Global Guerrillas

JOURNAL: Corporations in Crisis

Iraqna, the wireless company in Iraq, is in a tough position. Attacks have radically reduced its efficiency (it is also being disrupted by US jamming), damaged its brand, and put its employees in peril. Its experience will serve as an example to other companies contemplating market entry. The best example of this distress is the ratio of security vs. technical employees (from Der Spiegel):

"Working in Iraq is extremely difficult," says Sawiris. "There are no foreign experts who'll go to Iraq voluntarily, and reliable local subcontractors are nonexistent." The company currently employs only 400 technicians and administrators in Iraq, with another 1,200 employees working as bodyguards and equipment security guards.

Again, this is a variation on the Halliburton strategy.

JOURNAL: Failed body-count, successful disruption in London

Early results from the latest attack on London's mass transit system are in. The bombs, built in a fashion similar to those used in the earlier attack, failed to fully explode (only the detonators exploded). Despite this, the city was quickly drawn into a massive security lock-down that rippled across the world (NYC and Boston increased security measures). There are some factors that indicate that systems disruption may be have been the primary goal of the bombers. These include:

EMERGENT COMMUNITIES DEDICATED TO WAR (London, Iraq, and Al Qaeda)

When Lawrence led the Arab revolt against the Turks during the first world war, he did so with a community and not an army. The British never sent more than a handful of advisors to Arabia because they feared (rightly) an Arab backlash against a military occupation. So, without an army to rely upon, Lawrence built a community of war from the grab bag of individuals and tribes he had access to. What Lawrence built is best termed a community because (I strongly recommend BH Liddell Hart's book on Lawrence of Arabia for insight into his methods):

JOURNAL: Disruptive Communications

Iraq's largest cell phone company, Iraqna, is being disrupted on an ongoing basis (from the WSJ):

JOURNAL: The Battle of Algiers

If you get a chance, watch The Battle of Algiers. To get a little bit of insight into open source warfare (i.e. Iraq), substitute the pyramid structure used by the movement in the movie with hundreds of amorphous, self-directed groups. Consider how this would impact the aggressive counter-insurgency effort made by the French in the movie. In part, this explains the American Army's description of the war in Iraq as: "a Pillsbury Doughboy" insurgency -- you push on one section and it bulges in another.

The Brits got a taste of how open source warfare/terrorism works with the attack on London earlier this month. Before the attack, they lowered their terror alert because, "at present there is not a group with both the current intent and the capability to attack the U.K." The problem with this analysis is that it wrongly assumed (and likely continues to assume) that the barrier to entry for terrorism is high. It also assumed that there are a limited number of motivations for terrorist activity.

The UK's analysis may have been true in Terrorism 1.0, but in Terrorism 2.0 (or open source warfare) the barriers for entry into terrorism are low (and dropping quickly because systems disruption is easy) and the number of groups with the requisite motivation for terrorist activity (in aggregate) form a long tail distribution.

JOURNAL: The Objective of the London Bombing

The speculation over the intended goals of the London suicide attackers continues to rage. Unfortunately, the bulk of this speculation inserts a larger context into the debate that is irrelevant to the analysis of this specific attack. These contextual references include:

JOURNAL: The Controlled Chaos Exit Option

Reuters has published details of a leaked memo from the British Ministry of Defense. The memo indicates that both the US and the UK will draw down troop levels in Iraq over the next year (8,500 to 3,000 for the brits and 140,000 to 74,000 for the US). First, this may not occur. Plans are built all the time. Further, this leak may have been orchestrated as a way to defuse/confuse opposition to the war.

If it is real, it does indicate the US has chosen the controlled chaos option as its exit strategy. This option relies on loyalist paramilitaries for support (See my earlier brief on this for more). Integration of these militias into the defense of Iraq will extend the distribution of the long tail force posture already in place. NOTE: I have already graphed the force postures of both the US coalition (uniformed troops, militias, corporate mercenaries, etc.) and the guerrillas (al Qaeda, Baathists, nationalists, tribals, gangs, etc.) and the result is a long tail. However, in this long tail marketplace, participation is driven by revenge, greed, identity, desperation, and patriotism.

OPEN SOURCE WARFARE IN LONDON

The hunt for the perpetrators of the London attack is in full swing. The forensic evidence will be collected (including CCTV footage and Internet traffic), sifted, and analyzed over the next couple of weeks to identify the culprits and their origin. Unfortunately, what we may find is that this group had few, if any, direct ties to known al Qaeda entities. In fact, it is likely to be an operation accomplished completely by terrorist entrepreneurs that are using it to gain entry (through contribution) into al Qaeda.

THE DISRUPTION OF LONDON

Al Qaeda ("The Secret Organization of Al Qaeda in Europe" -- via their Web site that has been shut down) has purportedly claimed an attack on London's transportation system. 4 coordinated attacks -- 3 on the Underground subway's Circle line and 1 on a double decker bus -- has incapacitated the metropolis during the morning rush hour. The selection of the Circle line was likely due to its centrality to the Underground network (a postmortem network analysis will demonstrate the validity of this).

JOURNAL: Transparent Communications

The Internet provides many communications advantages historically only enjoyed by nation-states or large corporations to any group willing to take advantage of them. These tools can provide global text, voice, and video communications (one to one, one to many, and many to many) in a secure (military grade encryption and peer to peer connections) environment.

An example of an advanced version of this is a PKK (a Kurdish Guerrilla group) commander's seminar on Paltalk -- software that provides voice and video chat rooms. The open nature of this seminar demonstrates a growing trend in guerrilla communications: transparency. Guerrillas increasingly understand that it is non-productive for secrecy in most communications and coordination efforts -- as demonstrated by recent media enabled communications between Zarqawi and bin Laden. Here's why:

• Open communications is a PR event. It demonstrates that the group is active. Visibility can also translate into funding.
• Totally secure communications that prevents nation-state eavesdropping is impossible. Security, to the extent there is any, is best achieved through openness since it masks the recipients.
• It provides the opportunity to reach as many active participants, hangers on, and passive supporters as possible. It can energize a community.
• It's a chance to influence adjacent groups. This is part of the open source warfare model. Adjacent guerrilla groups are increasingly seen as an asset. Their activities provide a shield against detection (it divides counter-insurgency forces), amplify the core group's efforts (through similar attacks), and can feedback innovation (on how to accomplish activities successfully).