Global Guerrillas

GLOBAL OIL SHOCKS

This week, the security of Saudi Arabia's massive Ras Tanura facility was stepped up again, apparently due to specific threats by Al Qaeda. This should be taken as a credible threat, given that it follows on the heals of the aggressive attack on the KSA's (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) Abqaiq facility earlier this year (while global guerrillas weren't able to generate a black swan in the oil market this year, they were able to plunge Iraq into chaos through an attack on Askariya -- a social systempunkt). Also, this is yet another demonstration of the ongoing shift from classic terrorism to systems disruption within al Qaeda and many other non-state organizations. Unfortunately, the shift is well underway. It has already scored a major success in Iraq, and the extension of disruption to the KSA would only worsen our predicament.

The System Squeeze of Peak Oil

The emergence of oil systems disruption as a method of choice for al Qaeda, isn't really a threat due to the potential damage caused by spikes in oil prices. Instead, its impact derives from its potential to exacerbate a global problem called peak oil (LATOC and The Oil Drum are great sources of info on the topic). Peak oil isn't making headlines (yet), but it is a very real problem. Simply put, it is analysis that demonstrates that we are on the cusp of running out of oil. Vice President Dick Cheney's presentation to the London Institute of Petroleum in the fall of 1999 sums up the exponential drivers of peak oil nicely:

By some estimates there will be an average of two per cent annual growth in global oil demand over the years ahead along with conservatively a three per cent natural decline in production from existing reserves [from fields already producing oil]. That means by 2010 we will need on the order of an additional fifty million barrels a day.

Essentially, the dynamic Dick describes means that we need to replace 70% of existing daily production with new sources of liquid fuels every decade. The problem is that with each passing year the problem gets worse as both demand continues to increase (particularly as we bring China online) and depletion is calculated against a larger basis. Further, as the peak oil analysts argue, the depletion rate of existing fields may soon increase by up to eight percent as the mammoth fields (none of which have been found in 40 years) that provide bulk of the world's base production begin steep declines en masse (like we saw with with Mexico's Cantarell and Kuwait's Burgan last year). Ultimately, as is the case with all closed systems that exhibit exponential demand for finite resources, the need for replacement will eventually overwhelm the ability to produce it. The only debate is over when it will occur. Those estimates range from now (it has already occurred) to 2020, with the bulk of evidence pointing to an early emergence.

Accelerating the Shock

In pure economic terms, the shock of peak oil is likely to be difficult for the global community to bridge. There are few meaningful efforts underway at finding replacements for liquid fuels. Regardless, there is reason to hope that if we are given enough time, the transition can be made. However, the invasion of subsequent collapse of Iraq changed the equation. Any hope we had for a successful transition may now be dashed. Why? The inexorable mathematics of oil reserves tell us that in order to stave off peak oil, or at least slow its effects, there are only two producers that matter: Iraq and Saudi Arabia. All the other potential sources of production are either already in decline or too small to have much of an impact (the Alaskan north slope, the US Gulf of Mexico, Central Asia, etc.). In short, without smooth and rapidly increasing production in both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, we are in for an oil crunch the like of which we have never seen.

So far, the evidence is not looking good. Iraq has been the target of ongoing disruption since shortly after the invasion. These disruptions have kept oil production at or below prewar levels over the last three years. Further, ongoing economic failure and insecurity has made it impossible for Iraq to attract the investment it needs to ramp up production. The long lead time between investment in oil production and the subsequent output, means that any new contribution from Iraq will be off the table for at least a decade (or more) even if the intractable insurgency could be solved in the next five years. With Iraq in perpetual failure, any hope we have left is ensconced in Saudi Arabia, and that increasingly looks like a losing proposition. The chaos in Iraq will bleed into Saudi Arabia where global guerrillas will put to use their new techniques, as surely as the sun rises. Attacks on Abqaiq and Ras Turna are only the opening shots.

Here's something to think about: A perennial question that often comes up is whether we would be better off with Saddam in power today, or not. If you look at it purely through the prism of peak oil, that is an easy question to answer: of course we would be. One thing we can count on from the kleptocracies in power in most oil producing states, is that they will pump the oil if given the chance. All we had to do with Saddam's Iraq is remove the sanctions to get the oil moving again. Our attempt to remove Saddam instead and replace him with a more friendly state created the worst of all possible worlds. An open source network of global guerrillas that have decimated Iraqi oil production and perhaps, in the not too distant future, Saudi Arabia's too.

