Global Guerrillas

A DEFENSE AGAINST CASCADES

Global guerrillas can gain leverage from small attacks by assiduous study of the dynamics of the networks they attack. Within scale free networks with dynamic flows (electricity, information, etc.), cascades of failure can be induced by attacking central hi-load nodes (see the brief Cascading System Failure for more). These nodes can be identified as those with a high betweeness centrality, a term used to describe those nodes with the largest number of "shortest paths" that pass through them. When these nodes are shut down through an attack, the flow they handle (most likely with expensive high capacity equipment) is automatically routed to other lower capacity nodes that fail under the load (a cascade of failure). Within global guerrilla warfare, these critical nodes are called systempunkts -- the point at which an attack will cause systemic collapse.

A Proposed Defense
Traditional methods of defense against cascading failure include "islanding," homogeneity, and radical redundancy. Unfortunately, all of these techniques are either too drastic (islanding) or expensive (homogeneity and radical redundancy) to be good solutions. Adilson Motter, from the Max Planck Institute, offers a more elegant solution in his paper, "Cascade Control in Complex Networks." He proposes that cascades can be controlled by (he proposes an algorithmic approach):

• Disconnecting peripheral transmitting nodes. Networks with dynamic flows have two types of nodes. Those that transmit flow and those that convey flow. Hi-load nodes, in scale-free networks of this type, are those that convey flow. To protect against too much flow on the remaining low capacity nodes, transmitting (or production) nodes should be selectively disconnected from network. This will allow the network to remain with capacity limitations and thereby limit the spread of the cascade.
  
• Pruning central links. When central hi-load nodes fail, the loads they previously conveyed are re-routed via new central links. If those overloaded cental links are pruned (eliminated), it may be possible to prevent a general cascade. Essentially, this action will push the cascade back towards the transmitting nodes that are oversupplying the network.

UPDATE: HALLIBURTON TARGETING

As nation-states continue their drive to become more efficient, they increasingly resort to private corporations to provide critical services. These services are core to the US reconstruction and security effort in Iraq. However, because these services are market-based, they offer global guerrillas substantial leverage for disruption (see Target: Halliburton for more). A proven methodology at work in Iraq and Saudi Arabia is to target employees of "Halliburton" companies providing this support. These attacks have drained both countries of needed expertise, radically increased costs (increased security, insurance, etc. have drained billions), driven away new investment (as well as market participants), and trashed operational tempo. The interesting aspect of this is how few real casualties are required to destabilize a market. The attached graph demonstrates the low level of fatalities that have been inflicted on "Halliburton" employees and how little real effort it takes global guerrillas to inflict damage through the use of these new tactics. In fact, the total number of fatalities has even declined over the last four months. The reasons for this include:

• A shift to hostage taking. The media attention gained through hostage dramas has made simple assaults less effective in comparison. Numerous corporate withdrawals in exchange for the release of employees held hostage have reinforced this.
  
• More and smarter security. Secure enclaves, guarded convoys, and more have reduced the number of fatalities. However, this has been done at huge expense to both efficiency and tempo. This has reduced the number of fatalities from private security companies (and reflects the bulk of the decline).
  
• Fewer targets. In general, Halliburton targeting has been a success. Many companies have withdrawn their employees from Iraq or ceased operations in the country. Reconstruction is proceeding at a snail's pace. The current rate of attacks can be seen as a maintenance effort to ensure the continuation of market destabilization.

JOURNAL: Transneft

Worries continue to mount over a new Chechen guerrilla offensive led by Aslan Maskhadov. The real danger is the disruption of Russia's state owned oil pipeline system: Transneft. Russia is now the world's second largest oil exporter. Transneft's pipeline system is not only vast at ~ 49 thousand km, it is capacity limited to ~ 4 m barrels a day which means there isn't any redundancy available. Additionally, there are plentiful bottlenecks that can be exploited via global guerrilla tactics to inflict billions in economic damage (easily seen in the attached diagram). Global guerrilla tactics are the only missing ingredient (see cascading system failure and infrastructure meltdowns for more).

