JOURNAL: Pakistan's Truce

Pakistan, with bankruptcy and nation-wide unrest looming the foreground, has decided to pull the plug on its war with Islamic insurgents in the North West territories.  How?  As we have found, one of the ways weak states try to slow the spread of a rapidly spreading open source insurgency is to embrace it.   In Pakistan's case, it means allowing groups in both Bajaur (Fazlullah) and Swat (Taliban) to set up Islamic courts and enforce Sharia law.  In exchange for this level of local control, these groups have agreed to a truce with the government.  We can expect this process to quickly spread to more provinces soon since the enforcement Sharia law was a central element of the insurgency's 'plausible promise'  (see, how to start an open source war).  

To the extent there is an upside, 

1. Open warfare will slow, curtailing the bad effects of a unpopular guerrilla war on Pakistan's military.
2. These groups can now be negotiated with, since it is likely that by giving these Islamic groups local control, it forces them into a position of defending gains.  They now have something to lose. 
3. Internal opposition will mount as these Islamic groups over reach with their application of Sharia.   

In a move that is likely to catalyze internal opposition (via point #3 above), Pakistan has set up a 'Village Defense Rifle' program.  This program will distribute 30,000 rifles to tribal groups.  This program might enable militia formation that is nominally loyal to the government, and dilute the influence of Islamic groups. 

It also points to what may be Mexico's future.  The combination of a global depression and peak oil production/price collapse points to bankruptcy and broad social unrest.  Out of options and unable to slow the advance of a virulent open source insurgency -- fueled by the outsized profits of drug smuggling -- may lead Mexico to cede control over aspects of its legal system.  In short, it may legalize the production, transport, and sale of drugs as an effort to make the problem go away.  

Finally, does a two part strategy of legalized drugs and locally run Sharia courts loom in Afghanistan's future?