Global Guerrillas

JOURNAL: Haditha and Creveld's Paradox

As news of the incident in Haditha filters out, it is becoming increasingly clear that Martin Van Creveld's paradox of modern warfare is in play:

In other words, he who fights against the weak - and the rag-tag Iraqi militias are very weak indeed - and loses, loses. He who fights against the weak and wins also loses. To kill an opponent who is much weaker than yourself is unnecessary and therefore cruel; to let that opponent kill you is unnecessary and therefore foolish. As Vietnam and countless other cases prove, no armed force, however rich, however powerful, however advanced, however well motivated is immune to this dilemma. The end result is always disintegration and defeat...

JOURNAL: Shell Refuses to Meet MEND's Demand

In the ongoing war between Shell Oil and Nigeria's open source guerrilla movement (MEND), has reached a new level. Shell Oil was ordered by a Nigerian court (likely with Nigerian government support) to pay $1.5 billion in reparations for environmental damage to the Niger delta. Shell has refused to pay, pending appeal. Payment of this reparation was a plausible promise (a theme that unifies disparate groups and coordinates their activities, much like a "commander's intent" in 3GW and 4GW) that drove MEND's declaration of war on Shell and its subsequent disruption of 30% of Nigeria's oil production. The targeting and coercion of corporations by non-state groups is a key aspect of global guerrilla warfare.

JOURNAL: Primary Loyalties in Basra

There are two working assumptions for the global fragmentation we are seeing. One is that we are involved in a clash of civilizations (Huntington) and the other is that disconnectedness is driving discontent (Barnett). Neither survives a review of the facts.

Iraq provides a good test case. While Iraq's initial plunge into civil war appeared to center around a clash of civilizations (Sunni vs. Shiite) it is rapidly devolving past that to smaller groups with more cohesive primary loyalties (gang, mosque, tribe, family, etc.). The rise of intense inter-tribal warfare in Basra between Shiite militias/tribes/families is an example of the granular nature of the level of fragmentation we are seeing. With nearly hourly assassinations, no-go zones for police, the proliferation of antagonistic militias, and ongoing attacks on British troops (including the Mogadishu like event that occurred when a British helicopter was shot down) Basra is likely the most unsafe place in Iraq today despite the lack of any meaningful Sunni insurgency.

The other assumption, that a lack of connectivity is the source of problems, fails to account for the rapid proliferation of crime due to improved inter-state connectivity between Iraq and its neighbors. This transnational crime, from drugs to oil bunkering, is fueling the growth of militias and guerrillas throughout Iraq. This would be impossible without improved connectivity. Further, the radical growth in automobile ownership and telephone usage due to Iraq's rapid globalization has enabled high levels of maneuver and coordination among anti-state groups, making them much more effective. It has also provided a mechanism by which the most effective weapon in Iraq was built and rapidly improved upon: the IED and the VBIED. Finally, this new connectivity also allows funding to flow into Iraq from a vast number of sources. We are now in a world where even a small group of individuals can act like nation-states to underwrite the activities of guerrilla groups that represent their interests.

Take what you want from this example, but it's clear that rapid connectivity is a source of the problem, due to the high degree of leverage provided by the global platform. Further, this platform makes it possible, nay probable, that small groups will use it to advance their own interests (well below the civilization level).

UPDATE: It should be clarified that connectivity is neutral. Improved connectivity doesn't diminish danger (as improved connectivity on the US southern border is proving daily). It can be an enabler of both good and bad. The problem is that it doesn't take sides.

JOURNAL: Brazil's PCC vs. Sao Paulo's Police

Over the last two days one of Brazil's biggest gangs, the First Capital Command (or First Command of the Capital -- PCC), took the fight to Sao Paulo's government. The heavily armed gang staged 70 attacks on police that killed 70 people (including at least 35 policemen) and 24 prison uprisings with hundreds being held hostage. So far, the government has only been able to contain six of the prison uprisings, but that more are occurring as fast as they put them down (UPDATE: this number has climbed to 40). The latest attacks have moved into include attacks on buses (UPDATE: over 60 have been held up and torched) and banks.

