Global Guerrillas

AL QAEDA'S BLACK SWANS

Over four years after we began the war on terror, al Qaeda demonstrated that they still can manufacture events (black swans) that have the potential to throw our dynamically unstable global system into chaos. We appear be more vulnerable today to shocks of this type than we were four years ago.

The first attack, a successful one, on the Askariya shrine in Samarra, caused so much friction in Iraq's social systems, the country will likely end up in civil war. This would put the entire US venture in the country at immediate risk as the situation deteriorates. The second attack was an abortive attempt to take down the massive Abqaiq facility in Saudi Arabia. This was almost a disaster for the global economy (if the Aramco uniformed attack team had breached the second security ring, we would be looking at $100 a barrel oil today).

More is on the way. We should expect al Qaeda to begin to disrupt Saudi oil production in the more efficient but less glamorous method we have seen in Iraq and other locations, now that the attempted coup de main on Abqaiq was thwarted. These smaller and less difficult attacks, can in time replicate the effects of taking down a portion of Abqaiq. There will also be more attacks on Shiite symbolic targets, since even with the diminishing returns on terrorist attacks post-Askariya, it won't take much to continue the fragmentation.

Remember, al Qaeda is open source now. It is operating at a level of decentralization that will allow it to take the war to many locations simultaneously without central management. Bin Laden's threats reflect his inside knowledge of what is now a self-directed movement and not planning he has directed personally. Despite all of this current activity in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, we should also expect to see systems disrupted against US mainland targets in the not too distant future. The organization has more than enough capacity to accomplish this.

FAST COMPANY: POWER TO THE PEOPLE

The March 2006 issue of Fast Company is about to hit the stands. In it, with the help and insight of my intrepid and talented editor Will Bourne, I lay out the next decade in American security. In particular, I focus on how inexorable global trends will change our notions of what security means and who provides it.

Since its part of Fast Company's 10 year anniversary issue, it will be packed full of big think vision articles. Don't miss it!

Security: Power To The People. The myth of American omnipotence fell in the Iraqi desert, laid low by an agile new enemy. We have a chance now to rethink the systems that protected us in the past. It's one we cannot miss.

JOURNAL: Nigeria's Guerrillas Leverage Decentralized Initiative

The open source MEND movement (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta), an amalgam of numerous guerrilla groups and bunkering gangs (bunkering is the theft of oil from pipelines for resale, it is big business), have begun a campaign against the country's oil industry. E-mails from people in the movement, to the press, say that they have launched "impromptu" strikes. The word "impromptu" -- prompted by the occasion rather than being planned in advance -- is exactly the word to describe the decentralized decision making used in open source systems disruption (I described this method in the previous post on the next attacks against America). Local decision makers -- in response to local conditions and the signaling of nearby actors -- decide how, when, and where to exploit the situation. Results so far: 9 foreign oil workers, working for Shell (specifically for the subcontractor Willbros), have been kidnapped (3 Americans) and numerous facilities have been destroyed.

THE NEXT ATTACKS ON AMERICA

Osama bin Laden offered a truce to America last month. This is an Islamic tradition prior to an attack. He coupled that offer with a threat of an impending attack. We should anticipate (To clarify: this is prudent and not predictive) that new attacks on US targets will occur soon. IF or when terrorists attack the US again, how will the attacks be accomplished? Which targets will be selected? When will it occur? There has been lots of speculation on these points. So far, this speculation has been useless, due to an inability to separate the probable from the possible. The key to knowing what is probable is found in a deep understanding how warfare is evolving. With this as a starting point, it is possible to discern the broad outlines of any future attack.

The Factors Framing the Next Attack

The timing, target, and nature of the next strategic attack on the US is shrouded in uncertainty. Its arrival will be a black swan -- an unexpected event that can't be anticipated with any degree of assurance. Despite this, there are some factors that will shape its arrival:

• The diminishing returns on symbolic terrorism (attacks on populations or national symbols). Read: "Terrorist Death-March" It details how the returns from terrorist attacks on symbolic targets diminishes unless the scale and scope is constantly increased.
• The organizational limitations of al Qaeda and other groups. Read: "The Optimal Size of a Terrorist Network." This brief provides insight into the limitations on terrorist group size due to the actions in Afghanistan and the GWOT.
• A shift in objectives towards economic coercion. Recent strategy statements from al Qaeda (always a good guide for future activity) and the experience of Iraqi guerrillas has moved the debate among prospective attackers towards attacks on systems rather than symbols.