Book!

Wiley is now listing my book. Brave New War
ISBN: 0-471-78079-0
Hardcover
208 pages
April 2007
NOTE: From the look of it, it is set up for pre-orders on Amazon.

JOURNAL: Manufacturing Chaos in Iraq

TIME's Aparisim Ghosh reports that General Peter Pace belatedly has convened a group of young officers to answer the question: Why are there almost as many U.S. troops in Iraq now as there were two years ago when, in the interim, more than 300,000 Iraqi security forces have been recruited and trained?

I provided one answer to this question two years ago, when I wrote about loyalist paramilitaries (October 2004). The answer involved two elements. The first was outsourcing security, particularly in the British controlled south and Baghdad to "loyalist" paramilitaries. The second was incorporating paramilitary members into the new Iraqi security forces, particularly since they were more willing to fight than the general population. In classic US fashion (a reflection of the paucity of strategic thinking in our general staff), training to the numbers (quantity) and the early effectiveness of the unit in a fire fight (expediency) was deemed more important than loyalty of the unit to the government. The long term implications were not considered.

The result is that over the last two years the US military has actually created an environment that is conducive to a bloody and chaotic civil war. By partnering with paramilitaries, we accelerated the development of those forces that would take the war to the Sunnis.

What can we do? Nothing but leave. We can neither expect the leadership of US military to develop sound strategies for mitigating the damage done, nor can we reverse drivers of chaos that have been initiated over the last three years. This chaotic system is now running smoothly under the power of its own internal dynamics and continued intervention will only continue to worsen it. Withdrawal is the only option. The faster the better (although how to do this without tanking the global oil system is still yet to be determined).

THE ROLE OF CITIES

During the years between world wars one and two, strategists like J.F.C. Fuller contemplated the role of cities in light of his work on the emerging theory of maneuver warfare (3GW). They speculated that cities, particularly large ones in a strategic locations, could be used to dampen or stop the rapid advance of maneuver forces seeding chaos in their rear areas. This analysis proved out, particularly in the steppes of Russia, as cities proved their ability to first slow and then bleed maneuver forces dry. Within the context of emerging theories of system disruption, that are emerging as this war slowly ramps-up, cities play an entirely different role. As the events in Baghdad are proving daily, cities can be engineered to radiate instability rather than dampen it. This is accomplished through acts that leverage three attributes of modern cities. These include:

• Extreme mobility and interconnectedness (for example, high rates of automobile and cell phone ownership).
• Complete reliance on high volume infrastructure networks.
• Complex and heterogeneous social networks that are held together under pressure.

Blitzing the system

The key to unlocking the disruptive potential of cities within this new form of warfare, is to attack key points (systempunkts) within target infrastructure and social networks to force a change in the city's dynamic. Infrastructure attacks, particularly on power/fuel/water, negate the ability of the government to deliver political goods (for example, in October Baghdad only received 2.4 hours of electricity a day). This halts economic activity and forces the population to rely upon primary loyalties for daily survival (families, neighborhoods, religious organizations, gangs, etc.). It also damages the ability of the government to deliver political goods, which are the key to legitimacy. As a result, primary loyalties rise and nationalism falls. Next, attacks on the social fabric along fault lines (religious, ethnic, class, etc.), are then used to force these primary loyalty groups to arm themselves for security. Finally, as these manufactured groups naturally come into conflict (for access to resource, protection, or revenge), the city's intrinsic interconnectedness allows it to assume its own emergent dynamic, replete with feedback loops that accelerate conflict.

