is designed to fit in a car boot and consists of a battery and a bank of capacitors that can store an electrical charge. Flicking a switch on the dashboard sends a burst of electricity into an antenna mounted on the roof of the car. The antenna then produces a narrow beam of intense radio waves that is directed at the vehicle ahead. When the radio waves hit the targeted car, they induce surges of electricity in its electronics, upsetting the fuel injection and engine firing signals. "It works on most cars built in the past 10 years, because their engines are controlled by computer chips," said Dr Giri. "If we can disrupt the computer, we can stop the car." A prototype is due to be ready by next summer

GLOBAL GUERRILLA TARGET: IRAQI OIL PRODUCTION

Global guerrillas operating in Iraq have been spectacularly successful. May's oil exports averaged only 0.86 m barrels a day. June's numbers are likely worse. In general, global guerrillas have limited Iraq's oil exports to less than 1/3 of those anticipated by the US coalition planners (the domestic consumption baseline of over ~.6 m barrels a day skews the impact). As this continues over the next three years, Iraq can anticipate a shortfall of nearly $70 billion in oil revenue. The current $10 b a year in export revenue only generates ~$450 per capita in income, far less than needed for basic services, and light years away from the tens of billion of investment necessary (much more than $40 is needed for the oil industry alone) for infrastructure repair and expansion.

The costs of defending against these attacks goes beyond lost oil export revenue. Over 1/3 of Iraq's men in uniform have been dedicated to the defense of critical infrastructure. Mercenary outfits like Erinys (whose contract was just extended) are making money hand over fist providing 14,000 guards for the oil industry. Over 25% of all reconstruction dollars are currently being spent on private security. This distraction prevents the allocation of critical security resources to the discovery and elimination of the networks and financiers driving the bazaar. It is very reminiscent of the guerrilla strategy used by Lawrence of Arabia (who started operations just a few miles from where bin Laden was born and raised) against the Turks in 1916-17.

Global guerrilla attacks against the Iraqi oil industry are not only increasingly sophisticated, they are also multiplexed (which means they attack along different vectors). Additionally, the frequency of attacks have been high enough to keep defensive forces off balance. Tactics used by global guerrillas so far in the 130+ attacks on the Iraq oil network fall into three categories:

• Pipeline disruptions. Over one hundred attacks against the 4,300 miles of Iraqi oil pipelines have been made. These attacks increasingly target remote sections of pipeline, junctions, large capacity pipelines, and pumping stations; all of which serve complicate repairs. Many of these attacks have destroyed critical equipment that is in short supply.
  
• Assaults against oil industry personnel. Targeted assassinations (or attempts) as well as a general lack of security (Iraq's roads are free fire zones) have led engineering companies working on oil infrastructure to depart the country.
  
• Facility and dependent infrastructure attacks. 33 attacks have been made against oil and gas pipelines that feed refineries around Baghdad, particularly the huge Bayji refinery complex north of the city. A control room and warehouse for a gas plant was burned. A water treatment facility used to process water for the oil industry was disrupted. Over one hundred attacks against electricity infrastructure have impaired the functioning of electricity intensive oil production equipment.

This data demonstrates that the most effective start-ups in Iraq's bazaar of violence are global guerrilla networks. They have shown an ability to attract (either through ideology or money) the oil industry personnel with the vital data needed to make these attacks effective. Global guerrillas have stayed small to keep OPSEC (operational security) extraordinarily high -- coalition and government agents haven't been able to penetrate their networks. They have made attacks that have had incredible ROI (rates of return on investment) and have suffered few casualties. They are able, despite their small numbers, to keep a nation-state in failure. They are so successful as entrepreneurial start-ups, Geoffrey Moore should write a book on them.

It's only a matter of time before these entrepreneurs move to Saudi Arabia. There is a large pool of global "hot" money ready to fund this effort. The diminishment of the current monarchy will make many people very, very rich. A large series of attacks sponsored by the OBL venture capital network may be all it takes to provide the Kingdom with a bazaar of its own.

JOURNAL: GGs move from Iraq to Saudi Arabia

Newly trained global guerrillas, fresh from operations in Iraq, are going back to Saudi Arabia. They will replace the older, Afghanistan trained guerrillas in the country. This generational shift will quickly yield new leaders, trained in the new techniques of GG warfare. Their objective: to fail the Saudi state. Here's one scenario for this.

