Global Guerrillas

SWARM: Fuel and Oil Disruption in Iraq

Iraq. December 2005. In concert with the recent swarms on electricity production, Iraq's Beiji refinery (joined at the hip to a major power station that will likely be disrupted too) has been shut down due to threats against tanker drivers since December 19th. Iraq is already importing $200 million a month in gasoline and this disruption will cost the country up to an extra $20 million a day. With gas lines already a quarter mile long and a recent tripling of the consumer price for gasoline to compensate for the costs of these imports, the hit to the new government's legitimacy is already in motion. Cost of the attack (letters and potentially phone calls) = $0 (another example of global guerrilla efficiency).

In order to exacerbate the cash crunch, the guerrillas again destroyed a section of the $7 million dollar a day northern pipeline system (29 December) returning it to its normal inoperative state (which indicates that while the Kurds may control Kirkuk's oil fields as well as other newly found fields, they might never be able to profit from it). Due to this disruption, the Basra terminal (the export location for Iraq's southern oil fields in the Persian Gulf) has again become a single point of failure. Nature provided a second disruption, in the form of a storm and rough seas, that has prevented exports from Basra since Christmas at a cost of $70 million plus a day (1.21 million barrels a day in lost exports). For insight on how infrastructure disruption has kept Iraq in continuous economic failure, see my brief on Lawrence's of Arabia's Methods.

SWARM: Electricity Disruption in Iraq

Iraq. December 2005. As the US military's attention was focused on the chaotic political process in Iraq, the open source insurgency has switched targets yet again. While the ongoing methods continue (IEDs, Suicide bombers, etc.) at a reduced rate, the clear focus of Iraq's open source guerrillas has shifted towards systems disruption -- the aim of which is to delegitimizing the political process from the ground up (see State Failure 101 for more on how this process works). Historically, this has been effective against the two previous governments. To accomplish this, the guerrillas have (rightly, from a purely theoretical standpoint) focused attacks on electricity using the following methods:

• Attacked power lines. The US military conceded that 2,800 megawatts of the country's potential 7,100 megawatts (7,200 megawatts is the average demand) is disrupted, mostly due to sabotage, at any given time (nearly 40%). This is a slight improvement over 2004 numbers. Network analysis, tempo, and efficiency play a role here.
• Attack contractors and workers. 32 assaults were recorded (likely conservative) in December against contractors including: 6 killed, 5 wounded, and 2 kidnapped (this is a renewed continuation of the operational method I called Halliburton Targeting that I wrote about in 2004).
• Increased inefficiency. Ongoing attacks have added both excessive costs to the reconstruction effort and ongoing delays (see Disrupting Reconstruction for a more detailed description of how this works).

The result is that Baghdad gets only 6 hours of erratic electricity a day now, down from 11 hours in October. The rest of the country averages 13 hours a day. The rapid shifts in focus are indicative of global guerrilla open source methods. It doesn't reflect central planning but rather an ability to swarm quickly on vulnerabilities to maximize impact at minimal cost. Note also that this level of disruption has only been matched by the US air campaigns over the last decade (read the brief on EBOs for more on this method).

SWARM: Nigerian Oil Disruption

A group called the Martyr's Brigade (a new group, splintered off of the NDPVF, that is part of the growing community of open source insurgency in Nigeria), claimed credit for a dynamite attack on a major Shell oil pipeline in the Niger Delta. The blast killed 8 tribesman, living in a nearby fishing village, and has been burning out of control for days. While the destroyed pipeline carried only 7% (180,000 bpd) of the country's crude oil exports, the cascading effect (due the destruction of four lines and the shut down of a pumping station due to co-location and mutual vulnerability) of the disruption has halted the export 300,000 barrels of light crude for a week or more. This is the third major attack in the last months and in the case (which is on par with most systems disruption) the attackers escaped without incident or identification. NOTE: Nigeria supplies 14% of US crude oil imports.

