Global Guerrillas

JOURNAL: Task Force ODIN and Cloud Power

'Cloud Airpower' -- a three dimensional blanket of microsensors and machines that can dominate a target zone -- is the future of the Air Force. It's how the Air Force will participate in the future of warfare (which will be mostly a form of special operations and not conventional warfare). However, the AF leadership doesn't want to acknowledge it. Instead, the US Army is doing the innovation/tinkering necessary (this is a rough early effort, but it is coming from the right direction - from the bottom up):

The battalion is called Task Force Odin — the name is that of the chief god of Norse mythology, but it also is an acronym for “observe, detect, identify and neutralize.” The task force of about 300 people and 25 aircraft is a Rube Goldberg collection of surveillance and communications and attack systems, a mash-up of manned and remotely piloted vehicles, commercial aircraft with high-tech infrared sensors strapped to the fuselage, along with attack helicopters and infantry...

The Army cobbled together small civilian aircraft, including the Beech C-12, and placed advanced reconnaissance sensors on board. Also assigned to the task force are small, medium and larger remotely piloted Army surveillance vehicles, including the Warrior and Shadow, with infrared cameras for night operations and full-motion video cameras.

All are linked by radio to Apache attack helicopters, with Hellfire missiles and 30-millimeter guns, and to infantry units in armored vehicles.

Pin-Point Liquidations (via PPS) and Network Collapse

What does it take to collapse an open source insurgency/terrorism? Isaac ben-Israel, the former head of R&D for the Israeli MOD, describes the Israeli approach. They used a combination of thermodynamics, information theory (Shannon), and Stirling's approximation to develop a theory of systems/network collapse absent any specific knowledge of where a target network's critical points are. In short, the probabilities for collapse are:

• Rate of failure (of network nodes) = 11%. System collapse = 50%
  
• Rate of failure 25%. System collapse = 81%
  
• Rate of failure 50%. System collapse = 100%

Notes: The design of the network has a significant impact on the probabilities seen above. Induced failure of nodes must be applied to every autonomous network of interest.

Systems Collapse In Practice
To reduce terrorist attacks on Israel that started with the 2002 Intifada, the Israeli's used successive OODA loops and better information acquisition to improve their decision making (which allowed them to collapse bad assumptions). Armed with this improved decision making process they were able to put theory (above) into practice, via a process of pin-point assassinations (PPS). Here's what happened when they reached a level of 25% liquidation:

At first we used such liquidations as our response to terrorist attacks: they start - we respond, then they respond again. But starting from February 2003 the liquidation practice was not in any way linked with their attacks. We just have a list of the key figures - the list of organization leaders, of the so-called "field commanders", etc. So we started neutralizing them according to our list: we arrested those we could and liquidated those we could not. And in a short while, from mid-2003, the rate of terrorist attacks started decreasing - not only the rate of their successful attacks, but of the plotted attacks as well.

The results can be seen in the inset graph.

What this Means
It's clear that approach that combined system/network collapse and pin-point strikes were effective at slowing the rate of urban/networked terrorism aimed at Israel during this period. However:

• It takes a concerted effort. This theory/experience points to the direction the USAF should be moving: towards UAV/drone systems with pin-point lethality and large volumes of real-time information flows. Ultimately, "cloud" systems (coordinated via stigmergy) that blanket areas with sensors and UAVs with pin-point lethality (far above the level of current weapons systems) will evolve. The USAF is resisting this dominant evolutionary path and will suffer mightily as a result.
  
• It can evoke an evolutionary response. Open source insurgencies can evolve under pressure from this type of targeting (as we saw in Iraq). The dominant method is to fragment into ever smaller groups or ad hoc networks (a bazaar). This evolutionary response reduces the efficacy of the pin-point approach since it exponentially increases the intelligence burden and limits the effectiveness of any disruption achieved. NOTE: Of course, there are alternative, for example: the US chose to "purchase" these groups from the bazaar via the "Anbar Awakening" program.
  
• This method will likely only mitigate strategic attacks that require complex supply chains and planning. Tactical/local operations will suffer much less since they can be accomplished by smaller groups (see point above). Therefore, this method of approach does not lead to any meaningful pacification/peace.

THE CONTROLLED CHAOS EXIT FROM IRAQ

The United States is losing the moral conflict with Iraq's guerrillas. The US President's support among Americans has dropped to the lowest levels since Richard Nixon and opposition groups are becoming more strident and popular. Opposition calls for a rapid withdrawal from Iraq are now supported by a near majority of Americans. The development of these non-cooperative centers of gravity is due to the propagation of the following factors of moral conflict:

• Uncertainty. Can we leave in five years or next year? Is the Iraqi government worth fighting for? Will Iraqi troops ever be good enough to fight on their own? Is the insurgency growing or collapsing?
• Menace. Will US troops continue to die at the current high rate? Will the conflict devolve into a civil war with US troops caught in the middle? Will the conflict spread?
• Mistrust. Did Bush lie about the reasons for going to war? Are the Democrats playing politics with the war? Is the opposition treasonous?

