John Robb's Weblog

Future Salon

I am going to give a presentation on the collapse of Globalization 1.0 at the Future Salon on Friday in Palo Alto. It's an open conference, please check it out.

Abducting Entire Offices

Iraq: new trend, abducting entire offices of employees and not just people off-site.

Fukuyama Recants

Fukuyama interview: "we have unleashed the maelstrom"

He and I parted ways intellectually with Iraq, likely because I know more about warfare than he does. Nice to see him come back into the real world.

Of course, I might have been blinded by the rhetoric, Kunstler hits it between the eyes: At the highest level of public discourse, the cluelessness is shocking. The New York Times Sunday Book Review ran a front-page piece yesterday on Francis Fukuyama's latest salvo, America at the Crossroads, which is largely about our Middle East war policy, without once using the word "oil." The reviewer, Paul Berman, is not a dummy, but he has evidently flown up the national rectum with the rest of the people who are paid to think in our society. To these guys, the whole issue is an effete argument over strategic fashions such as "realistic Wilsonianism."

Lara Logan

Very cool clip by Lara Logan from CBS on the validity of the press coverage from Iraq. She's right on the money. Why we are still trying to "shoot the messenger" is beyond me. It's getting to the point where I wonder if the people making the charges are even remotely sane.

The Economist Needs An Expert

Correction to the Economist on Iraq: Three years after America and its few allies invaded Iraq, the incident illustrates one or two features of the war that continues there. America's 138,000 troops in Iraq, already adept and courageous conventional fighters, are much improved at fighting irregularly. This is a benefit of experience: half the marines in Ramadi, aged about 21 on average, are on their second six-month tour of Iraq, and some are on their third. It is also the result of improved tactics and technology. American snipers, hidden on rooftops above main intersections and other likely spots for roadside bombs, known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), have killed scores of bombers in recent months. New jammers, fitted on to American vehicles, can counteract some remote triggers for IEDs, forcing bombers to revert to cruder and riskier devices, such as command-wires. The Americans now reckon that they foil about 40% of IEDs. If they had done their homework, they would have found that this percentage is down from 50%.

In nearby Abu Ghraib, amid shady date palms and well-watered fields, a group of Sunni farmers claims that many of their relatives had been killed by Shia assassins within the police. Such tales are no doubt exaggerated. Yet, at a time of appalling sectarian tension, many Sunnis seem to believe them. I don't think they are watching the flow at the morgues (see previous post).

The Window of Controlled Chaos is Now Closed

Jeffrey Gettleman has the details. The cycle of revenge will continue to escalate -- Zarqawi pulled it off (he's likely off to Jordan now, his job in Iraq is done). Here's a likely scenario: US troops, caught between a government that has outsourced security to militias and the guerrillas, will hide by entrenching themselves in their bases. That won't help. There will be attempts at intervention to prevent wholesale slaughter, but these events will only increase tensions with the militias. Eventually, these militias in combination with the guerrillas will cut supply lines to US bases. Unable to function, there will be an attempt at a belated withdrawal. It won't be pretty.

The Battle for Baghdad

Independent: Many Iraqi leaders now believe that civil war is inevitable but it will be confined, at least at first, to the capital and surrounding provinces where the population is mixed. "The real battle will be the battle for Baghdad where the Shia have increasing control," said one senior official who did not want his name published. "The army will disintegrate in the first moments of the war because the soldiers are loyal to the Shia, Sunni or Kurdish communities and not to the government." He expected the Americans to stay largely on the sidelines.

3 Things About ETAs Collapse

One: Catalonia. Plausible promise potentially realizable.
Two: Classic failure to adapt. Was actually fighting drug traffickers rather than embracing the transnational business opportunity. Failure to adopt systems disruption in a sustained way.
Three: Secretive hierarchy. Failure to seed and support other groups.

Venezuela

Sam Logan: By the end of 2007, it is quite possible that a total of two million Chavez supporters will have been trained and reinserted back into their normal lives, ready to resist at a moment’s notice. It is highly unlikely that this militia will be called to protect Venezuela from an outside invader... A civil war in Venezuela would be intense, extremely destructive, and spell doom for the future of Venezuela’s economy, society, and oil output. Due to the nature of asymmetrical warfare, it would be nearly impossible to completely eradicate a group of dedicated and trained Chavez supporters.

Two 20-year Wars

TO: THE objectives of the British mission to Afghanistan could take as long as 20 years to achieve, according to a confidential Ministry of Defence briefing seen by The Sunday Times. The same is true for Iraq.