John M Glionna writing for the LA Times ("
In Thailand, a New Model for Militants?" October 1, 2006), writes about its growing open source insurgency:
Terrorism experts believe that the insurgency is led by a coalition of regional groups, including the National Revolutionary Front Coordinate and the Pattani United Liberation Organization, or PULO, which are vying for control of the region. ...experts differ over the roots of the insurgency. Some say it's a battle over religious freedom, others say it's a fight for territory and self-rule. Still others say it's both.
Without any identifiable hierarchy or political platform for the insurgency, the government becomes confused. Further, the insurgency's targeting of economic systems (infrastructure and tourism) with increasingly sophisticated methods (example:
cell phone triggered attack on electricity infrastructure) is also a source of confusion. Due to these factors, standard counter-insurgency breaks down since it is impossible to determine the messages that need to be countered to "win hearts and minds" and the systems that enable the government to deliver political goods (necessary for legitimacy) is malfunctioning. Which leads to this:
"The nation's best military intelligence concedes we are waging a war on ghosts," said Srisompob Jitpiromsri, a political scientist at Prince of Songkla University. "We don't have a clue as to who their leaders are or what they want."
Frankly, it doesn't really matter if this insurgency has been instigated by the al Qaeda network or is due to historical factors (as argued by Joseph Chinyong Liow, at Singapore's NTU, in "
Radicalism in Thailand? Toward an Alternative Interpretation." PDF). The results will be the same given the similar path of organizational/methodological development and a similar plausible promise: the weakening of Thailand's control over its southern region.