Isolation Drives Vulnerability to Moral Conflict
The decline in US moral cohesion is a natural consequence of the isolation of US decision makers from the external reference environment. Instead of making connections, we severed them (for a complete analysis of why this occurred, read my earlier brief on "Boyd on al Qaeda's Grand Strategy"). This isolation (across mental, physical, and moral vectors) drove:

• Bad decision making. The willingness to accept flawed intelligence on Iraq's WMD capabilities. The failure to stop the looting after the invasion. The decision to disband the Iraqi military. The failure to send enough troops.
• Ad hoc planning and strategy development. The lack of a plan to win the peace in the Iraq. The plethora of different military plans since then: build Sunni militias (Fallujah), stability for elections and a political solutions, aggressive counter-insurgent sweeps, clear-and-hold (oil-spots), etc.
• False or corrupt internal dialogues. An internal: Are you with us or against us? Democracy throughout the Middle East was the real goal of the US invasion. This is another Vietnam.

The Controlled Chaos Exit
The end result of this break-down in moral cohesion will be the following:

• A withdrawal within the next three years. The inevitable result of a collapse in US moral cohesion is a quick withdrawal. The pressure to leave will only increase.
• A reliance on "loyalist" paramilitaries. Despite the claims that Iraqi troops are capable of independent action, they aren't. While some few may be able to lead an engagement, they don't have any of the support systems necessary to sustain an army in the field (from medical to supply to air power). This support capability won't emerge before we leave since it takes many years to develop. This means that we will rely on Shiite and Kurdish paramilitaries to enforce the peace (we got a taste of what that means when the US raided the Badr Brigade's/Interior Ministry's torture chambers in November).
• The collapse of the Iraqi state and the spread of the conflict. The withdrawal of US forces will cause the Iraqi state to split. The Kurds will be the first to leave. An independent Kurdish state will inflame regional tensions through the activation of guerrilla groups in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. A slow burning war between Shiites and Sunnis will draw in regional powers and cause substantial instability in the Gulf Monarchies with large Shia populations. Finally, as Iraq's global guerrillas return home from the Iraqi training grounds, they will bring disruption with them.

SIZING THE IRAQI INSURGENCY

Here is my new estimate on the size of the Iraqi insurgency. It is available as a PDF download: How Big is the Iraqi Insurgency.pdf. I will likely convert it to a Web view at a later date.

VAN CREVELD'S PREDICTION

Iraq’s insurgency is made up of dozens of different groups, each with their own motivation for fighting. Under this big tent, no one group is dominant. Even the foreign Jihadis under Zarqawi are but a single digit percentage of the total insurgency. Despite this fragmentation, the insurgency appears to act as a single entity: it probes for weakness, improves its methods, and mounts campaigns. The major reason for this is that Iraq, unlike most of the places we have fought insurgencies, is a relatively modern urbanized environment. It has a cell phone grid, a modern highway system, and Internet connectivity. People have the ability to both communicate and travel quickly throughout the entire country. This high level of connectivity makes possible for the insurgency to combine and recombine into new organizational networks that are similar to what we only see in advanced western settings.

LONG TAIL COUNTER-INSURGENCY

The complexity of the threat posed by open source warfare in Iraq has accelerated the US military's use of outsourcing. The growing trend towards outsourcing military operations has created a new variant on the term, "a long tail." Traditionally, this term has been used to describe the number of support personnel (the tail) required to support combat troops (the tooth). Tooth-to-tail ratios have grown over the years as the complexity and resource intensity of modern combat has increased. In essence, modern warfare requires a loooong tail of support troops. The US military's tooth-to-tail ratio is approximately 1 to 10 (or more).

The modern variant of the "long tail" can be seen in the force structure of the US counter-insurgency effort in Iraq. This new tail is composed of 120,000 personnel in hundreds of large and small companies that provide everything from traditional support functions to reconstruction to security in Iraq. To be even more accurate, you could also throw in the tens of thousands of Shiite, Kurdish, and tribal militias that US troops rely upon.

If we plot the number of personnel by the source, the resulting curve has the classic long tail distribution pattern. The curve starts with the US military and rapidly drops off as additional groups are added. At the far right hand side of the curve are a plethora of small private military companies, tribal groups, and engineering companies that provide security and reconstruction services.

The good thing about the long tail approach to warfare in Iraq is that it provides a demand driven mechanism for dealing with a rapidly evolving threat. For example, the US State Department can hire private bodyguards from Triple Canopy to defend themselves against assassination and kidnapping (this means that they are not reliant on a bureaucratic US military for protection services and can therefore tailor their purchases to their specific needs). The bad part is that the US military hasn't come to grips with this new way of conducting war. It doesn't provide the platform services necessary to make it work efficiently (exactly what those platform services are will be detailed in my upcoming book).