A Crude Shape Emerges

Here's what we can discern from these factors:

• It's clear that given the organizational limitations of al Qaeda and other prospective attackers that the network that will make the next attack on the US will not be as large and complex as the one that carried out 9/11. This creates hard limits on what can be accomplished through symbolic terrorism -- since operationally complex operations like 9/11 or the use of WMDs are beyond the capabilities of any network that can be fielded (of course, when dealing with black swans, anything is possible).
• Any potential symbolic terrorist attack that is less impressive than 9/11 will be a devastating blow to the moral momentum of the attacker. The diminishing returns from symbolic terrorism dictate this.
• The combination of the above with a growing recognition of the value of economic coercion will drive the development of alternative plans. These new plans will likely be focused on systems disruption.

What this means

Here's a likely scenario: The networks used by the terrorists in any future strategic attacks on the US will be small, decentralized clusters. Many of the clusters, like what we saw in London and Madrid, will be homegrown and only loosely affiliated with external groups. Instead of symbolic targets, these groups will hit infrastructure networks. Much of the instruction and research passed to these groups will be done through the Internet. Unlike 9/11, these networks will have operational cell sizes of 2-3 members with only a remote support system. Since the tools and training necessary for infrastructure attacks are crude, the moral burden of these attacks can be meager (these attacks don't have to result in the deaths and dismemberment of random civilians), and the chance of capture is relatively small, the pool of potential participants is quite large.

Their operational method won't be focused on training for a single wasting attack but on repetitive attacks within a radius from a safe location. They will focus on systempunkts that provide them the opportunity for cascades of failure across multiple systems. Widespread blackouts, natural gas cut-offs, water shortages, and more. These infrastructure systems won't be attacked once but on multiple occasions and timed to coincide with repairs (which radically multiplies the impact on economic systems). The net result of this effort will be that each attacker will have the capability of inflicting hundreds of millions (if done correctly, billions) in economic damage to the US before they are neutralized (typical of the leverage we see in global guerrilla returns on investment).

The impact of these attacks, particularly if they are numerous (attracting copycats?) and spread out over an extended period of time will be severe. Given their lack of symbolic content (and the potential that they will be relatively anonymous), the moral benefit to US cohesion will be small. Initial outrage against the attackers will quickly turn against the government itself, with severe repercussions (particularly if the government's response is crude and deemed ineffective). Globally, these attacks will put at risk the US position as a safe haven for investment and may result in a large outflow of capital as the market's moral sentiment cracks.

ASK THE EXPERT: Fourth Generation Warfare in Afghanistan

I'm very pleased to offer a 24 hour question and answer session with an expert on the current situation in Afghanistan. AD was at the center of the information flow on US operations in Afghanistan. He is also has considerable experience in fourth generation warfare.

Here's a little background on our host for this session: AD is field grade officer with the US Army. He recently has returned from a tour in Afghanistan where he was a team chief at strategic level command in country. He has been a line commander as well. He has been in the Army for over a decade.

Here's how this is going to work. Ask your questions in the comment area below and AD will answer them. Very simple.

My first question: How has the Taliban reorganized since the invasion? What's the level of cohesiveness and are there other non-Taliban guerrillas operating in the country?

JOURNAL: Iraq's IED micro-markets

Iraq's insurgency is a cooperative community arrangement between many diverse groups that operates much like open source development in the software industry. As an adjunct to this cooperative arrangement, micro-markets have formed around the arming and prosecution of specific forms of attack. These micro-markets enhance innovation, participation, and skill development.

The best example of this is in the building and emplacement of IEDs, where guerrilla entrepreneurs have form cells for hire that specialize in certain aspects of the IED operations chain (the IED, or homemade bomb, has become the weapon of choice for Iraqi guerrillas fighting US soldiers). Greg Grant, a reporter just back from Iraq, wrote extensively about this micro-market in an article for the Defense News back in August 2005. He continues with a follow-up piece for Defense Technology International on the same topic (many thanks to Noah at DefenseTech for the heads-up).