INTELLIGENT DEFENSE: A VIRTUAL CONFERENCE

I am very pleased to introduce Intelligent Defense: a live virtual conference on terrorism and security. I will host one hour conversations (very much like an NPR show) with smart and talented individuals on the issues we are exploring on Global Guerrillas. Doug Kaye, the talent behind the excellent IT Conversations, is providing technical and operational support for the conference. Our first conversation, with Valdis Krebs, will focus on "Analyzing Terrorist Networks."

THE BAZAAR OF VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

A major difference between the guerrilla war we are fighting in Iraq and previous insurgencies is its lack of center of gravity as we commonly understand it (an ideology/party, ethnic independence, etc. or hierarchy). The real center of gravity in Iraq is a bazaar of violence. This bazaar is where a combination of local and global "hot" money is funding a diverse set of groups, each with their own methods of operation and motivations. Groups engage in co-opetition to share resources, intelligence, and funds (see the attached simplified diagram). They even expand operational reach by purchasing amateur mercenaries (not pictured).

A bazaar of violence is a hallmark of global guerrilla warfare. When a state collapses, as it did in Iraq, global guerrillas quickly arrive with money and violence. Through this funding, terrorist violence, and infrastructure disruption; global guerrillas create conditions ripe for the establishment of a bazaar of violence. In essence, the bazaar is an emergent property of global guerrilla operations within a failed or collapsed state. Once established, it builds on itself and creates a dynamic that is almost impossible to disrupt.

While it remains to be seen (although we will soon see it tested in Saudi Arabia) whether global guerrillas can collapse a weak state, it is clear that global guerrillas are more than capable of keeping a state in position of failure/collapse. By analyzing the feedback loops (ROI on attacks) for global guerrilla operations, the following pattern of activity can be discerned:

• Terrorist attacks. Car bombs, mortar attacks, snipers, etc. These attacks have a high return early in the process of destabilization. The media coverage is intense and the public is psychologically traumatized. The nascent governments reaction is often harsh which serves to alienate the people. It also serves to create new groups that either want to mimic active groups or those that want revenge for retaliatory government strikes. Over time, these attacks suffer diminishing returns (negative feedback) due to a lack of media coverage and population desensitization.
  
• Targeted killings (assasinations). These attacks, particularly if focused on relief or reconstruction organizations, can have an immediate and long-lasting impact on state recovery. It can break apart national coalitions and cause the withdrawl of companies and organizations that are critical to reconstruction. These attacks can also be used to dissuade participation in the government.
  
• Infrastructure disruption (network attack). These attacks are the bread and butter of global guerrilla operations. It deprives the emergent government of the ability to deliver those services necessary for legitimacy and economic recovery. It also, particularly in the case of Iraq, deprives the government of funds necessary for reconstruction and ongoing security. The rate of return from these attacks is by far the highest of all attack types.

JOURNAL: Marketplaces for Violence

US forces recently found an entrepreneurial global guerrilla start-up that was manufacturing car bombs. Unfortunately, the competitive marketplace for violence in Iraq will quickly replace them. Failed states like Iraq and Afghanistan are, contrary to perceptions, awash in money. An important axiom of global guerrilla warfare is: if a state fails (either through internal dynamics or by design), markets will form to keep it there.

ST. Soldiers also found more than 12 million Iraqi dinars (about S$14,000) in three safes at the car-bomb production site, along with AK-47 rifles, ammunition, timers and computer boards. Three people were detained... 'The soldiers believe they have captured the financier, the explosive device manufacturer, the spotter and the triggerman,' the statement said. It did not say when the searches were done.

JOURNAL: More on Iraqi Electricity

Global guerrillas have successfully stalled power production in Iraq (see Iraqi Electricity Disruption for more). This situation is made worse by growing demands for electricity (expected to reach 8,000 megawatts this summer, twice what is actually being produced) due to subsidized prices. See the attached chart (from the CPA and GAO) on how this combination has reduced hours of service in almost all of Iraq's provinces. It is going to be a long, hot summer in Iraq.