Unfortunately, the lack of a platform, particularly in the form of legal cover for deployed PMCs, is about to unravel this distribution. The Iraqi government has started to regulate private military companies working in the country. Since the rules governing these personnel are still largely undefined, this regulatory effort will likely result in a distortion of the US military's counter-insurgency market due to rampant corruption and mismanagement by Iraqi authorities.

OPEN SOURCE WARFARE IN LONDON

The hunt for the perpetrators of the London attack is in full swing. The forensic evidence will be collected (including CCTV footage and Internet traffic), sifted, and analyzed over the next couple of weeks to identify the culprits and their origin. Unfortunately, what we may find is that this group had few, if any, direct ties to known al Qaeda entities. In fact, it is likely to be an operation accomplished completely by terrorist entrepreneurs that are using it to gain entry (through contribution) into al Qaeda.

INSIDE THE FALLUJAH TAZ

New data (4.3 Mb PowerPoint) from the US military on global guerrilla operations in Fallujah provides fresh detail on how the bazaar of violence in Iraq operates.  Here's what the US forces found:

• 11 improvised explosive device (IED) "factories."
• 653 unexploded IEDs.
• 203 weapons caches (graphic of the amounts of large munitions found).
• 3 hostage holding areas.

The data (and the map) indicates a very dispersed operation in Fallujah.  One explanation for this is that US airstrikes on guerrilla facilities in the city forced decentralization.  However, a more likely explanation given the available data on how the city was run indicates that the insurgency in Fallujah TAZ was a highly decentralized organization at the outset -- the dispersion of the facilities merely reflects this organizational style.  For example: each group likely had their own caches of weapons and/or a factory.

One final note on the centrality (or more precisely, the lack of centrality) of Fallujah.  The data shows that very few IEDs and IED materials were found (less than a month at the current run rate).  Obviously, many of the devices were removed prior to the assault for use in the multi-city counter-assaults that occurred.  However, even if we assume that each IED "factory start-up" produced a device every day (a generous assumption), the total production rate would be less than 1/4 of the current usage rate of 772 IEDs a month (half of the production ended up in inventory or were rejects/duds). 

IRAQ'S SECURITY SYSTEM MELTDOWN

The most important result of the reduction of the Fallujah TAZ was the decimation of Iraq's security.  From all perspectives, the global guerrilla campaign against the Iraqi security system has been an unqualified success. Here's how it rolled out:

• Pre-action preparation.  Hundreds of attacks, including high profile mass assasinations, have shaken the Iraqi security system to its core.  The net result:  50% attrition within Iraqi national guard groups.
• Test Failure.  In a crucial test of the battle readiness of Iraqi unit, they failed.  In the 24 hours prior to the attack on Fallujah, 100 of the remaining 425 men in Iraq's best-trained battalion, normally 850 men, headed for the hills.  The only troops that remained were reconstituted Kurdish pershmerga.
• Coup de grace.  Since then, attacks on Iraqi forces (mostly against the police, given the national guard has been gutted) have escalated across Sunni Iraq.  For example, attacks on multiple police stations in Mosul resulted in the scattering of ~5,000 policemen.  The commander was fired and there are reports of policemen switching sides.  This was repeated across Sunni Iraq.  Total policemen on-hand in Iraq dropped from 84,900 to 43,900 between August and October.

A Systemic Failure

Iraq's security system is currently in free-fall.  All the major elements underlying its potential for success have crumpled under pressure from global guerrillas (the total numbers of troops on hand have actually decreased since January 2004 -- see chart):

• A crisis in the state's legitimacy.  The interim Iraqi government, due to ongoing attacks on infrastructure, has been unable to deliver the basic services required to legitimatize the government.  Iraq is in failure and economic collapse.  The net result is that the state is required to rely on market factors to build its security system.
• Market failure.  The all-volunteer security model initially worked due to widespread unemployment (estimates are as high as 75%).  However, ongoing attacks have distorted the the employment equation.  A high probability of death or dismemberment is now part of the job description for positions in the police and national guard.  These troops stayed in place as long as things went well.  They have since proven they will melt away at the first sign of danger.  This market failure has thrown the Iraqi government back onto ethnic loyalties.
• Loyalist paramilitaries.  To fill the ranks, the Iraqi system attempted to build on the loyalty of Shiite and Kurdish fighters.  However, lukewarm support for the interim government by Shiites (at least until the elections) and the promise of tough fighting has left only the Kurds (reconstituted peshmerga) in the ranks. 

