The ROI (return on investment) from making FAKE attacks against EU targets could exceed $1,000,000 to $1. IF 10,000 FAKE attacks are made in the next year by self-activating, super-empowered individuals, the costs would be incalculable.
The successful terrorist attacks on Brussels and Paris have left the EU vulnerable to tens of thousands of fast, frequent and fake attacks by self-activating terrorists.
Here's how.
The recent attack on Brussels was big, bloody, and effective.
Fortunately, attacks on this scale don't occur often. They take lots of time to prepare for and lots of support. Given these costs, it's unlikely we'll see an attack on this scale for a while.
Unfortunately, there is a way for terrorists to get around that limitation. A way to continue to damage the EU without mounting a new, large-scale attack. This is accomplished by self-activating terrorists making small, frequent and fake attacks. Fake attacks that have a disruptive impact similar to a real attack. Attacks like:
- threats to buildings, organizations and individuals
- suspicious packages left on trains, airports, etc. or mailed bombs/biochem
- reports of suspicious activity - building, organizations, and individuals
Why are fake attacks effective?
- in the current environment, every threat/attempt is taken seriously by the government. Police, fire, and the military responds. Buildings are searched. People are accosted.
- it costs orders of magnitude more to respond to a fake attack than it takes to mount it. Airports are closed. Subways are suspended. Traffic is stopped.
- these attacks can be made frequently, with very little risk/cost to the attacker. Simply, anybody can participate with 10 minutes of instruction.
Worse, at scale (tens of thousands), these attacks could deeply damage the socioeconomic fabric of the EU, by increasing distrust of minorities, generating hundreds of billions in security costs and sinking Schengen.
Have fun,
John Robb
PS: Next post: How robots make large scale conventional war between the major powers much more likely.