For its second exercise of military power, this is pretty impressive. The scale, intensity, duration, and the coordination demonstrated by these attacks shows that this gang has made the transition from evading the police to treating the police (the nation-state) as a competitive threat. It also has set what could be construed as a plausible promise that could be used to recruit allies: that Sao Paulo's government can be attacked successfully.

The open question is whether the other gangs that inhabit Sao Paulo's massive favela (10 million people live there without basic services) will join as participants in open source warfare. There are indications that they are both plentiful and powerful -- there are at least a dozen gangs in Sao Paulo that qualify as virtual states with economies fueled by transnational crime (Sao Paulo is the international hub for transshipments of cocaine to Europe and Africa).

IF this does move to open source warfare (it may be that the PCC is large enough, and decentralized enough to create its own ecosystem for OSW), we can expect to see an increasing emphasis on attacks to coerce the city's business class. The intent of this coercion will be to force the business class to relinquish the limited power they exercise over the favela. I suspect that this coercion will offer only limited success until emergent innovation leads the gangs to exercise control over the basic services that enable the city's functioning core (the attacks on the bus system was a good start in this direction). At that point, the effort will be successful.

UPDATE: The violence continued into Monday. 21 new killings have increased the total 38 police and guards killed (and 38 suspected gang members). 184 attacks in total, mostly aimed at police. Attacks on buses (mentioned earlier) have caused the bus drivers to stay away from work. 2.9 m people that use buses are stranded (classic systems attack) and the city is stalled. The Brazilian stock market and the Real are down 2% due to the violence (this may become the real leverage over time).

OPEN DISCUSSION: Can the US collapse Iran?

A couple of weeks ago, I made my case that the US will use air power to collapse Iran (this is an argument derived from analysis on what is likely to occur and is not an editorial based on pet theories/hopes for what could be...). Here's the question: can Iran be forced into collapse through air power (an effects-based operation) and special operations (is it vulnerable to the humpty dumpty principle of state cohesion like Iraq has proven to be)?

JOURNAL: Fragmentation in India?

Naxalites are "the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country." India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

India and China, are both more of a risk to us as sources of instability than they are as sources of competitive economic risk as cohesive states. These countries are in close proximity to the fragmentation of the state into zones controlled by primary loyalties (ethnic, religious, ideological, gang, family, etc.) throughout Asia and prime candidates for economic and social chaos due to the ongoing inability of the state to provide buffers against the pressures of globalization.

In India's case, in addition to ongoing and exceedingly diverse ethnic insurgencies in locations like the oil rich Assam, there is a budding Maoist insurgency (covered by John Lancaster of the Washington Post). This description of manufactured primary loyalty sounds familiar (which creates loyalty in opposition to the state):

Once dismissed as little more than an irritant, the Maoist movement is gaining ground in this country of more than 1 billion people, feeding off anti-government hostility in some rural areas and highlighting the uneven nature of India's unprecedented economic boom. Analysts say the movement consists of about 10,000 regular fighters, with several hundred thousand supporters. The rebels are known as Naxalites, after the eastern town of Naxalbari where the movement began in 1967.. the rebels draw strength from "deprived and alienated sections of the population" and "are trying to establish 'liberation zones' in core areas where they are dispensing, or claiming to be dispensing, basic state functions."

This conflict between paramilitary and guerrilla does too:

He's 30 years old, speaks English and is conversant in the language of e-mail and the Internet. Friendly and self-confident, he could be a manager in a call center, or perhaps a software engineer on one of India's gleaming high-tech campuses. But "Comrade M," as he asks to be called, prefers a different line of work: waging war on the Indian state... "They're absolutely ruthless killers," a senior Chhattisgarh security official, B.K.S. Roy, said by telephone from the state capital, Raipur. "I've never seen this kind of brutality in my life before, the way they strike and kill Salwa Judum members. They're hacked to death, heads severed from bodies...." "They come into villages, beat up men, rape women," she (a Naxalite) said of the paramilitaries. "I don't feel bad at all about killing them...." Comrade M, the university graduate and a squad leader, said the rebels typically laid ambushes for "our friends in khaki uniform" using mines triggered by camera-flash devices.