Globalization in Free Fall

The systemic failure of Iraqi security, creates the following situation:

• Ethinic passions on the rise.  The use of Kurdish fighters in both Fallujah and Mosul has exacerbated the insurgency. 
• The US in the hot seat.  Left with the security burden, the US is in a tough position.  Its firepower intensive tactics (force protection 2GW methods) are causing more damage to the Iraqi government's legitimacy than it provides.  Further, we also don't have the troops in country to even approximate what is needed to provide a modicum of basic security.
• Complete system failure.  This has set the stage for ongoing attacks by innovative guerrilla entrepreneurs on all other aspects of globalization in Iraq (people, resources, and investment).  The economy will remain in failure, as will the state.

TARGET: THE FALLUJAH TAZ

Fallujah is a TAZ.  A temporary autonomous zone that is being used by global guerrillas for regional operations.  It isn't a central hub of the insurgency, because there isn't any central hub.  The insurgency is a decentralized entity composed of many small networks that coordinate their activities through the open source bazaar.  A good definition of Fallujah (and other locations like south Wazirastan) is that it is:

• A lawless zone
• that is locally controlled and
• fiercely independent.

What a TAZ provides

A TAZ is not a major source of funding, manpower, or supply for the insurgency.  It doesn't power the insurgency at a root level.  It is merely a geographic zone that is free of state control -- an organic byproduct of a failed or weak state.  Global guerrillas find sanctuary in a TAZ because they fight the same enemy.  The state.  A TAZ provides:

• Basic shelter (housing, etc. that can be bought).
• Freedom of movement (it is a no-go zone for forces of the state).
• Open commerce (interconnections with other groups, trading, etc.)

Collapsing the TAZ

The current operation to take Fallujah pits US Marines (and their reconstituted Peshmerga and Badr Brigade allies) against local boys, organized by neighborhood, mosque, family, or tribe.  Most of the global guerrillas previously operating in the city are already gone.  However, some will stay for the fight (as payment for the support provided and/or due to a strong affection for the city's people).  The net result will be:

• A good fight.  The city is being defended by people that are fighting for their homes.  This isn't Najaf (which is often cited as the model for Fallujah), where the militia was bused in.  Think Grozny lite (to the limited extent that traditional Arab warfare can translate to siege warfare).
• Little damage to the insurgency.  Most of the people and equipment we want to kill or capture is already gone.  The US/Iraqi government telegraphed their desire to retake the city months ago.  Further, many other locations are available (the US does not have enough troops in country to make a full court press on every TAZ in Iraq).
• A moral loss.  The first target seized by the US military was Fallujah's hospital.  The reason:  to limit information (or disinformation) on the number of casualties generated by the firepower heavy Marine assault.  Despite this action, the media will deliver the moral message.  A weak force of local "freedom fighters" has been crushed by a powerful US military.  As a result, we will likelly see a Sunni boycott of the elections.

TERRORISM AS A TECHNIQUE

Terrorism is a technique of warfare grounded on the theories of fourth generation warfare and Boyd's framework of pscyhological conflict. As a technique of war, it is blunt weapon that directly assaults the enemy's society and the minds of its decision makers by killing its citizens. The wanton and random nature of the technique provides much of its strength and its weakness. Further, the method is limited to three vectors by which its effectiveness can be improved. These include:

• Scale improvements. Bigger attacks, better results.
  
• Symbol selection. The more dear the symbol atttacked, the greater the impact.
  
• Extended reach. The deeper inside a society's comfort zone a strike is made, the better the results.

Terrorism hits the wall
Al Qaeda adopted terrorism as its method of warfare when it first began operations. It improved the effectiveness of its strikes by pushing along the vectors outlined above. The end result of this effort was the attack on 9/11. That attack was the apex of conventional terrorism, only nuclear terrorism could exceed it. Without a nuclear alternative, terrorism is declining as a technique. There is reason to believe, based on strategic and theoretical analysis, that nuclear terrorism isn't likely to arrive in any relevant time period. If al Qaeda did have a nuke, it would have used it in that attack rather than method it chose. Additionally, the current emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation makes it very difficult to obtain one. Left without this alternative, terrorism is in decline due to the following (all of which are acutely felt by al Qaeda and affiliated groups):

• Diminished returns. People become inured to terrorism the more it is used.
  
• The comparision to 9/11. All attacks, when held up in comparison to 9/11, pale.
  
• Indecisive results. While 9/11 was able to gain a victory within Boyd's framework, it was unable to gain a decisive result that achieved the stated goals of al Qaeda. As a result of this perceived failure, al Qaeda intentionally opted for a rural insurgency in Afghanistan (that never materialized due to the emergence of a stable, decentralized, narco state alternative).