What this means

The extreme leverage afforded by this method means that Che's dream of a foco insurgency is finally possible. A small group can, if the targets are properly chosen, force a state into failure and keep it there. The key is to limit attacks on the government forces to only those necessary to fracture their moral cohesion, and focus the majority of effort on those activities that accelerate social and economic fragmentation. Unfortunately, once a global guerrilla effort ensconces itself in a major city, all hope of ejecting it within any relevant time period becomes moot. We are sure to see more of this activity in the future. Key insights include:

• City collapse offers extreme economic rewards in the form of smuggling and black markets. The more it is deprived, the greater the reward. This creates a positive feedback loop as groups involved in the disruption gain from these activities. For example, insurgent and militia involvement in gasoline smuggling and black market power generation in Baghdad.
• The collapse of a central city prevents any hope of countrywide economic recovery. Further, the chaos the city generates radiates outward through refugee flows. As this occurs, the social conflicts are exported, and other cities begin to fall into chaos like dominos.
• The sheer complexity and size of modern mega-cities with populations in the millions defies remedy. Once destabilized, these cities will either continue in chaos until either they depopulate or the exhaust themselves. Of course, further impetus (attacks on systempunkts) towards instability can recharge the mechanism as needed.

THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW)

In 1989, as the Berlin wall was being torn down, Bill Lind (with Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, and Wilson) wrote "The Changing Face War: Into the Fourth Generation" for the Marine Corps Gazette. This seminal article made the case that while large scale interstate warfare was going the way of the dodo, low intensity guerrilla warfare and terrorism would thrive in its stead. They were right.

To make their point, Lind and his collaborators divided warfare over the last two centuries into four generations, where each previous generation was defeated by a successive generation of warfare. While, the first three generations deal with interstate warfare (although I make the point in my upcoming book "Brave New War" that the real fourth generation, missing from the framework, is nuclear warfare -- extreme mobility via ICBMs and SLBMs with extreme firepower via nukes), Lind's Fourth generation was between states and non-states. On the surface, many of the elements described as core to the fourth generation are not new and reflect guerrilla wars we have seen in the past:

• The emphasis on extreme dispersion.
• Decentralized logistics. An ability to live off of the land.
• Psychological warfare aimed collapsing the moral cohesion of the enemy (internal collapse).
• Extreme emphasis on maneuver at the expense of firepower.

However, Lind argued that the use of these methods of warfare on a global scale, with new technology, and through new methods of employment in combination with the decline of the West would radically increase the threat posed by fourth generation opponents. This has proven out as these opponents use our strength against us (judo moves) and our rear areas are increasingly targeted (rather than our military forces).

Into 5GW

Lind: Whoever is first to recognize, understand, and implement a generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat.

Things would be bad enough with just fourth generation opponents but as the research on global guerrillas has borne out, a new more dangerous generation is forming: potentially a 5th generation of warfare. Much of this new generation was derived and accelerated in cauldron of Iraq, just as the basis for 3rd generation of warfare was proved out in the Spanish Civil war. What we see is jarring:

• Open source warfare. An ability to decentralize beyond the limits of a single group (way beyond cell structures) using new development and coordination methodologies. This new structure doesn't only radically expand the number of potential participants, it shrinks the group size well below any normal measures of viability. This organizational structure creates a dynamic whereby new entrants can appear anywhere. In London, Madrid, Berlin, and New York.
• Systems disruption. A method of sabotage that goes beyond the simple destruction of physical infrastructure. This method of warfare, which can burst onto the scene as a black swan, uses network dynamics (a new form of leveraged maneuver) to undermine and reorder global systems. It is through this Schumpeterian "creative destruction" that new environments favorable to opposition forces are built (often due to a descent into primary loyalties and pressure from global markets).
• Virtual states (ala Philip Bobbitt). Unlike the guerrilla movements of the past, many of the 4GW forces we are fighting today have found a way to integrate their activities with global "crime." No longer are guerrilla movements or terrorists aimed at taking control of the reigns of the state or merely proxies for states. A new form of economic sustenance has been found. This black globalization is already vast (a GDP of trillions per year), and gains momentum through weakening and disruption of states. This military/economic integration creates a virtuous feedback loop that allows groups to gain greater degrees of independence and financial wealth through the warfare they conduct.

  NOTE: Whether you call these developments 4GW on steroids or the start of a 5th generation, it just doesn't matter. Whichever way you cut it, things are developing quickly and in the wrong direction.

Quote on Iraq

"We are in a tribal society in Basra and we [the British army] are in effect one of these tribes. As long as we are here the others will attack us because we are the most influential tribe. We cramp their style."

British officer, Lt Col Simon Brown, commander of the 2nd Battalion to The Guardian, "The British officer said: 'We are now just another tribe," October 14, 2006.