The Martyr Brigade's statement: "Today, we took out 200,000 barrels of oil per day from Shells production this year. Since the produced oil cannot provide any economic and social benefit ...more of such sabotage shall be carried out with great pace... " NOTE: A second pipeline explosion has been reported, again in a remote area.

JOURNAL: The Pull of Black Globalization in Afghanistan

Last year, Nangahar province in Afghanistan reduced opium poppy cultivation by 96%. This reduction contributed 60% of the country's overall reduction in cultivation in 2004 (although higher yields on existing cultivation negated the effect). This reduction was in large part due to promises of seeds for new cash crops, financial support, and improved infrastructure. Of course, this didn't happen. The money allocated for this was inevitably lost in the state's corruption, mismanagement, and misallocation. The result was that the economy in the province declined by 60%. This year, the farmers have resumed poppy production (which at $6,500 a hectare is 10x what could be achieved through other crops). Tom Coghlan, of the London Telegraph reports that a huge council of the traditionally fractious tribes have decided to form a mutual defense front against eradication efforts of their poppy crop -- Malik Zahir, 40, chief of Darga village: "Every tribe is committed to fight. There will be 100 per cent cultivation."

The bottoms up process of global guerrilla formation is well underway in Afghanistan, driven by a desire for economic advancement using any and all means necessary. This is going to be a very tough year for the US and its allies in the country.

JOURNAL: Co-opting Transnational Crime

Bloomberg. Evo Morales, the Bolivian Indian activist who... opposes U.S. efforts to ban production of coca, is set to win election as president. ( Note: the Democracy Center has a nice primer on the ins and outs of the election process in Bolivia)

This is going to be interesting. Unlike Afghanistan, which has ceded control of its economy to the drug networks, Morales may defuse them by legalizing them (by using cultural differences as a justification). This is in line with Samuel Huntington's theory that a clash of civilization's will produce different, and likely antagonistic, culturally attuned democracies. It is also a partial solution to the disruptive effects of global guerrillas.

JOURNAL: Leveraging Globalization

Sten Tamkivi, the 27-year-old head of Skype's software development: "What Skype has shown the world is that you can take a great idea, with few resources, and conquer the world." (Courtesy, Mark Lander NYT).

NOTE: This applies to warfare in the 21st Century too.

SWARM: System disruption in action in UK blast?

A start of systems disruption in earnest?

7/12/05: Zawahiri video posted to the Internet: "I call on the holy warriors to concentrate their campaigns on the stolen oil of the Muslims, most of the revenues of which go to the enemies of Islam. The enemies of Islam are exploiting such vital resources with incomparable greed, and we have to stop that theft with all we can and save this fortune for the nation of Islam." (this is a follow up to bin Laden's earlier call for systems attacks)

11/12/05: The Bruncefield Total/Texaco oil depot northwest of London exploded. The explosion was so intense, there is very little likelihood that any cause will be found. 400 tankers offload everyday at the facility which stores 4 million gallons of gasoline, diesel, kerosine, and aviation fuel. As one of the top 5 facilities in the UK, it supplies 5% of the country's energy needs.

NOTE: If so, this attack was probably due to the same community dynamic we saw in the London subway attacks. Also, if this attack is not claimed it doesn't mean that this wasn't terrorism, it might mean that the threat has evolved to a more effective form. Anonymity is a weapon.

NOTE2: Here's some more from Zawahiri on al Qaeda's focus on oil production from Jamestown.org. Again, this development is a strong confirmation that al Qaeda is aligning itself with the Global Guerrillas approach to systems disruption.

In particular, he called on the mujahideen to "make every effort in your power to stop the greatest theft in history of the natural resources of both present and future generations." To do this, they should "focus operations on [oil production], especially in Iraq and the Gulf area, since this will cause them to die off." The gravity of these statements was graphically demonstrated last September when Saudi security forces, after a 48-hour armed confrontation at al-Dammam, uncovered a stash of forged documents aimed at providing militants with access to some of Saudi Arabia's principal oil and gas facilities. Since this time, forum traffic has kept the "U.S. thirst for oil" theme at the fore as an explanation for American strategy in the region, and, accordingly, has highlighted the vulnerability of the superpower, as illustrated by the episodes of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Comments to this effect populate the forums passim.