Post Terrorism Conflict
As a result of these factors, terrorism is in deep decline as a method of warfare. It won't disappear, particularly given its historical momentum and the fragmentation of the opposition's effort. However, it is in the process of being replaced by a more effective alternative mainly through a highly decentralized and innovative process of development in Iraq that has stripped al Qaeda of its control of the movement (despite its attempt to integrate Zaraqawi into its command and funding system). Within that conflict, global guerrilla warfare is on the rise. This method of warfare differs from from terrorism and classic guerrilla warfare because it attacks systems as a means of decisively undermining the psychology of its opponents. Its elements include:

• Infrastructure sabotage.
  
• Market disruption.
  
• State failure and deligitimization.

Epilogue
To the global guerrillas in Iraq, it may appear that they are participating in classic terrorism or guerrilla warfare since this new method of warfare draws on a similar tactical approach. However, the results of their efforts point in another direction. Almost all of the attacks in Iraq can be aggregated into categories of system attack that lay waste to the processes of globalization and state power. In contrast to terrorism, global guerrilla warfare is a greenfield technique -- in that it never suffers diminishing reutrns (I will post more on this later). It also converts the inevitable civilian casualties that often over time detract from terror's effectiveness into a more acceptable "collatoral damage" -- people that are killed while near valid targets (this is another lesson learned from the US military). The net result is an effort that is likely going to be decisive within Boyd's framework. It will win the war in Iraq (unless there is immediate action to counter it). It will also be a method of warfare that will be exported around the world.

LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES

Iraqi uniformed forces are being rapidly trained to fight the growing insurgency in the country. This effort is showing signs of failure. These include:

• A lack of government legitimacy. The Iraqi government appears to be a puppet of the US (for lack of a better term). It has also been unable to deliver basic services (for example: electricity and street level security) to the Iraqi people that are at the core of claims to legitmacy. Soldiers won't fight for an illegitimate government regardless of how well trained they are.
  
• A successful campaign of FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) by the guerrillas. Constant attacks against Iraqi forces (over 700 deaths this year) has driven up turnover (as high as 40% in some areas), adversely impacted recruiting, and forced Iraqi forces into a protective posture.
  
• Infiltration. Evidence is mounting that the low level of due diligence in the recruitment of Iraqi forces has resulted in force riven with insurgent sympathisers.

The Latin American Solution
The secret sauce of US counter-insurgency efforts in the post-Vietnam era are loosely controlled loyalist paramilitaries. This policy option is now very likely under consideration given the recent appointment of John Dimitri Negroponte as the Ambassador to Iraq. Negroponte was the Ambassador of Honduras during the establishment of the Contras and other Central American paramilitaries. These units enjoy multiple advantages over uniformed forces including:

• Legitimacy and loyalty. Unlike the uniformed Iraqi forces, militias draw on tribal, ethnic, and religious loyalties. Close knit units can be formed on the basis on long-standing relationships. This increases their ability to fight.
  
• Rapid ramp-up. These militias require little formal training. They can quickly leverage existing relationships and lines of loyalty to build units.
  
• Effectiveness. Decentralized militias have a record of effectiveness. They innovate rapidly and can draw on the same sources of strength available to global guerrillas.

Unleashing the Genie
The establishment of a counter-bazaar of loyalist paramilitaries in Iraq would quickly put the insurgency on the defensive. Over the next year, their establishment would likely result in a level of "controlled chaos" sufficient to allow the US to withdraw its forces. Additionally, these militias could operate while the government maintains a fig leaf of democracy. However, there are some negative consequences we can expect if this option is selected. These include:

• Institutionalized corruption. These militias would likely involve themselves in illegal activities. A government abetted franchise for their counter-insurgency activities would require inaction in regards to their criminal actions.
  
• Human rights abuses. These militias will operate within the same rule set used by the guerrillas they are fighting. This means assassinations, hostage taking, etc.
  
• Long term instability. While the militias will be able to put a lid on the growth of the insurgency, they will likely be unable to eradicate it. This means that Iraq will be stable enough for the US to leave but will suffer long-term instability.

NOTE: This is not an endorsement of this option, it is merely a exploration of what is possible.

GLOBAL GUERRILLAS AND TEMPORARY AUTONOMOUS ZONES

Like pirates of the past (particularly those of the 1st century BC and 18th century), global guerrillas operate from geographically dispersed locations. These locations are sanctuaries of convenience on a global scale. Examples include:

• Failed and collapsed states. GGs are able to establish mobile operations centers (Sudan and Afghanistan) and generate new sources of funding (opium in Afghanistan and oil "bunkering" in Nigeria) within these vacuums of authority.
  
• Zones of chaotic organic order. Negotiated relationships with tribesmen in Waziristan (Pakistan), have provided security, intelligence, and supplies for GG groups. In Fallujah (Iraq), GGs have used a collapse of state authority and the subsequent rise of organic Islamic order to provide cover for cells.
  
