The current US approach in Iraq is to clear areas of insurgent activity and hold them to prevent their return. This is a redux of a 20th Century counter-insurgency method called oil spots (a variant is strategic hamlets). The idea is to tightly control select areas and return them to a vestige of normal life (under the assumption that this is what the people the vast majority of people in those areas want). As a method for achieving the articulated strategy for Iraq, it is markedly flawed. Some flaws in this approach can be seen in the recent history of Ramadi and Fallujah, both of which are currently being 'held' by US forces:
- Attacks against Americans continue. 34 US troops have died in Ramadi since September. There are ongoing battles for control of the central roads (which are essential US supply routes). 11 Marines recently died from an IED blast on the outskirts of Fallujah.
- An open source insurgency exists in both cities with multiple Iraqi groups operating in concert. In Ramadi, al Qaeda has moved to a support, training, and financing role.
- The city has a robust and competitive market for violence. Both cities have 50% + unemployment. The current market price for violence are only $200 for the death of an American and $50 to emplace an IED.
The flaws with 'clear and hold'
As we see in Ramadi and Fallujah, even areas 'held' by US troops are still being contested. This points to problems with 'clear and hold' -- it was originally designed to fight rural insurgencies of the 20th Century, which means it will be difficult to apply to the current environment of ethnic/religious fragmentation, urban environments, and global guerrilla methods. Additionally, the current plan is complex because it is being combined with a draw down in the US presence (to reduce opposition to the war in both Iraq and the US). The result is an extremely difficult judo move that uses US forces clear towns for relatively unprepared Iraqi units to hold, while at the same time consolidating bases to reduce its presence in preparation for a pull-out. Here's a critique:
- Open connections. Iraq's insurgency is relatively urban. Urbanites cannot be "locked down" like subsistence level farmers. They need access to connections: transportation, utilities, communications, and trade to function economically. These "holes" provide opportunities for exploitation. Additionally, the economic revival of an urban environment (in contrast to farming) requires more than a freedom from violence. It requires extensive reconstruction which in turn creates more avenues for coercion and disruption. For example, due to this potential for disruption, progress in Fallujah since its reduction has been meager. See "State Failure 101" for more.
- Insufficient manpower. The US doesn't have a sufficient number of troops in theater for this manpower intensive strategy -- to clear areas, train Iraqi troops, and support them once in place. This will not be reversed due to insurmountable structural factors. This situation will only get worse as the US starts to bring troops home.
- Expanding insurgency. The use of use of "trusted" uniformed Iraqi militias to hold cleared towns, would only heighten violence due to sectarian tensions. We can expect extremely harsh tactics by Iraqi units in Sunni towns as they take control (similar with the torture chamber that was recently found in the Iraqi Interior Ministry). This will only serve to activate a larger percentage of the population to take up arms. Note, if we use Sunni units we will find them quickly co-opted by insurgents.
What this means
The likely outcome will be that the US will have little real value (a decrease in violence) to show for its efforts over the next year. If we do it flawlessly (which is going to be very difficult given a thinking enemy), the controlled chaos may hold long enough for the US to get most of its troops out. Here's what it means:
- Moral collapse. There will be intense pressure from US voters to exit Iraq prior to the US elections next year. This is the last plan that the US public will allow without serious repercussions for the American political leadership. It's a one way ticket.
- Melt down. As the plan bogs down and the body bags of Iraqi troops flow home in increasing numbers (due to insufficient armor, training and increased fighting), there will be a backlash against the US. Expect increased pressure by Shiite militias on our rear 'safe' areas after full independence. Since this pressure will threaten our lines of supply as well as our exit path, it will put the US military in a difficult position. The key is to get as much as we can out of Iraq before it occurs.
- Unexpected events. A rapidly evolving plan like this creates the potential that unexpected events may cause serious disruption. For example: the expansion of the conflict to a new area (the US?) and/or a major overrun (we almost saw this in the attacks on the Baghdad hotels in October/November) where a large group of Americans are killed and taken hostage. Either event could cause a radical policy collapse.