The arrival of adaptive micro-markets (just like traders using rules of thumb gleaned from experience to recognize changes in global financial markets) or bazaars for violence in Iraq has changed many of the ways US forces fight. Most interestingly, an increasingly valuable form of measurement for success or failure is the market price of IED materials:

The market in Iraq for.. IEDs, has come to resemble that of any other commodity: It is well-financed and effectively managed, with supply adjusting to meet demand. U.S. military officers use the street price of an IED in Baghdad as an important measure of success in the war...

A competitive marketplace:

According to U.S. military intelligence, more than 100 cells operate in Iraq. Most limit attacks to roadways and neighborhoods near where the cell members live (NOTE: local action, global impact). Cells advertise their technical skills on the Internet, posting streaming video of IED attacks to jihadist web sites.

A combination of cooperative sharing and micro-market competition has led to the rapid proliferation of new technology and innovation among insurgent cells:

The most deadly device, however, is the explosively formed projectile (EFP), often called the shaped charge. Designed to attack armored vehicles in an urban environment, EFP's impart tremendous lethality in a small, readily concealable device not much larger than a coffee can.... According to U.S. intelligence officials who asked not to be identified, EFP's were first supplied to Shiite insurgent groups in Iraq allied with Lebanese Hezbollah. (since early 2005) EFP use has since migrated to Sunni insurgents and the devices are now found throughout Baghdad... "The Internet has changed the nature of warfare," says (Lt. Col. Shawn) Weed (U.S military intelligence officer in Baghdad). "Someone can learn how to build a new bomb, plug the pans into the Internet and share the technology very quickly."

JOURNAL: Adaptive Markets

Andrew Lo, of MIT, has an interesting paper called, "The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis" (AMH) He applies evolutionary biology to trading strategies in financial markets. In short, the AMH theorizes that:

• The market environment's risk and reward ratios are constantly changing. Think of this as an evolving market ecology.
• Inefficiencies exist. There are arbitrage opportunities that can be exploited.
• Investment strategies wax and wan (due to their applicability to an evolving market ecology).
• Innovation is the key to survival. Rapid adaptation improves risk/reward.
• Survival is the only objective that matters. "While profit maximization, utility maximization, and general equilibrium are certainly relevant aspects of market ecology, the organizing principle in determining the evolution of markets and financial technology is simply survival."

All of Lo's rules for traders and investors participating in financial markets apply to global guerrillas engaged in open source warfare. It also implies that static doctrines (as we see in conventional militaries) and formulas for nation-building are likely to break given rapid changes in the warfighting ecology.

In contrast, the trial and error approach of local actors, often yields improvements in methods that improve risk/reward ratios. These local innovators can quickly find and exploit arbitrage opportunities (risk free success) when they arise. Local strategies can also be quickly replicated across the horizontal networks of open source warfare (which may allow locally developed innovation to apply to the strategic level through the emergent intelligence of the aggregate network). Finally, the only goal we may be able to discern from an open source warfare movement is the need to survive (beyond being a "old saw" of guerrilla warfare, it also explains the movement's rapid adoption of transnational crime and its rapidly changing target sets).

JOURNAL: Lessons from the arrival of bird flu in Africa

Bird Flu has shown up in Nigeria. The presence of bird flu in this location is particularly unsettling due to the inability of global health agencies to control and track its progress. However, the most interesting challenge is due to the prevalence of AIDs in many African countries:

"If H5N1 gets into people with AIDS it would likely persist and throw off mutants left, right and center," the British virologist Dr. Oxford said. (the New York Times, February 12, 2006, "Experts Sound Alarm as Bird Flu Spreads")

The genetic sharing that occurs when two horizontal pathogens are combined in a single host can create a more lethal entity. For survivability, this new more lethal entity will need to improve its transmission and increase its persistence in a treated host. Sounds like the same situation we are facing with the combination of rapidly evolving transnational criminal networks and open source terrorists. The net result: global guerrillas.

EMERGENT INTELLIGENCE IN OPEN SOURCE WARFARE

Open source warfare, like what we see in Iraq and increasingly in other locations, relies on networks of peers rather than the hierarchies of command and control we see in conventional militaries. This structure provides an open source movement with levels of innovation and resilience that rigid hierarchies can't match. Unfortunately, these attributes are likely not constrained to merely local tactical activity. Open source movements can exhibit emergent intelligence that guides the movement's collective actions towards strategic goals.