• The Internet. The size and structure of the Internet provides virtual sanctuary. The Internet provides the glue that links groups that operate within the ancient modes of organic order -- religious, tribal, etc. -- that form the backbone of the physical world sanctuary, with the modern world's operational environment. However, the Internet is more than merely a communications medium, it is a place of sanctuary in itself.

The TAZ
Global guerrillas do not require extensive logistical structures. Their units are small, fleet, and adaptable. Despite this, they are able to inflict extensive damage by leveraging the power of networks and markets. Most GG activity is accomplished within the confines of "controlled" areas (that's where the targets are), however, much of the long term planning and training occurs within temporary autonomous zones (TAZs) -- areas beyond the control of the global nation-state system. GGs can "manufacture" TAZ sanctuaries as needed from any location that exhibits a vacuum of global order. These places provide staging grounds for offensive operations in "controlled" areas. The elimination of TAZs will be a long-run problem for nation-states. Unfortunately, military solutions can work against progress by creating a TAZ where none existed before (example: Fallujah). Here are some ideas on how to approach the problem:

• Rapidly shifting locations. Entrepreneurial guerrillas are quick to take advantage of new opportunities for sanctuary when they arise. A partial solution is to avoid the creation of power vacuums via failed or collapsed states whenever possible (example: Iraq). A failed/collapsed state is worse than a rogue state. Economic and other non-military support structures need to be strengthened to prevent state failure.
  
• Locations that resist interdiction. Remote, hostile territory makes rapid response difficult. Nation-states require significant periods of time to work through the complexities (mostly political) necessary to neutralize these locations.
  
• Diversity. Again the theme of "strength through diversity" is apparent. There isn't any single formula for eliminating TAZs. Each location requires an unique effort.

AL QAEDA'S STRUCTURE

The recent arrests of al Qaeda operatives reveals more about their current organizational structure. What emerges is a highly redundant organization that reveals few weaknesses. It's important to note that this represents only bin Laden's portion of the growing number of ventures that now call themselves "al Qaeda." Here's the overview of a proposed structure:

• A core that controls broad strategic direction and financing. This core group (bin Laden and Zawahiri) are buffered by a layered courier network.
  
• Portfolio managers, key financiers, and communications nodes. The portfolio managers control multiple cells that conduct operations in a given region. Financiers manage cash flows and connections to funding sources. There are few connections between any two at this level (control of financing is a key attribute of bin Laden's power in the network). Most connectivity is downward to the next level. Communications nodes manage Internet connectivity for high flow information sharing (mostly for intelligence moving upward, moderate flow for operations/plans).
  
• Entrepreneurs, Finance admin, Intelligence, and Operations (in aggregate mid-level management). These people manage sparse cells. Entrepreneurs have a high degree of latitude. They can opt for other sources of financing to gain independence (or start their own portfolio). These cells are run in parallel, redundant, and are limited in scope (all of which aids robustness).
  
• Foot soldiers and administrative support. These people are drawn from a virtually bottomless pool of ad hoc members. Connections are based on personal relationships (previous face-to-face experience) with entrepreneurs and other mid-level management.
  
• Family and sympathetic supporters. These people are added ad-hoc based on the needs of individuals in the next layer up. Strong personal connections are key here. This pool is the source of recruitment for higher levels.

FAILED STATES vs. ROGUE STATES

The key focus of our current strategy is the elimination of rogue states. The benefits include an eradication of state supported terrorism and the capacity to produce WMDs (bio and nuclear). The method we have chosen (in Iraq and Afghanistan) is to force these weak rogue states into failure/collapse. Unfortunately, as we have found, failed states are extremly difficult to reconstitute, particularly given new mechanisms like the bazaar of violence.

The question we should ask is: "is a failed state better than a rogue state?" Given failed states are unlikely to produce WMDs, this answer is yes. However, failed states are decidedly superior to rogue states in their ability to spawn, nurture, and support global guerrillas. This would be akin to a focus on WW2's endgame (Hiroshima) while ignoring everything that went on between 1939 and 1945.

Failed states provide unrestricted training grounds for multiple global guerrilla groups. They offer numerous financial opportunities (for example, half of Afghanistan's GDP is opium -- in contrast to the anti-drug Taliban). Global guerrillas are unbounded by rogue state policies and are free to innovate. Internal violence can accelerate recruitment and the development of tactical innovations. Unrestricted borders allow global guerrillas to infiltrate adjacent states (and given ubiquitous air transportation, everywhere in the world).

Failed states will provide the perfect platforms for the destabilization of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt.

