Correction to the Economist on Iraq: Three years after America and its few allies invaded Iraq, the incident illustrates one or two features of the war that continues there. America's 138,000 troops in Iraq, already adept and courageous conventional fighters, are much improved at fighting irregularly. This is a benefit of experience: half the marines in Ramadi, aged about 21 on average, are on their second six-month tour of Iraq, and some are on their third. It is also the result of improved tactics and technology. American snipers, hidden on rooftops above main intersections and other likely spots for roadside bombs, known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), have killed scores of bombers in recent months. New jammers, fitted on to American vehicles, can counteract some remote triggers for IEDs, forcing bombers to revert to cruder and riskier devices, such as command-wires. The Americans now reckon that they foil about 40% of IEDs. If they had done their homework, they would have found that this percentage is down from 50%.
In nearby Abu Ghraib, amid shady date palms and well-watered fields, a group of Sunni farmers claims that many of their relatives had been killed by Shia assassins within the police. Such tales are no doubt exaggerated. Yet, at a time of appalling sectarian tension, many Sunnis seem to believe them. I don't think they are watching the flow at the morgues (see previous post).
Have you read the article on Mosul in the latest Atlantic? I'd be interested in your take on it. (If you don't subscribe, this is only a teaser... http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200604/coming-normalcy)
Posted by: David Lewis | March 26, 2006 at 06:22 PM