Global Guerrillas

THE BIGGEST GANG IN IRAQ

US soldier on patrol in Mosul Iraq, "This is like a gang war, and we are the biggest gang."

The US has fully abdicated any attempt at winning in Iraq under any meaningful victory conditions. That route is forfeit, as operations wind down (particularly in Anbar), funding for reconstruction evaporates (Bechtel's departure from Iraq marked the end of the effort), and efforts to rebuild the Iraqi military continue to fail (due to a deficit of loyalty to the government). Despite this, withdrawal from Iraq doesn't appear to be an option. The reason for this is simple and doesn't include shame or a loss of power. It's more basic. It's OIL. Iraq is a core producer of oil for global markets. Control of this oil cannot be ceded to either the guerrillas or Iran under any meaningful current interpretation of US policy. Further, a full US withdrawal would put Saudi Arabia at risk -- the collapse of both of these oil producers in tandem would plunge the global economy into a depression. As a result, the US will inevitably decide to stay. The US political establishment seems to have already defaulted to this decision, as seen by the complete lack of any substantive political discussion about actually leaving Iraq. The most we will likely see is a substantial reduction in troops to take the stress off of the army and assuage critics.

However, a decision to stay isn't a strategy. Given the inability of the current leadership to generate an alternative, the likely default strategy that might be adopted is the the role of the spoiler. This strategy is dedicated to merely preventing any antagonistic regional powers (Iran and Syria) or internal factions from toppling the hollow shell of the Iraqi government. Actions necessary for this role include, an ability to pummel (typically with air power and rapid reaction forces) any groups engaged in open warfare, and an ability to defend the borders. At all other times, US forces will be tightly sealed within their bases to prevent casualties. The problems with this strategy are manifold:

• Moral damage. US moral cohesion will collapse if casualties continue to mount. At minimum, the US political establishment will suffer a substantial loss in legitimacy (both parties) -- particularly since neither will square with the American people on the real reason we continue to stay in Iraq: OIL. Also, the perception of the US globally will continue to slide.
• Operational risk. Both open source movements (Sunni and Shiite) may focus their violence on the US. This situation puts the US against all of the factions with only the shell of the Iraqi government to back it up. This scenario gets worse if these forces (with Iranian support) can cut the supply lines to US forces.
• Expansion of the conflict. The entire strategy collapses if the war spreads to Iran or Saudi Arabia. By perpetuating the status quo, the US may be inadvertently contributing to the spread. Also, given the demonstration of Iraq, it's very likely that both Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies would rather fall than ask the US in to help.

ED NOTE: In an unusual step, I have revised this brief several times since I published it. The original front section is now its own brief. Sorry for the confusion. I should be done now.

GUERRILLA ENTREPRENEURS REVISITED

Back in 2004, it was evident that criminal activity was a primary driver of the growing insurgency in Iraq (see: "Guerrilla Entrepreneurs" October 22, 2004 for more). If looked at from a global guerrilla systems dynamic, self-financing via criminal activity is best seen as a positive feedback loop -- a mechanism that reinforces an aberrant trend. For example, it rewarded early efforts at the disruption of the Iraqi oil system (see "Target: Iraqi oil production" July 12, 2004 for more). It also provided a mechanism for attracting new participants to the open source war -- a place where groups formed out of primary loyalties could find financial support for their activities -- and established a means of perpetual funding for Iraq's bazaar for mercenary violence (which is used to hire teams for IED attacks and other forms of violence).

In a positive development, Juan Zarate (a deputy national security advisor) and a cross functional team (composed of people from the FBI, CIA, etc.) recently wrote a classified report that recognized the role of criminal self-financing. For more, read the story by John Burns and Kirk Semple (at the NY Times) on the leaked copy they received. Unfortunately, the vagueness of the report's findings indicates how little the government knows about these in-country financial flows and the underlying dynamics of the type of warfare being waged in Iraq.

