Here's a quick critique of jihadi strategist Abu Musab al-Suri's "The Call of Global Islamic Resistance" (widely circulated in Arabic, but there is not an english language translation available on the Web for me to link to). A good starting point for exploring this work is Andrew Black's (writing for Jamestown) comparison of al-Suri's work with that of William Lind in The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. Andrew claims that al-Suri's work provides organizational improvements in fourth generation warfare (which are akin to what I am working on here on global guerrillas).
I disagree. Here's why. Al-Suri's slogan for his treatise -- "system, not organization" -- encapsulates his desire for extreme decentralized at the expense of organizational hierarchy. The objective of this desired decentralization is, obviously, to imbue the Salafi-jihad with vast improvements in survivability and innovation. While the objective is correct, al-Suri's call for decentralization doesn't work in practice within real-world conflicts and organizational structures.
In reality, al-Suri's proposed structure sounds more like the pipe-dreams of Louis Beam's "Leaderless Resistance" and Che Guevara's Foco than a viable organizational structure for a guerrilla movement. The only viable model, as demonstrated on numerous occasions in real world conflicts, isn't a uniform system without hierarchy, it is a disorganized and chaotic open source movement (which provides benefits that more than offset the loss):- Ideological goals vs. operational goals. Al-Suri/Beam/Guevara all assume some level of motivational and methodological purity is maintained in their decentralized organizations without indoctrination from a formal hierarchy. This does not exist in the real world since all war, like politics, is local. In decentralized warfare, it is hyper-local. Open source movements embrace this diversity and set a goal that is typically simple, accessible, and operational (best described as a plausible promise, for example: "we can defeat the US in Iraq"). This goal, without ideological baggage, allows a wide variety of groups with different motivations and backgrounds to join the effort. Further, communication through open means (media/Internet) is available to all participants that have the ability to do so. It isn't the sole province of any ideological leadership.
- Isolation vs. complex inter-networking. Another assumption of al-Suri is that each group can act totally independent of the movement. Open source movements, in contrast, allow a wide variety of cross connections to quickly share methodological improvements. They even allow the creation of micro-markets that assemble operations through the use of economic interactions.
- Subsistence insurgency vs. viable economies. Finally, al-Suri leaves the role of funding the ongoing insurgency to the background operations of the individual teams and the occasional infusion of capital from roving violence capitalists (from the main organization). Open source movements are not nearly so shallow. They readily move in and out of economic activity without pause and actively engage in alliances with criminal enterprises (oil bunkering, drug smuggling, etc.). This ongoing activity allows them to not only meet all current needs, it allows them to expand operations.