GLOBAL GUERRILLAS AND TEMPORARY AUTONOMOUS ZONES

Like pirates of the past (particularly those of the 1st century BC and 18th century), global guerrillas operate from geographically dispersed locations. These locations are sanctuaries of convenience on a global scale. Examples include:

• Failed and collapsed states. GGs are able to establish mobile operations centers (Sudan and Afghanistan) and generate new sources of funding (opium in Afghanistan and oil "bunkering" in Nigeria) within these vacuums of authority.
  
• Zones of chaotic organic order. Negotiated relationships with tribesmen in Waziristan (Pakistan), have provided security, intelligence, and supplies for GG groups. In Fallujah (Iraq), GGs have used a collapse of state authority and the subsequent rise of organic Islamic order to provide cover for cells.
  
• The Internet. The size and structure of the Internet provides virtual sanctuary. The Internet provides the glue that links groups that operate within the ancient modes of organic order -- religious, tribal, etc. -- that form the backbone of the physical world sanctuary, with the modern world's operational environment. However, the Internet is more than merely a communications medium, it is a place of sanctuary in itself.

The TAZ
Global guerrillas do not require extensive logistical structures. Their units are small, fleet, and adaptable. Despite this, they are able to inflict extensive damage by leveraging the power of networks and markets. Most GG activity is accomplished within the confines of "controlled" areas (that's where the targets are), however, much of the long term planning and training occurs within temporary autonomous zones (TAZs) -- areas beyond the control of the global nation-state system. GGs can "manufacture" TAZ sanctuaries as needed from any location that exhibits a vacuum of global order. These places provide staging grounds for offensive operations in "controlled" areas. The elimination of TAZs will be a long-run problem for nation-states. Unfortunately, military solutions can work against progress by creating a TAZ where none existed before (example: Fallujah). Here are some ideas on how to approach the problem:

• Rapidly shifting locations. Entrepreneurial guerrillas are quick to take advantage of new opportunities for sanctuary when they arise. A partial solution is to avoid the creation of power vacuums via failed or collapsed states whenever possible (example: Iraq). A failed/collapsed state is worse than a rogue state. Economic and other non-military support structures need to be strengthened to prevent state failure.
  
• Locations that resist interdiction. Remote, hostile territory makes rapid response difficult. Nation-states require significant periods of time to work through the complexities (mostly political) necessary to neutralize these locations.
  
• Diversity. Again the theme of "strength through diversity" is apparent. There isn't any single formula for eliminating TAZs. Each location requires an unique effort.

AL QAEDA'S STRUCTURE

The recent arrests of al Qaeda operatives reveals more about their current organizational structure. What emerges is a highly redundant organization that reveals few weaknesses. It's important to note that this represents only bin Laden's portion of the growing number of ventures that now call themselves "al Qaeda." Here's the overview of a proposed structure:

• A core that controls broad strategic direction and financing. This core group (bin Laden and Zawahiri) are buffered by a layered courier network.
  
• Portfolio managers, key financiers, and communications nodes. The portfolio managers control multiple cells that conduct operations in a given region. Financiers manage cash flows and connections to funding sources. There are few connections between any two at this level (control of financing is a key attribute of bin Laden's power in the network). Most connectivity is downward to the next level. Communications nodes manage Internet connectivity for high flow information sharing (mostly for intelligence moving upward, moderate flow for operations/plans).
  
• Entrepreneurs, Finance admin, Intelligence, and Operations (in aggregate mid-level management). These people manage sparse cells. Entrepreneurs have a high degree of latitude. They can opt for other sources of financing to gain independence (or start their own portfolio). These cells are run in parallel, redundant, and are limited in scope (all of which aids robustness).
  
• Foot soldiers and administrative support. These people are drawn from a virtually bottomless pool of ad hoc members. Connections are based on personal relationships (previous face-to-face experience) with entrepreneurs and other mid-level management.
  