Of course, we will eventually see seemingly proto-state movements (which cannot in the current environment expand beyond very limited boundaries since the same forces that are dissipating the nation-state work against proto-states too) like these develop innovative off-shoots and and more importantly cooperative arrangements with fellow travelers (in that they share a desire to hollow out India) that fully embrace global guerrilla methods. These newer groups will increasingly incapacitate the state by undermining essential services supplied to functional cities. I suspect they will be successful.

US BORDER MILITARIZATION

"I think the Bush administration and the federal government should put up the money to create the kind of protection the federal government is responsible to provide. We have to press the federal government. It's their responsibility, not the state's responsibility." Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger

On Monday, President Bush is expected to announce the deployment of up to 10,000 National Guard troops on the US border with Mexico. On its face, this is a political move, intended to shore up support among the Republican base going into the mid-term elections. However, it is indicative of something much more.

It is an example of the inexorable erosion of nation-state sovereignty due to the emergence of a neutral global platform. As the nation-state continues to lose control, it will increasingly militarize civil problems. In this case it is in response to the nation-state's realization that its loss of control of the US southern border has become an acute problem (particularly for the states on the border). This problem is due to a combination of rapidly increasing economic immigration (no end in sight) and increased violence from armed open source smuggling networks that have "liberated" large sections of Mexico from state control (please read this review of Moises Naim's book to learn more about smuggling networks). Unable to offer a political or civil solution, the nation-state will increasingly opt to use the only organization that still appears functional: the military.

Unfortunately, like the pro-immigration protests that set this ball in motion, this action will yield the opposite of the intended effect. It will both speed the unravelling of the American domestic fabric and undermine any remaining confidence that the US federal government (particularly by its dependence on a grossly underfunded and overstretched National Guard) can provide anything of meaningful value.

Further, as we escalate the conflict, we may find that open source economic networks are more than able to defend themselves (as we are seeing around the world) as global guerrillas.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Washington Trip Recap

My trip to Washington was fantastic (although, very short). On Monday morning, I gave a very short new briefing at the National Press Club on the rise of non-state foes (global guerrillas) and the need for the Defense department to adopt a platform to address this new, highly decentralized threat. I'm not sure everyone understood what I was talking about, since they inhabit a parallel world to the competitive and extremely flexible global business culture I inhabit in Boston. Regardless, I concluded that it was my duty to help push this forward by introducing the first attempt to really change the underlying structure of the Pentagon to ensure that it is even nominally functional in the fast paced 21st Century threat environment: Raytheon's DIB (which is essentially a set of requirements for universal system interconnections -- a bare bones platform specification). The rest is up to them.

After the briefing, which will likely yield an article in the Armed Forces Journal on the need for a military platform, I had a great lunch with the Raytheon marketing team moving this concept forward (they are a great group of people). Lunch was followed by a lengthy meeting with James Fallows from The Atlantic to talk about the global situation and potential solutions. James is very smart and I love his articles (I subscribed to the Atlantic because of them). His background and insight allowed our conversation to use the type of shorthand that is possible when people have a great deal of knowledge about a topic.

The day was capped with an extremely pleasant dinner with Bill Lind (the father of fourth generation warfare) and our mutual friend Andy. Bill has a strong intuitive grasp for the global situation based on years of thoughtful reflection and study. He is also a singular intellect which naturally enabled an extremely rewarding conversation. Finally, not having spent much time with him before, I also found he is also a very pleasant dinner companion. Thanks again to Andy setting this up.