DANGEROUS KNOWLEDGE

North Korea's public relations announcement (via a test detonation) that it had nuclear weapons, is a great demonstration of the proliferation of dangerous knowledge beyond the realm of major states. We can expect more demonstrations in the near future as Iran, spurred on by the example of North Korea and the opportunity afforded by the US embroiled in Iraq, replicates the process. It won't stop there. Insecurity caused by the growth in global multi-polarity will drive the process. We can expect to more entries into the nuclear club over the next decades, by states that hitherto have avoided developing these weapons.

As we are finding with Iran, the problem isn't just the ownership of the weapon (although that matters), it is the knowledge of the process necessary to make it. Any disruption of the physical assets through bombing or sabotage can at best only delay the inevitable, if both the knowledge and the will to do it are left intact.

If we take the long view of this, the process we see at work at the state level with nuclear weapons foreshadows a more interesting trend line. This trend dictates that the knowledge of technologies that enable mass destruction/death/disruption will inevitably fall within the capability horizon of organizations with increasingly lower levels of complexity. Soon, the level of organizational complexity required for weapons of this type will descend below the level of a state. In short, dangerous knowledge will continue to proliferate and eventually reach organizations that are willing to use these weapons.

While non-state entities that develop this capability may be more vulnerable to physical intervention than states, they do have attributes that work in their favor that will make detection increasingly difficult (bordering on impossible). Further, since knowledge of the process will increasingly define the danger (particularly since many of the weapons that are on our future docket are increasingly defined by the manipulation of information rather than physical assets), it will become increasingly easy to transfer and resuscitate the original danger if those involved are not completely sealed off.

How we answer the problems of North Korea and Iran will be an important harbinger of our ability to deal with this larger trend. I suspect that we won't adapt well. NOTE: Drivers of the proliferation of dangerous knowledge:

• Rapid advances in dangerous (particularly self-replicating) technologies.
• Ubiquitous global education in sensitive subjects. Increasing pool of actors.
• Tool improvement. Moore's law.
• Knowledge/information transfer. Internet.

LAST STOP FOR BAGHDAD: Connectivity and counter-insurgency

The insecurity of Baghdad's Dora neighborhood was demonstrated yet again in early October by three blasts that killed 17. What makes this interesting -- different and apart from the ongoing violence in the rest of the country -- is that this mixed neighborhood was "cleansed" by the US military in August.

The August operation was meant to make Dora an example, carefully chosen due to the presence of critical infrastructure, of how the US was going to apply classic counter-insurgency strategy (aka oil spots) first to Baghdad and outwards from there. The oil spot strategy -- the detailed playbook for this new attempt at it was written by DoD thinker Andrew Krepinevich, and was published in Foreign Affairs (September/October 2005) if you are interested -- is the latest and potentially the last (given the upsurge in domestic discontent with the war) US strategy for fixing Iraq.

A simple rendition of the oil spot process is:

• isolate (cordon off) an area,
• cleanse it of insurgents, and
• provide it with political goods (the process is then repeated in a new area while maintaining a cordon around the first and so on until the country was pacified).

Connectivity

Put into perspective, the bombing in Dora is likely another indicator that even this classic strategy isn't working to dampen the insurgency (the recent upsurge in all of the negative indictors, from US deaths to number of attacks per day, provides it with a supportive backdrop). However, the problem with it isn't that the US military is incompetent (although it's pretty telling that the best strategic thinking in this war isn't coming from the general staff), it is that modern connectivity invalidates it. Iraqis, and Baghdadis in particular, are much more connected and mobile than the rural farmers of global backwaters in the last century that this strategy was built to pacify. They travel and communicate at levels and ranges that nullify attempts to isolate them for pacification. Here are some examples of this connectivity:

• Telephone subscribers. Prewar: 833,000 August 2006: 8,100,000 (nearly an order of magnitude increase)
• Car owners. Prewar: 1,500,000 October 2005: 3,100,000 (usage/traffic is 5x more than prewar)
• Internet subscribers. Prewar: 4,500 August: 197,310 (44x prewar)

What it means

The paradox is that in order to pacify Iraqis under the current US strategy, they need to be isolated from the surrounding community. However, they cannot be isolated, because the very political goods that the government needs to deliver to gain their loyalty are inextricably tied to this connectivity. In short, while this connectivity brings progress, it will also deliver mayhem. There's no easy way around it.

