As anticipated, the much touted "surge," that promised to clear, hold and pacify Baghdad has succumbed to network effects (see the 2005 brief, "Clear and Hold?" which is as valid now as then). Essentially, Iraq's guerrillas destabilized the previous strategy by using essential connectivity to attack previously cleared areas. Unable to hold these areas put the Petraeus team on the horns of a dilemma, to either reinforce the Baghdad strategy by creating walled and garrisoned enclaves (which ran into political/media opposition, drove up the potential for an overrun of a US outpost, and posed a manpower challenge since Iraqi troops were insufficiently loyal to the government) or retake the offensive and go after the guerrilla networks.
The team chose the latter option. The result has been a surge in Baquba to tamp down guerrilla networks making some of the attacks, which as with previous experiences has proven to be of little efficacy since the networks evaporated when US troops arrived.
The Gaussian vs. the Paretian Strategist in Iraq
Here's an useful way of looking at the current situation that may yield additional insight. The classic clear and hold method (Baghdad) as well as enclave sweeps (Baquba) fall are part of a
Gaussian strategy to dampen/slow/impair guerrilla activity in order to allow rebuilding to shift the curve of popular support in favor of the government and away from the guerrillas. The Gaussian strategy is also aimed at US domestic audiences, which would see a smoothing/slowing of numerical measures of violence as progress.
However, since the insurgency we face in Iraq is open source and not Maoist, this won't work. The opposition isn't seeking to shift popular support to an alternative form of national governance but to a hollow state (more due to emergent intelligence than group expectations). To accomplish this, the insurgency is using Paretian strategies that leverage network effects to amplify attacks that disrupt/fragment/destabilize Iraqi society -- essentially army of Davids experimenting, sharing innovations, and iterating towards a successful cascade of failure that topples Goliath.
Is this Asymmetric?
Probably not, since when we do adopt Paretian strategies of amplification, they often provide a pay-off that exceeds the cost in chaos. For example, the alliance with some Anbar tribes to force the insurgency into infighting is a point of light in otherwise dull strategic roadmap. So, if the use of the Paretian approach isn't completely an asymmetric advantage of an open source insurgency, why don't we use it more?