• Family and sympathetic supporters. These people are added ad-hoc based on the needs of individuals in the next layer up. Strong personal connections are key here. This pool is the source of recruitment for higher levels.

IRAQ AND FOCO INSURGENCY

When Che Guevara crossed into Bolivia in 1966, his intent was to create a rural foco insurgency. A foco insurgency is one that forgoes the methodical political indoctrination of the population in favor of small bands of fast moving guerrillas that gain victories against state forces. In Che's model, the victories of these guerrillas would ignite an organic revolution that would overthrow the government. His hope was that it would avoid the innevitable corruption he saw in communist revolutionary parties. Foco insurgencies didn't work for a variety of factors related to the time, to wit: Che died in 1967, hunted by government forces. The urban guerrilla/terrorists (who felt that urban environments provided better protection than the rural terrain that Che favored) that followed him, suffered the same fate.

Che's theory lives on
Iraq's insurgency is a variant of Che's foco insurgency in that it operates without a need popular support. However, the environment today differs in many important ways that provide it with the opportunity of success. Here's why Iraq's insurgency has gained traction:

• Multiplexed loyalties. Iraq is riven by ethinic, tribal, political, and religious loyalties. This provides numerous fault lines for guerrillas to exploit.
  
• An occupation. The US occupation serves as a focal point for guerrilla activity. The elimination of the Baathist military sufficiently weakened the state in ways that made it easy for a foco insurgency to gain momentum.
  
• Modern networks. Iraq has a modern (although dilapidated) infrastructure that is ripe for attack. This infrastructure is critical for its economic recovery and is in stark contrast to the sparse networks of developing nations ~40 years ago. Additionally, a diverse set of global media networks allow guerrillas to circumvent state controls on information to amplify fault lines.
  

The Bazaar vs. the Foco
A series of tactical innovations allows global guerrillas to both survive and thrive in Iraq. These innovations (cumulatively called the bazaar) allow it to survive state counter-pressure, learn/advance, and deplete the ruling government of funds/authority/legitimacy. In contrast, the foco was unable to accomplish this. Also, unlike the foco, the end point of the bazaar isn't a new state but the destruction of the state. Here's how global guerrillas have improved on the model:

• A diverse set of small groups with different motivations. These groups don't have a center of mass (hierarchy) that can be targeted. Their small size provides them excellent OPSEC and the collapse any subset of groups doesn't disrupt the whole. Strength through diversity.
  
• A bazaar of violence. This bazaar provides a clearinghouse of money, information, and other resources necessary for rapid group learning and improvement. This complex system enables small groups to exceed the rate of improvement of centralized organizations.
  
• Leverage from markets and networks. These networks provide Iraq's guerrillas rates of return far in excess of those expected for groups of their size.
  

What this means
A vibrant bazaar insurgency in Iraq will set the stage for the following events:

• Iraq's bazaar will outlast the US occupation. The choice for the US will be to either continue to write a blank check for Iraq and run up deficits or withdraw. It is only a matter of time before the decision to withdraw is made.
  
• Organic Islamic order. The goal of this insurgency is very much in line with Che's vision (an organic order that arises out of state weakness). However, in Iraq, the complete disruption of state power isn't replaced with another state but rather organic Islamic order -- the Fallujah and Taliban model.
  
• How this will spread. Given the factors that power Iraq's bazaar, it will be difficult but not impossible to export this insurgency to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan without one of the following events (here's what to look for): Intervention by the US military in Saudi Arabia to prevent collapse, a coup or open conflict between factions in Pakistan's military (triggered through assassination of Musharref and other key people), and a civil war in Iraq that draws in adjacent states.