JOURNAL: Systems disruption in India

The innovations in warfare from the proving ground in Iraq continue to percolate outwards. India has now become a prime target for global guerrilla systems disruption (its large number of highly leveraged mega cities are perfect for urban takedowns). The ultimate goal of this activity is to force social system breakdown, a descent into primary loyalties, and an expansion of open source warfare. Jamestown has the quote:

A recent disclosure by the Indian security forces revealed that al-Qaeda affiliated militant groups are devising novel, radical and spectacular plots against India's critical infrastructure. The synchronized July 11 Mumbai train bombings carry the hallmarks of an al-Qaeda-style operation. Again, in late August, reports of two armed militants breaching security at the Kakarapar nuclear power complex in Gujarat prompted India's nuclear facilities to be placed under heightened security measures.

JOURNAL: Social disruption in Bahgdad's Sadr City

While the governments of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the US engage in the motions of legacy power politics, Iraq's global guerrillas are decisively rending the social fabric of Iraq and potentially the Middle East. November 23, 2006 provided a solid example of an inflection point in this type disruption (like the attack on Samarra earlier this year), with a triple car bomb in Baghdad's Sadr city (200 dead and 250 wounded) and an attempted overrun of Iraq's health ministry (run by Sadr's party).

First, this attack eliminates the remaining legitimacy of the current government. It is also a deep blow to the legitimacy of Sadr's movement (despite attempts to shift blame to the US Army for the failure) since it couldn't even provide basic security in both of its showcase properties. Second, to regain legitimacy, the Mahdi army will certainly go onto the offensive in tandem with reconstruction/relief (a replay of Hezbollah's approach). In contrast, the government will do nothing on either score. The Mahdi army counteroffensive will likely force them to move beyond abductions and into large scale assaults in order to replicate the level of this attack. By doing so, it will achieve a goal of the attackers: it will put these militias in direct confrontation with the US army and the few functional Iraqi army units as they range beyond the borders of Sadr city in force.

JOURNAL: A political "fix" for Iraq?

The current US solution for Iraq is founded on the belief that it is possible to staunch Iraq's chaos through a political "fix" that involves direct negotiations with Iran. Unfortunately, the truth is more complicated. Iraq's non-state guerrillas aren't mere proxies of Iran. Instead, they are largely autonomous.

First, these groups don't rely upon Iran for their operating income since they can manufacture income through participation in black globalization's multi-trillion dollar economy. A classic example of this is the decentralized and open source marketplace for the transnational smuggling of gasoline. In a June 2006 report, Ali Al Alak (the inspector general of the Iraqi Oil Ministry) detailed how guerrillas and militias were using the calculated disruption of Iraqi pipelines/refineries, the arbitrage of government subsidies for gasoline, and bribes/hijackings/tampering to generate nearly $100 million a month in income from imported gasoline (30% of Iraq's total fuel imports).

Second, this income provides these groups with the ability to fund their own violence. For example, they can purchase weapons from global arms markets (more black globalization) and hire local mercenaries (to fuel the marketplace for IED attacks and hire militiamen). From the perspective of these groups, an Iranian puppet state is as much a threat to their continued existence as a US dominated Iraqi government. Vive le chaos!

US ELECTIONS AND IRAQ

Within the strategic framework of John Boyd (America's greatest strategist), the election of a divided government in the US can best be viewed as a strategic judo move:

• The previous government's moral cohesion was traded for
• potential improvement in our global physical connectivity (communication with allies, enemies, and internal audiences)
• and a chance to upgrade our mental connectivity (the ability to gather untarnished information and analyze the the efficacy of new solutions).

Non-cooperative centers of gravity

In short, the election merely codified what was going on behind the scenes in the US. Growing opposition to the war was building due to the effects of a combination of strategic paralysis and a lack of internal dialogue. Both strategic paralysis and a lack of internal dialogue can be linked to a decision to an inappropriate use of propaganda to shore up US moral cohesion (inappropriate in that it neither works over the medium/long term nor does it allow strategic flexibility -- both of which were needed in Iraq). However, this election -- despite the substantial benefits of deflating the previous government's propaganda bubble -- may not provide much other improvement to our strategic situation:

• Non-cooperative centers of moral gravity now have a voice in the Congress. As a result, the moral cohesion necessary for any lengthy or costly strategy has passed. Growing dissent will now have tangible effects.
• While improvements in physical connectivity (dialogue) with internal audiences has improved, it is likely to turn into a cacophony of half-baked ideas. Also, attempts at physical connectivity to external allies and foes (via Baker) will likely not result in any substantive change -- we are in too weak a position, particularly relative to Iran, to gain any substantial cooperation.
• Finally, improvements in information gathering and analysis will likely yield little since they are still looking at the situation in Iraq through the lens of political/regional state conflict and domestic political concerns -- assume that Baker's political ISG will trump any decisions generated by Gen. Pace's military counter-insurgency group.

What this means

Looking back, the current situation may have been inevitable given the new realities of 21st century warfare (see "Playing with War" for more on this). Looking forward, we can expect the following:

• The US will withdraw to bases in Iraq (a completion of a trend that began last year to limit casualties) and many (perhaps half) of the US forces in Iraq will be withdrawn over the next year. This will likely be the only policy change that all decision makers can agree on -- as long as it is presented under the cover of a "strategy" to make it possible. As a result, violence in Iraq will spike as unsupervised Iraqi troops are unleashed on civilians and guerrillas decimate isolated Iraqi units. It won't matter to most of the people in the US as long as US troops aren't involved.
• Iraqi oil production will completely collapse as the southern pipelines are severed due to chaotic violence. This reduction of 1-2 million barrels of oil a day will cause a return of $80 a barrel oil. Spikes above that price may occur as guerrilla attacks (both Shiite and Sunni) spill over into Saudi Arabia (see my new book "Brave New War" for more on trend lines in systems disruption). A big spike, due to a full take-down of a major Saudi facility or KSA government collapse, would have global implications. It would throw into disarray many developing countries, potentially including China.
• Iran will increasingly, despite ongoing conversations with the US (via Baker?), be blamed for the violence in Iraq and the KSA. Open conflict with Iran will continue to escalate due to this and Iran's development of nuclear weapons. The multiplication and tightening of triggers for this war -- from the complete resupply of Hezbollah's ATGWs/rockets which may ignite a new war in southern Lebanon to a pre-emptive Israeli or US strike on Iran's nuclear facilities to a US engagement with Iranian forces that escalates under its own steam -- will make it almost inevitable.

GLOBAL GUERRILLAS IN THE UK

The spread of the open source war to the West isn't a matter of speculation or conjecture. It's real and tangible as new groups/networks emerge with increasing frequency (see this brief for more on the community dynamics of open source group formation). A measure of those networks we do know about in the UK, was provided on November 9th 2006 by Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, director general of the MI5 (a person rarely given to hype). She provides us (see the original transcript) with the following:

• "What I can say is that today, my officers and the police are working to contend with some 200 groupings or networks, totalling over 1600 identified individuals (and there will be many we don't know) who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas."
  
  
• "We are aware of numerous plots to kill people and to damage our economy. What do I mean by numerous? Five? Ten? No, nearer thirty - that we know of. These plots often have links back to Al-Qaida in Pakistan and through those links Al-Qaida gives guidance and training to its largely British foot soldiers here on an extensive and growing scale. And it is not just the UK of course. Other countries also face a new terrorist threat: from Spain to France to Canada and Germany."
  
  
• "What we see at the extreme end of the spectrum are resilient networks, some directed from Al-Qaida in Pakistan, some more loosely inspired by it, planning attacks including mass casualty suicide attacks in the UK. Today we see the use of home-made improvised explosive devices; tomorrow's threat may include the use of chemicals, bacteriological agents, radioactive materials and even nuclear technology. More and more people are moving from passive sympathy towards active terrorism through being radicalised or indoctrinated by friends, families, in organised training events here and overseas, by images on television, through chat rooms and websites on the Internet."