JOURNAL: Virtual States

Afghanistan. An armed attack by Taliban guerrillas on police in Helmand province kill six. It's yet another example of how the Taliban (armed force) is combining with opium producers (economy) to reduce the power of the state in Afghanistan. Ongoing attacks on police in this province (the biggest opium producer) have killed 55 soldiers and police officers this year.

Afghanistan's 'black' globalization is quickly overwhelming the government. This nascent virtual state has a bigger economy, more effective 'soldiers,' deep penetration of its opposition (via corruption and elected warlord affiliates), strong connections to global trade routes, and employs over 2 m people. The Afghan government only have the US military and the trappings of nation-state sovereignty in their plus column.

SYSTEMS DISRUPTION SWARMS

A new variation on an extremely old method of warfare has emerged. This new method is called systems disruption -- which has been a major theme of this weblog since its inception. Based on extensive analysis, I believe that systems disruption will become the dominant method of warfare for non-state networks against nation-states.

It consists of simple attacks (using ad hoc weapons) on critical nodes of infrastructure -- oil, gas, electricity, water, etc. These attacks, if properly targeted, can cause cascades of failure that sweep entire systems. The result is a paralyzed economy that produces costs that far outstrip the costs of the attack (this is a guerrilla version of the American air power method called effects-based operations). This new method vastly improves on the three other ways non-state entities have fought strategically with states in the past:

• Moral conflict. 4th generation guerrilla war. A slow and difficult process of erosion.
• Strategic symbolic terrorism. A variant of moral conflict that can be projected. Pushed to a new level by al Qaeda. Limited in its long term impact. Requires extensive pre-planning and flawless execution.
• WMDs. Limited and flawed attempts in the past. Requires extensive knowledge and likely state support to accomplish correctly.

Lessons
In Iraq, systems disruption is the 'secret sauce' of the insurgency. A series of relatively infrequent and small attacks have held the Iraqi electricity, oil, and water systems at nearly pre-war levels despite a massive reconstruction campaign. This success has fueled the insurgency by creating economic chaos and radically decreasing the legitimacy of both the US occupation and the new Iraqi government. These attacks boast the following attributes:

• Easy, inexpensive, and safe. Almost none of infrastructure attackers have been caught or killed. Infrastructure networks are notoriously easy to destroy using ad hoc weapons and have a vast number of vulnerable points.
• Fuels fragmentation. The decimation of primary services provides a way to fragment the target state's population. If cultural fault lines are present (Huntington), this will accelerate the descent to primary loyalties and conflict.
• Fantastic ROIs. The network effect of infrastructure attacks can produce returns on investment in the thousands of percent (a rate of return recognized by bin Laden)

How this works
Over time, systems disruption will become the most effective method by which virtual states subvert or coerce target nation-states. It does this by:

• Leveraging external connections. Systems disruption uses the ties of globalization against the target state. By making it an unreliable business partner it hurts its ability to compete globally and retain relationships. These partners (often morally ambivalent markets), will put heavy pressure on the target state to resolve the crisis.
• Minimizing moral opposition. Symbolic or body count centric attacks increase the moral staying power of target states. In contrast, the blame for sustained systems disruption typically rebounds onto the state itself. Since almost all wars in the future will be over marginal objectives (external to the life and death of the state or the central well being of its populace), attacks that radically increase costs without a corresponding increase in moral commitment have a high likelihood of success.
• Riding urbanization. The growth of urbanization is a global megatrend. These urban centers are the economic lifeblood of a nation-state and typically the key points of connection to the world. Large cities, however, offer a green field of vulnerability to this method of attack. The larger the cities, the more reliant it is on key systems. Systems disruption can quickly collapse urban environments into disaster zones.

I have detailed two scenarios (last year) that show systems disruption in action:

Russia. More.

Saudi Arabia.

CLEAR AND HOLD?