NOTE: More on Zarqawi and Foco insurgency

JOURNAL: Mercenary Outsourcing

Mercenary outsourcing is a key attribute of global guerrilla warfare. This behavior is very similar to the bribes and the promise of "loot" Lawrence of Arabia used to assemble his Arab forces to attack the Turks and their infrastructure. Osama bin Laden has issued a bounty of $12,500 (in gold) for any attack that kills a British or American soldier, and $6,250 for any other coalition troops. Other financiers (and middlemen that will collect payment from others) have offered varied levels of payment that average $500 per successful attack and $3,000 for the death of a soldier. Iraq's poverty and unemployment, made perpetual by successful infrastructure disruption, is helping to build the mercenary gangs that augment core GG activity.

As GGs evolve, they will begin to tie market-based financial rewards (benefits derived from stock and commodity markets) to financial support for "terror" mercenaries. For example, a $10,000 attack against Saudi pipelines, given the current tightness in the oil market, could easily provide opportunities for hundreds of millions in financial rewards.

$100 OIL?

Attacks against the Iraqi oil system continue to increase (see chart). As a result, oil production in Iraq is still well below pre-war levels and declining... (as is Iraq's electricity production). This pattern of activity is one demonstration of the shift from simple terrorism to global guerrilla strategies. The expertise gained here will likely be used to disrupt Saudi Arabian and Caspian sea production (the Saudi system offers substantial opportunity for cascades of failure). GGs are already flowing into Saudi Arabia from Sudan and Iraq. Additionally, they have begun aggressive operations again in Chechnya (near critical pipelines in Dagestan and Azerbaijan). Through these disruptions, global guerrillas will be able to gain pricing control over oil.

The impact of this disruption is likely to be severe given the window of vulnerability in the oil market due to insufficient production and high demand. In support of this, Adam Sieminski, Deutsche Bank's chief energy strategist, estimates that a major disruption of supplies would result in $80 oil. Two disruptions (a major attack on Iraqi and Saudi production), would result in $100 oil. This price, if extended for months, would result in a severe global recession.

While we can't predict a black swan event, we can anticipate events based on trends, capabilities, motivations, and unique periods of vulnerability.

FAILED STATES vs. ROGUE STATES

The key focus of our current strategy is the elimination of rogue states. The benefits include an eradication of state supported terrorism and the capacity to produce WMDs (bio and nuclear). The method we have chosen (in Iraq and Afghanistan) is to force these weak rogue states into failure/collapse. Unfortunately, as we have found, failed states are extremly difficult to reconstitute, particularly given new mechanisms like the bazaar of violence.

The question we should ask is: "is a failed state better than a rogue state?" Given failed states are unlikely to produce WMDs, this answer is yes. However, failed states are decidedly superior to rogue states in their ability to spawn, nurture, and support global guerrillas. This would be akin to a focus on WW2's endgame (Hiroshima) while ignoring everything that went on between 1939 and 1945.

Failed states provide unrestricted training grounds for multiple global guerrilla groups. They offer numerous financial opportunities (for example, half of Afghanistan's GDP is opium -- in contrast to the anti-drug Taliban). Global guerrillas are unbounded by rogue state policies and are free to innovate. Internal violence can accelerate recruitment and the development of tactical innovations. Unrestricted borders allow global guerrillas to infiltrate adjacent states (and given ubiquitous air transportation, everywhere in the world).

Failed states will provide the perfect platforms for the destabilization of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt.

DATAMINING THE TERROR WEB

INTELLIGENT DEFENSE: The Internet and the WWW are critical to terrorist/global guerrilla communications. On the 8th of August, I will talk with Dr. Mark Last of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel. He and his team are working on a project to apply advanced data mining techniques to unearth terrorist activity on the Internet.

Dr. Last co-authored a paper, "Using Data Mining Techniques for Detecting Terror-Related Activities on the Web" (PDF) that provides detail on the approach. This proposed system works in conjunction with an ISP (with or without their permission) to determine potential terrorist activity. If applied to ISPs (and potentially Internet Cafes) across the Middle East, it might provide a means of detecting patterns of behavior that may be used to prevent attacks.

Here is Dr. Last's biography and a list of papers he has published.

Here's the audio of the conversation. Please check the Intelligent Defense site for updates on the program.