JOURNAL: Can Georgia become a MicroPower?

NOTE: Here's some interesting thinking. The idea is that small states can protect themselves if they are willing to use economic systems disruption as a strategic weapon. You don't have to agree with it, but I serve it up here as food for thought.

The crisis between Russia and Georgia has escalated to mutual deportations of respective nationals and economic sanctions. Georgia is in a tough spot, its pro-western policies is not backed by reciprocal support from the US. Further, as the earlier disruption of Georgian natural gas and electricity proved, Georgia is heavily reliant on Russian economic connectivity. If things don't change in a hurry, Georgia will be forced to choose between economic stagnation and compliance with Russian hegemony.

The Ukrainian Solution

However, there is an indirect method that may provide Georgia a way out of this faustian bargain. The answer is similar to the approach used by Ukraine when faced with a similar level of economic pressure earlier this year. In that crisis, Russia tried to cut-off supplies of natural gas to the Ukraine while at the same time pumping natural gas through pipelines that ran through the country. Of course, the Ukrainians naturally siphoned off the gas they needed from Russia's european customers. These customers quickly forced Russia to resolve the crisis.

The uncomfortable fact for Russia, hidden behind the bluster of this crisis, is that it is reliant on oil/gas exports for 50% of the state's finances and the bulk of the vast portfolios of its top politicians. Further, the state owned firms that provide this bounty are also traded on global markets -- which provides the huge market capitalizations that provide Russia with the financial muscle for their entire natural resource strategy (which has become the centerpiece of Russian foreign policy). In sum, Russia's center of gravity is no longer with the will of its people. It has now shifted to its customers and the investors that buy its stock on global markets. Russia is reliant on the moral strength of people that scurry at the sound of a mouse, but it doesn't even know it yet.

Adopting global guerrilla methods (particularly systems disruption) as state policy

Georgia does have a way out of the predicament. It could adopt the global guerrilla methods (aka fifth generation warfare) and use system disruption as a strategic weapon to coerce Russia to relent. Like the Ukraine found out (I suspect unwittingly), the best way to coerce Russia is to disrupt its export of natural gas/oil. Fortunately for Georgia, Russia's vast distances yield a pipeline transport system that is both heavily concentrated and extremely vulnerable (I've done the network analysis and it would be very easy to do, it is rife with systempunkts). A dozen small teams (2-3 at most, my personal choice would be mercenaries to enhance plausible deniability) dedicated to blowing up sections of these pipelines (either within Russia or in 3rd party nations like Poland and Ukraine), would likely yield a 20% to 30% sustained reduction in Russian exports.

The result would be predictable. The rapid and severe customer/investor reaction to a reduction in Russian exports would be so severe that Russia would be forced to promptly concede. All Georgia needs to do now, is adopt 4GW and go to work defending itself.

QUOTE: One of MEND's Spokesmen

"Our goal remains the destruction of the Nigerian oil industry and all who stand on the pathway to our objective."

Joseph Gbomo. Self-declared MEND spokesman with a good track record. Statement following the killing of 14 Nigerian soldiers and the abduction of 25 Nigerian Shell subcontractors. Marketwatch. Success so far: 872,000 barrels a day of production.

PROPAGANDA WARS

Traditionally, guerrilla wars are fought in the moral sphere. This means that the side that can hold together its moral cohesion the longest, while simultaneously fragmenting its opponents, will come out the winner (I think this is shifting, but we can save that thought for later).

From this grain of truth, the US government/military reached (primarily due to hindsight bias re:Vietnam) the conclusion that moral conflicts are won through propaganda. In other words, the side with the better propaganda machine wins the war. These organizations are implementing this conclusion in this conflict. Everything from embedded journalists to continuously rosy statements (such as "the tide of history is on our side," "the insurgency's back is broken," "just a few more months and the turning point will be reached," etc.) to pro-war bloggers that regurgitate talking points are part of a propaganda effort deemed necessary to win our current conflict. However, this decision to build a propaganda machine isn't showing signs of working. The reason is that a propaganda campaign within the current complex, global and media/information saturated environment is not only foolish, it is downright dangerous. Why? Here are the reasons:

• It generates dissent faster than it solidifies support. People have access to so many alternative sources of information, that any concerted attempt to spin facts is quickly seen for what it is: deception. The result is that non-cooperative centers of gravity are generated (first globally and then domestically) so quickly, that the very moral cohesion sought is the first victim of the effort.
• Propaganda efforts destroy effective decision making. The US military's approach to this propaganda war has been to trot out generals at every opportunity to provide upbeat and positive assessments (the most negative statement is blandly neutral). Anything less would be seen as a negative in the moral conflict and thereby disloyal. This has the unintended consequence of clouding internal decision loops. In the business world this is called "drinking your own kool-aid" (in a cold reference to the Jamestown religious cult where the members committed suicide by drinking poisoned kool-aid). Facts are misinterpreted/misrepresented for marketing externally, these tainted facts are consumed by internal audiences, and bad internal decision making is the result ("we don't need more troops," "we should stick it out since it will get better soon," "more of the same will work," etc.). This is pure poison given the complexity of modern counter-insurgency.
• Natural allies are quickly turned into enemies. Since propaganda is central to the US war effort, any criticism (from any quarter) is seen as something that aids and abets the enemy ("if you are not with us, you are against us"). A good rule of thumb (and this applies to all organizations and not just the US military/government), is that the best people don't work for you. However, it also follows that they aren't necessarily working against you either, and they could provide you substantial benefit to you if properly enticed (this is something that has become a central aspect of most organizations in our heavily cross connected world). Propaganda alienates this group since they aren't seen as being on the "team."

The Alternative

Since propaganda is so ineffective, what would work? I believe a better approach (perhaps the only approach that even has a hope of working given the complex networked environment within which wars are fought today), is:

• A strict adherence to unvarnished truth. Assessments should not be spun. Decisions and analysis of results should be completely caveated. This requires backbone (which is perhaps in short supply). Truth generates trust.
• Transparency. Confidence in decision making is generated through transparency (both internally and externally). Transparency also allows the process to be improved. This is completely at odds with the Cold War secrecy culture that is currently in place.
• A willingness to listen to criticism (particularly from knowledgeable external sources) and respond to it if justified. This doesn't require thick skin, it only requires a willingness to acknowledge truth when you see it. This process generates a growing network of allies. NOTE: This also requires that the hermetic seal around most government/military organizations needs to be broken. If the routes into these organizations are limited, the benefit will be limited too.

End Note

While truth, transparency, and receptiveness are difficult traits to develop, they offer the best path towards a sustainable effort. For those cynics out there, this isn't nearly as naive as it looks at first glance. The wars of the future will be non-existential (not against peer competitors, no matter how much some would like) and of indefinite duration (read: long). In order to pick the right ones to fight, fight them well, and sustain the effort over the entire required duration: an open process must be adhered to. Anything less offers nothing but vociferous dissent, sequential disasters, and ignoble defeat.

JOURNAL: Thailand's open source war

John M Glionna writing for the LA Times ("In Thailand, a New Model for Militants?" October 1, 2006), writes about its growing open source insurgency:

Terrorism experts believe that the insurgency is led by a coalition of regional groups, including the National Revolutionary Front Coordinate and the Pattani United Liberation Organization, or PULO, which are vying for control of the region. ...experts differ over the roots of the insurgency. Some say it's a battle over religious freedom, others say it's a fight for territory and self-rule. Still others say it's both.

Without any identifiable hierarchy or political platform for the insurgency, the government becomes confused. Further, the insurgency's targeting of economic systems (infrastructure and tourism) with increasingly sophisticated methods (example: cell phone triggered attack on electricity infrastructure) is also a source of confusion. Due to these factors, standard counter-insurgency breaks down since it is impossible to determine the messages that need to be countered to "win hearts and minds" and the systems that enable the government to deliver political goods (necessary for legitimacy) is malfunctioning. Which leads to this:

"The nation's best military intelligence concedes we are waging a war on ghosts," said Srisompob Jitpiromsri, a political scientist at Prince of Songkla University. "We don't have a clue as to who their leaders are or what they want."

Frankly, it doesn't really matter if this insurgency has been instigated by the al Qaeda network or is due to historical factors (as argued by Joseph Chinyong Liow, at Singapore's NTU, in "Radicalism in Thailand? Toward an Alternative Interpretation." PDF). The results will be the same given the similar path of organizational/methodological development and a similar plausible promise: the weakening of Thailand's control over its southern region.