The current US approach in Iraq is to clear areas of insurgent activity and hold them to prevent their return. This is a redux of a 20th Century counter-insurgency method called oil spots (a variant is strategic hamlets). The idea is to tightly control select areas and return them to a vestige of normal life (under the assumption that this is what the people the vast majority of people in those areas want). As a method for achieving the articulated strategy for Iraq, it is markedly flawed. Some flaws in this approach can be seen in the recent history of Ramadi and Fallujah, both of which are currently being 'held' by US forces:

• Attacks against Americans continue. 34 US troops have died in Ramadi since September. There are ongoing battles for control of the central roads (which are essential US supply routes). 11 Marines recently died from an IED blast on the outskirts of Fallujah.
• An open source insurgency exists in both cities with multiple Iraqi groups operating in concert. In Ramadi, al Qaeda has moved to a support, training, and financing role.
• The city has a robust and competitive market for violence. Both cities have 50% + unemployment. The current market price for violence are only $200 for the death of an American and $50 to emplace an IED.

The flaws with 'clear and hold'

As we see in Ramadi and Fallujah, even areas 'held' by US troops are still being contested. This points to problems with 'clear and hold' -- it was originally designed to fight rural insurgencies of the 20th Century, which means it will be difficult to apply to the current environment of ethnic/religious fragmentation, urban environments, and global guerrilla methods. Additionally, the current plan is complex because it is being combined with a draw down in the US presence (to reduce opposition to the war in both Iraq and the US). The result is an extremely difficult judo move that uses US forces clear towns for relatively unprepared Iraqi units to hold, while at the same time consolidating bases to reduce its presence in preparation for a pull-out. Here's a critique:

• Open connections. Iraq's insurgency is relatively urban. Urbanites cannot be "locked down" like subsistence level farmers. They need access to connections: transportation, utilities, communications, and trade to function economically. These "holes" provide opportunities for exploitation. Additionally, the economic revival of an urban environment (in contrast to farming) requires more than a freedom from violence. It requires extensive reconstruction which in turn creates more avenues for coercion and disruption. For example, due to this potential for disruption, progress in Fallujah since its reduction has been meager. See "State Failure 101" for more.
• Insufficient manpower. The US doesn't have a sufficient number of troops in theater for this manpower intensive strategy -- to clear areas, train Iraqi troops, and support them once in place. This will not be reversed due to insurmountable structural factors. This situation will only get worse as the US starts to bring troops home.
• Expanding insurgency. The use of use of "trusted" uniformed Iraqi militias to hold cleared towns, would only heighten violence due to sectarian tensions. We can expect extremely harsh tactics by Iraqi units in Sunni towns as they take control (similar with the torture chamber that was recently found in the Iraqi Interior Ministry). This will only serve to activate a larger percentage of the population to take up arms. Note, if we use Sunni units we will find them quickly co-opted by insurgents.

What this means

The likely outcome will be that the US will have little real value (a decrease in violence) to show for its efforts over the next year. If we do it flawlessly (which is going to be very difficult given a thinking enemy), the controlled chaos may hold long enough for the US to get most of its troops out. Here's what it means:

• Moral collapse. There will be intense pressure from US voters to exit Iraq prior to the US elections next year. This is the last plan that the US public will allow without serious repercussions for the American political leadership. It's a one way ticket.
• Melt down. As the plan bogs down and the body bags of Iraqi troops flow home in increasing numbers (due to insufficient armor, training and increased fighting), there will be a backlash against the US. Expect increased pressure by Shiite militias on our rear 'safe' areas after full independence. Since this pressure will threaten our lines of supply as well as our exit path, it will put the US military in a difficult position. The key is to get as much as we can out of Iraq before it occurs.
• Unexpected events. A rapidly evolving plan like this creates the potential that unexpected events may cause serious disruption. For example: the expansion of the conflict to a new area (the US?) and/or a major overrun (we almost saw this in the attacks on the Baghdad hotels in October/November) where a large group of Americans are killed and taken hostage. Either event could cause a radical policy collapse.