NETWORK ANALYSIS TO PREVENT ATTACKS

A trademark of al Qaeda global operations is extensive prior preparation. Many of the larger operations have taken years to execute. This build-up period presents counter-terrorists with the opportunity to unearth potential members of the operational cell well prior to the "h-hour of the op." These early discoveries, if handled correctly can lead to the members of the rest of the operational network. Unfortunately, most of our security systems are geared towards the immediate arrest and detention of suspects, once identified. A smarter approach would be identify, observe, and act (only when a critical mass of the network is identified) -- very much like that used by financial or organized crime investigations. Perversely, new powers that enable law enforcement to arrest and detain suspected terrorists at will, with the hope of pressuring confessions in detention, works against us.

Valdis Krebs (an extremely talented analyst of terrorist networks -- which matters a lot in a field that is as much mindset as method) demonstrates this in a new article that details how the 9/11 network could have been unearthed based on the early 2000 discovery of 2 cell members (see -- Krebs, "Connecting the Dots"). In his example, he demonstrates how the careful tracking of connections between potential members -- money flows, e-mail/phone contact, and potential face-to-face contact -- can be mapped using social network analysis. Ties to known terrorists convert a suspected network into an active one. Connections of connections identify emerging network "leadership."

Action against the network should only be taken if a critical number of members have been identified (evidenced by diminishing returns from further investigation) or there is a sign of impending attack. These signs include:

• Increased activity in the network. Networks are dynamic and the rate of connection activation is a critical data point.
  
• Reversal of money flows. This happens when excess funds not needed for an operation are removed for protection from post operation arrests.
  
• Large face-to-face meetings of key members. A meetings are infrequent (they may only occur once) to prevent discovery but are necessary for pre-action coordination. A "pulsed" face-to-face meeting is a significant signal of impending attack.

A CORPORATE SUPERPOWER?

In my first post on the growth of PMCs (private military companies), I outlined their current lack of legal status and the potential for disaster downstream if it isn't addressed. In this post, I look at the reasons and potential implications of the spectacular growth of PMCs in Iraq.

The occupation of Iraq represents a turning point for the use of PMCs. Traditionally, PMCs have been used in the small, dirty conflicts that fall below the radar of the great powers. In Iraq, PMCs are directly involved and play a major part in the world's most important conflict. Here is the current state of affairs in Iraq:

• PMCs currently employ 15,000 security personnel (estimates are as high as 20,000). They represent the second largest military force in Iraq, behind the US. As Peter Singer says, "it is a coalition of the billing."
• PMCs are funded by a combination of the DoD and private contractors. Between 10-25% of expenditures on reconstruction efforts is spent on PMC security forces.
• PMC security is expensive. It costs upwards of $2,000 a day for an experienced security guard in Iraq. This high pay has recruited some of the best soldiers in the world drawn from units such as Delta, the Seals, and the SAS. This has caused a reversal, more SAS trained personnel currently serve in UK PMCs than in the SAS itself (this is also probably true for Delta and the Seals too).

The role of PMCs in Iraq has grown quickly over the last year, much more quickly than anticipated by the DoD planners for the occupation. This is due to a unique combination of drivers, which are:

• There is an insufficient number of uniformed forces in Iraq. A lack of sufficient allied support and an unwillingness (as well as an inability given that 8 out of 10 US ground divisions are currently allocated to rotation in Iraq) of the US to commit more forces to Iraq has created a vacuum of need.
• The perception that casualties among PMCs employees are more politically palatable than those of US soldiers. This has proven true in the past and is proving true in Iraq on the whole. However, as the murder and mutilation of 4 PMC employees in Fallujah demonstrates, this assumption can backfire under the right circumstances.
• PMC forces are easily scaled due to the power of free market economics. The huge sums allocated to the reconstruction of Iraq is funding the demand. In terms of supply, the large pool of available personnel (40 years of cold war training) as well as the number of PMC entrepreneurs assembling forces is proving limitless.

PMC usage in Iraq will not go away, it will continue to grow quickly if the threat scenario continues to remain grim (if the threat situation increases beyond current limits, there will be a retrenchment phase as reconstruction contractors reevaluate their positions). Here's what this means over the long-run:

• An increasingly chaotic occupation effort if left unchanged. The incident involving Blackwater Security personnel in Fallujah is a harbinger of future problems. PMC forces are not, by and large, directly part of the US command structure in Iraq. They operate independently without much coordination between themselves and the US military. The chaos this creates will complicate US policy in Iraq. Current ad hoc efforts at coordination may yield improvement. This process needs to be formalized quickly in order to head off disasters in the future.
• As the chaos in Iraq spreads to adjoining countries, PMC growth will widen to protect the interests of multinational corporations and nation-states in jeopardy. The strong growth of new terrorist cells and guerrilla organizations in Iraq will likely not constrain their operations to Iraq. The chaos seen there will spread to adjoining countries (the gulf monarchies in particular) which will increase the demand for PMC services.
• The current alignment between US policy and the PMC industries objectives will break down. The US policy objective is to see the spread of global peace (which would result in the elimination of the need for PMCs). In contrast, the PMC industry is driven by an increase in instability. Aligning these contrasting desires is going to be one of the greatest policy issues of the 21st century.