Emergent Intelligence

What is emergent intelligence? It is a form of macrointelligence that arises from local interactions. It isn't merely the simple stigmergic interactions (Stigmergy is a term used in biology -- from the work of french biologist Pierre-Paul Grasse -- to describe environmental mechanisms for coordinating the work of independent actors) necessary for the coordination of the swarm activities of local autonomous agents. Rather, it is a form of group intelligence that learns, achieves goals, and engages in self-preservation. There are five simple requirements for emergent intelligence (a good starting point for those that want to dive deeper into this subject is Steven Johnson's book "Emergence"):

• A critical mass of participation is necessary. A certain minimum number of participants, either individuals or component groups, is necessary for micromotives to translate into macromotives. It also means that without a minimum number of interactions between these participants, the statistical nature of macrointelligence won't emerge. More is different.
• A local focus is useful. Open source actors are mainly focused on local activity. The simplicity of this focus is a feature and not a bug since it prevents activity that may upset the entire organism's operation. Local action, global impact.
• Random interactions are necessary. Random interactions between groups and individuals outside is a necessity (this assumes a certain level of mobility and communications capability). These interactions provide a fluidity to the learning process that finds and responds to new information quickly.
• Pattern matching from stigmergic communication. The ability to see patterns of activity from simple signs is a necessity. Gradients of activity provide "maps" to areas of focus for individual actors or groups.
• An openness to interaction. A willingness to interact with others is required. This assumes some commonality between actors that bonds them to each other.

What does this mean?

Analysis of the Iraqi insurgency indicates that emergent intelligence is evident. A complex series of local interactions has led to shifts in its behavior that reflect complex learning, goal attainment, and self-preservation despite a lack of a leadership hierarchy. What this means to the outcome of the war is as follows:

• The insurgency will continue to improve over time. Despite losses, the macro behavior of the Iraqi insurgency will become more complex (virulent) the longer it operates. As a result, it will be difficult to dislodge with each passing month. We will see less activity where it has little impact and more where it matters. Further, this activity will become more efficient.
• Breakout is possible. While it is unlikely that the insurgency will spread horizontally to other countries in an incremental fashion, it is very likely that those trained in this environment will seed other movements (and inevitable that the knowledge of this will initiate activity). Further, this breakout can occur globally and in unexpected locales -- since this neutral method isn't tied to any single motive, it can be applied to any cause.
• It is impossible to discern the motives of this movement (UPDATED). The motives of individual actors are easy to discern. A global motive is impossible to uncover, particularly since it is the culmination of thousands of local interactions. Even observations of the movement's global pattern of activity might be fruitless, since the time horizon is likely too short for accurate measurement. The movement is in a constant process of maturation in response to evolving environmental conditions.

JOURNAL: Vulnerability to Systempunkts

When the entire country of Georgia was cut off from natural gas supply for weeks through the destruction of two collocated pipelines (a couple of hours of work), the assumption of many in the West is that our more complex system would prevent that level of vulnerability. This is a bad assumption. While it is true that Western countries do maintain more of a reserve capacity (up to 45 days in LNG storage depots, although this depletes over the winter) than Georgia (1 day), the vulnerability of centralized routing still exists. Most US natural gas is transported via pipeline from the New Orleans area or Canada. The vulnerability of this "long supply line" can be seen in this example of open source research put together by John Young of Cryptome: Washington DC area natural gas system. Europe has similar vulnerabilities.

SYSTEMPUNKT 5

The value of a systempunkt is measured in the effects it produces and not in the degree of damage to the target system. It is possible to create a desired effect with little to no destruction of the target system. Think hard on this.

SYSTEMPUNKT 4

It will be the case that a planner who is adroit at systempunkt selection will have the capacity to completely shut down a target system. This should be approached carefully. Complete disruption of the target system or the destruction of critical parts will result in the growth of redundancies and alternatives. It may also lead to an increase in the moral cohesion of the target state. Partial disruption carries the hope that the system will be made whole again and thereby increases its coercive value and the delegitimization of its protector.

SYSTEMPUNKT 3

In selecting systempunkts, heterogeneity in the target system is your ally. Differences in a system's capacity, connections, and ownership work in the favor of the planner. Leveraging these differences is part of the art of systems disruption.

SYSTEMPUNKT 2

If a choice is to be made between a heavily defended systempunkt of major importance and more numerous lightly defended ones of less importance, the choice is easy. The many are more important than the one since they offer repeatability. Continuous disruption turns time into an ally and increases its impact on the moral cohesion of the population and their markets.