In Context

The groups that Dame Eliza's MI5 has identified are clearly the tip the of the iceberg. The dynamics of this model of warfare dictate that for every group identified (almost all in the likely detection zone depicted by the red nodes in the graphic in the upper left), there are dozens more in formation or fully functional without direct connections to known sources of danger (without a direct connection to a known terrorist group or individual, it is nearly impossible to differentiate dangerous networks from benign ones). As my brief The Changing Face of War: Into the 5th Generation described, these groups will:

• Continue to form under their own steam. They are a product of the growing appeal of primary loyalties (a function of globalization) relative to those of the increasingly remote "interests of the state." Also, since the situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan show no sign of abating (in fact, quite the opposite), this dynamic will continue to intensify. Again, since there isn't any cohesive hierarchy associated with this community, gains in rolling up one network will not transfer to many other networks. They are relatively autonomous and this adds mightily to their resiliency.
• Increasingly move towards economic and social systems disruption. The ongoing pressure on groups from the MI5 will counter the development of complex plans that require large networks to accomplish. The natural outcome of this pressure is a move towards the simplicity and outsized returns generated by systems disruption (this has also been reflected in both statements from al Qaeda to the output of Internet media). Luckily, we are still a decade away from when fully functional weapons of mass destruction become viable for the productivity level of small networks of this type (Ikle's scenario). Our ability to deal with this effectively now, will predict our success then.
• Connection to transnational crime will continue. The connection between many of these groups and the smuggling networks of "black globalization" will continue to generate funding for ongoing operations (both in the UK and abroad). This connection also means that we will increasingly see "terrorism for hire" among disaffected and unemployed youth. This will radically expand the pool of potential participants.

BOOK REVIEW: Annihilation from Within

I just finished an excellent new book by Fred Ikle, the distinguished defense and foreign policy scholar, called Annihilation from Within. It was a surprisingly good and a mercifully short (in the sense that he quickly gets to the point without needless repetition) read. I heartily recommend it for all readers of this site since Fred's work is a natural compliment to the work being done here on global guerrillas.

Here's Fred's argument in a nutshell. The global order we enjoy today is unravelling. The reason is simple. Technological change is moving forward faster than social/political change. Eventually, ubiquitous access to rapidly advancing technology will make it possible for small groups to confront status quo political and social structures with weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological, and other unknown new technologies. Since our antiquated nation-states are not constructed to withstand these challenges the results will be devastating: some states will completely collapse, others will turn into police states, and some will be taken over by coups (he lays out a scenario for how these weapons can be used to take control of a state). In short, most of the damage that will be done won't be from the attacks themselves, but from the societal response to the attacks (hence the name: Annihilation from Within). He completes the book by providing us with some ideas on how to mitigate the societal damage -- continuity of leadership, detection, unity, and territorial sovereignty.

In all, Fred Ikle does a great job at encapsulating a key aspect of global guerrillas. Unfortunately, he intentionally disregards the changes in warfare, copiously documented on this site, that will make the threat constant/ongoing/improving, rather than merely a set of random outliers. As a result of this deficit, Fred proposes, as improvements to our status quo political structures, only minor tweaks and amorphous goals (like unity). If he had fully embraced these changes in warfare, he would have seen that the nation-state isn't a structure that will provide the resilience we need to survive these challenges -- particularly since the complexity of its solutions are now generating negative returns on investment (they are not only ineffective, they can often cause more harm than good). What is needed are new simple platforms (my modification of Joseph Tainter's Byzantine strategy), that will continuously produce efficient, flexible, and non-zero sum resiliency from the bottom up. How to build these platforms is THE challenge of this century.

If you keep gazing into an abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you.
Friedrich Nietzche

JOURNAL: US Central Command's Chaos Meter

Michael Gordon provides us with a leaked powerpoint graphic from a classified briefing by the US Central Command (click the graphic to the left for a better view). What makes this interesting isn't the fact that the military recognizes Iraq's slide (which indicates that the military may be leaking this to provide posterior political armor against the inevitable backlash a defeat in Iraq will generate), rather, it is the use of the term "chaos" as a military metric. This harkens back to my earlier brief on "controlled chaos" back in 2005. Post the Samarra bombing (a social systempunkt attack), it has been all down hill. The rate of the decline has been very quick, in large part due to global guerrilla preparation of the Iraqi battlespace.