MERCENARIES UNBOUND

Private military services are big business. Currently, there are hundreds of firms that generate over $100 b a year in revenue (about 1/4 of the entire US military budget, and if taken in aggregate the second largest military in the world) and is growing at many times the rate of the DoD (Department of Defense).

PMCs (private military corporations) are central to the US effort in Iraq. With between 15,000 PMC (Update: 20,000) mercenaries in Iraq, they represent the second largest allied military force in theater. They are also used extensively in hot spots across the world (over 50 countries). Given this widespread use, large size, and the sensitive nature of their services; it is surprising that the industry is relatively free of regulation. P.W. Singer (author of Corporate Warriors), wrote an essay on the law and PMCs called, "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Private Military Firms and International Law" (PDF). In the essay he provides a concise overview of the current laws that relate to PMCs:

• There is little local control. All but few states have few statutes that even recognize PMC's exist. If a nation puts too much pressure on a firm, it can simply shop nations for a permissive environment in which to base (example: Executive Outcomes). In fact, all the mechanisms typically used multi-nationals to avoid taxation or labor/environmental regulations are available to PMCs to avoid oversight. For those states in which PMCs typically operate, the legal structures and political environments are too weak to challenge PMC usage and practices (case in point is the bad behavior of Dyncorp employees in Bosnia).
• There are few international controls. International conventions/laws propose a restrictive test for mercenary status (which is easy to circumvent via legal means). Further, the corporate nature of current mercenary efforts makes legal action against individual employees doubtful, particulary when the corporation is sanctioned by a state (corporations working in Iraq are sanctioned by the US State Department). Singer sums it up: "The general result is that, contrary to common belief, a total ban on mercenaries does not exist in international law. More importantly, the existing laws do not adequately deal with the full variety of private military actors. That is, they are specifically aimed at only the individuals working against national governments or politically recognized movements of national liberation."

Over the long-run, there will be a regulatory regime to regulate PMCs. The most likely location for an oversight body will be in the UN (which will determine whether a PMC is sanctioned or not according to conventions). Additionally, enforcement will likely be done by national governments in support of the world court. This improvements to the existing control system will likely consist of:

• Standards of conduct and quality. This will require audits.
• Rules for the treatment of PMC employees if captured. A Geneva convention for UN sanctioned PMCs is in order.
• Rules on when PMCs may be employed. This difficult subject will require substantial negotiation by all parties.
  

Until these rules are adopted and enforced globally, there is the potential of severe problems. These include:

• The trial and execution of PMC employees for war crimes (they are not protected by the Geneva conventions). This is very likely to occur in Iraq.
• Gross misconduct by untrained, unqualified PMC personnel in a war zone.
• The establishment and operation of PMCs that operate against the international community of nations.

DESTABILIZING TERRORIST NETWORKS

Counter-terrorist forces (Mossad, CIA, DoD, etc.) routinely use assassination to disrupt terrorist networks. However, despite the apparent success of this approach (moral and propoganda), experience indicates that this technique is not very effective. Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda have proven to be extremely resiliant despite attempts at "decapitation."

The reasons for this are complex but understandable. Let's dive into this topic by first listing what organizational/network disruption means. Kathleen Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt in their paper "Destabilizing Networks" propose a well constructed set of criteria:

• The rate of information flow through the network has been reduced (perhaps to zero).
• The network, as a decision making body, cannot reach a consensus.
• The ability of the network to accomplish tasks is impaired.

However, evidence indicates that terrorist networks aren't susceptable to these measures of disruption due to leadership removal. The reason is that in a distributed terrorist network, intra-networking between emergent leaders radically reduces the impact of leadership removal. The removal of leadership from a distributed network is rapidly repaired. The reasons for this are:

• Redundant design. Existing leadership ofthen suppresses emergent leaders by acting as gatekeepers. If leadership is removed, emergent leaders quickly ascend to central positions by "turning on" connections that are already in place.
• Meta-matrix design. Distributed networks are actually composed of a meta-matrix of networks -- networks for information transfer, knowledge sharing, task completion, etc. This layered approach network design reduces the impact of removal of leadership from the social network alone.



• Dynamic design. Relationships in the network aren't dictated by assigned hierarchical relationships, rather they are based on a complex panoply of factors that are constantly changing. Therefore, the structure of the network is in constant flux in response to learning and adaptation by the individual nodes.

This analysis indicates that assassination isn't effective in disrupting terrorist networks. The belief that it will have a disruptive impact may be due to the "mirror imaging" of counter-terrorists that work in hierarchical networks. In fact, leadership removal may make the network more opaque to future analysis given the emergence of new leadership that may not be known.