Open source warfare dictates against long planning cycles and complex attacks except in extreme circumstances (the handbook of open source warfare is Brave New War). Typically, this means that for attacks to be sufficiently disruptive at this level of planning, they need to target soft but systematically important nodes on critical networks. However, there is an exception to this rule. If the defensive response to attacks on hard, symbolic targets is excessively intense, the damage caused by even failed attacks can be as disruptive as attacks on critical infrastructure. I made the case for this in the Dec. 2009 post: "Failure as a Strategy".
It now appears that the US counter-terrorism community accepts this premise (see "Al Qaeda's new Tactic is to Seize Shortcuts" in the LATimes) and is acting on it. Here are some choice quotes from the article:
- An examination of recent plots, including the bombing attempt on a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day, has convinced U.S. counter-terrorism analysts that Al Qaeda is becoming more opportunistic, using fewer operatives and dramatically shrinking the amount of planning and preparation that goes into an attack.
- The lesson Al Qaeda probably took was that, " 'Jeez, the damn bomb didn't go off and the Americans are still going out of their minds,' " a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official said.
- U.S. intelligence agencies are struggling to stay abreast of the evolving threat. The National Counterterrorism Center expects to add as many as 50 analysts this year focused exclusively on tracking emerging threat data that previously might have been overlooked when the emphasis was on trying to detect and prevent a mass- casualty plot.